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This thesis is informed by post 9/11 global security environment. It examines 
how Kenya has responded to terrorism threat from Al-Shabaab and the basis of its 
strategies. The study aimed at a critical analysis of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) 
strategies in Kenya. The specific objectives were to discuss the philosophy of Global 
War on Terror, investigate terrorism as a conflict in transition, examine CVE in War 
on Terror, and explore responses to terrorism in Kenya. To achieve this objective, the 
study posed research question on basis of CVE strategies in Kenya, and whether they 
can succeed if mediated by use of force. The study reflects on a framework of analysis 
which framed Global War on Terror as the independent variable influencing national 
security strategies by states. Accordingly, the central assumption of the study is that 
contemporary national security strategies by states are informed by global WoT 
framework. Methodologically, the study collected primary and secondary data. 
Primary data was collected through personal interviews from respondents in the field 
of Counter Terrorism and CVE. Secondary data was collected through documentary 
analysis of literature on CVE in Kenya. Data collected was analyzed through narrative 
and content analysis. Analysis and interpretation of data collected established that 
CVE strategies in Kenya are facing challenges which are related to how they are 
captured from the premise of the global War on Terror framework. The study 
recommends that the philosophy of War on Terror in framing CVE strategies, is not 
applicable locally. It is shrouded with narratives that perceive the problem as an 
external rather than internal problem. CVE strategies in Kenya need to be 
homegrown, flexible and customized to local contexts to capture the transitional 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1 Background to the study 
Events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) in US heralded a turning point in global 
security environment. They prompted new understanding of security with emphasis 
on non-state actors and power diffusion.1 In 1970s, scholars in conflict studies had 
challenged classical Realist thought that considered domestic politics as distinct from 
international politics.2 It was evident that distinction between domestic conflicts and 
international conflict had blurred. 9/11 underscored realities that violent extremism 
was borderless and groups like Al-Qaeda were rapidly transforming with globalized, 
regionalized and localized networks/franchises to pursue their causes.3 
 In response to these attacks, US declared and began global War on Terror 
(WoT), characterized by use of force. This approach used military power and 
strategies like coercive diplomacy and sanctions.4 US rallied states to join in this war; 
it is either ‘you are with us or against us’.5 However, as WoT continued, terrorist 
groups held ground. This was further compounded by emergence of homegrown, lone 
wolves and foreign fighters travelling to theatres of war like Iraq, Syria and Somalia. 
It was realized that use of force was reactive, causing anger, frustration and 
radicalization. The military approach was considered counterproductive since it could 
not win hearts and minds, which was key in WoT. To address these shortcomings, 
focus shifted to proactive measures that sought to address underlying factors, prevent 
violent extremism and promote resilience in the societies. These later Counter Violent 
Extremism (CVE) measures focused on use of soft power approaches and entail co-
opting people rather than coercing them.6 
                                                          
1 Richards, Julian. The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis.: Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2010 
2 Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. Transnational Relations and World Politics. (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press.1972) 
3 Hoffman Bruce. “The Changing Face of Al-Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism”, Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, 27:6 (2004): pp.549-560,  
4 Coronado, J. P. Between Soft Power and a Hard Place: Dilemmas of the Bush Doctrine for Inter-
American Relations. Journal of Developing Societies, 21(3-4), (2005): pp.321-335. 
5 See transcript of President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Thursday Night, 
September 20, 2001," CNN, 21 September 2001.   
6 Nye Jr., J. S. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”. The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 616(1), 2008: 94-109. 
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Like other states, Kenya first responded to terrorism through the military 
means. For instance, Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) made incursion into Somalia in 
2011. Its aim was to uproot the enemy from the source once and for all.7 The enemy 
as perceived to from external. Al-Shabaab, being a non-state actor could not respond 
to the military means to achieve their aims. The group strategically retreated to the 
drawing board and re-examined its survival options and strategy. This retreat gave 
birth to strategic shift in its strategy for Kenya, by introducing radicalization and 
recruitment of Kenyan youth. The enemy ‘without’ metamorphosed into an enemy 
‘within’.  
These dynamics made Kenya to re-calibrate its responses to CVE, particularly 
to deal with the homegrown threat. The CVE strategy was thus incorporated alongside 
military strategies. It is that way since then. Adoption military-CVE duality-strategy 
in Kenya raises critical policy and empirical questions. Military and CVE strategies 
have conflicting ends. The latter seeks to win hearts and minds, but the former 
undermines this very praxis. Mediating CVE with a military strategy raises critical 
policy and empirical questions, particularly the proper criteria of validity of CVE 
strategies. There is little information to illuminate along these lines. This study sought 
to reach deeper insights into philosophy, context and rationale of CVE strategies in 
Kenya.  
1.2 Statement of research problem 
Post 9/11 exemplifies a changed security environment with new kind of 
threats. There is profound dissonance about the identity and implications of these 
threats. Debates have raged about the strategic responses required, attendant 
institutions needed for these responses, and timelines for effective response. Whereas 
Cold War’s enemy was easy to identify, analyze and respond to, contemporary 
terrorism defies this frame. Terrorism presents an asymmetric, amorphous and 
borderless threat that is ever evolving. Despite this such realities, many states respond 
to terrorism through the cold war framework: through use of force. WoT is the 
dominant contemporary framework that has anchored national security policies of 
many states, especially in regard to terrorism threat.  
                                                          
7 Mwagiru, Makumi. The War on Terror, Somalia and AMISOM Revisited, In Mwagiru, Makumi. The 
Three Anthems and Other Essays (Nairobi: Three Legs Consortium) 2018. Chap 25. 
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As currently framed and conceptualized, WoT does not take cognizance of 
evolving, asymmetric, amorphous and borderless character of the threat confronting 
states. It is still fixated with rigid state-centric lens. Whereas the enemy is 
asymmetric, WoT is still caged in symmetric realms. If the war is fought like 
asymmetrical one, it will have serious implications on national security. First, it is 
defectively framed as a war. This ‘war’ seems not to be bound by peacetime-wartime 
frames; it runs in perpetuity.8 Wartime has become the only kind of time states have. 
This raises questions of feasibility of this war, ethic and citizenry support. Nine years 
since Kenya made a military incursion into Somalia, the war has no end in sight. A 
war with no end for Kenya is by no means sustainable; economically, social-
politically, morally or otherwise.  
A closer scrutiny of underlying conditions of this threat, nature, causes, 
contestations, and plausible responses point to structural and cultural dimensions.9 
The issues border on concerns of peace and conflict management. This begs the 
question why terrorism is not analyzed within frameworks of peace and conflict 
management. Terrorism epitomizes a struggle for a cause: a form of conflict. Given 
volatility of operating environment, terrorism is ever metamorphosing. It is a conflict 
in transition characterized by complex peculiarities, that makes it challenging to 
respond to. As the conflict goes on, actors involved are strategically changing their 
offensive and defensive tools and strategies.10 Responding to a mutating conflict is a 
daunting task because of its changing character, actors involved and lack of necessary 
conditions for successful negotiations, most critical being a mutually hurting 
stalemate.11  
Terrorism threat continues despite responses by states. It seems that responses 
have not captured the conflict at its moments. This study attributes this failure to 
state-centric and security analytical lenses to terrorism problem. The underlying 
conditions of terrorism conflict are structural. They can be examined through conflict 
management frameworks. The frameworks offer plausible avenues to address direct 
                                                          
8 Dudziak Mary L. Wartime: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences. NY: Oxford University Press. 
2013 
9 Navin A. Bapat. “The Escalation of Terrorism: Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict, 
International Interactions, 40:4 (2014), 568-578, 
10 Reidy, Ken. "Benevolent Radicalization: An Antidote to Terrorism." Perspectives on Terrorism 13, 
No. 4: (2019) 1-13.  
11 Marina Ottaway. "Mediation in a Transitional Conflict: Eritrea". The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science. 518: [1991] 69-81. 
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violence like a terrorist attack and underlying structural issues in which it is 
embedded. Such an analyzing has profound implications on terrorism study, 
especially potential responses. This study proposes peace and conflict management 
frameworks to re-examine terrorism threat and attendant response strategies.  
CVE is suggested as remedy the problem. It is conceptualized as the domain 
of soft approaches to influence others to obtain desired outcomes.12 Conceptually, 
CVE focuses on addressing underlying root causes that drive violent extremism. It 
seeks to win the hearts and minds of targeted individuals.  In Kenya, CVE strategies 
are shrouded with narratives that perceive the problem to be external rather than 
internal. The problem of homegrown radicalization is not properly conceived and 
appreciated. There is also a problem with availability of information on realities of 
local CVE contexts in Kenya. Even where such knowledge exists, policies and 
practices are not grounded on it. Equally, participation and engagement of other 
players like the public, civil society, private sector and academic is still a mirage. 
Appreciating on of local contexts in Kenya is necessary for appropriate CVE policies 
and practice. 
This study looks beyond the comfortable platitudes of generalized descriptions 
of CVE strategies for its own sake. It problematizes CVE theory and practice in 
Kenya.  There is need to establish what works and does not, and why. The study 
responds to the research questions whether CVE strategies can succeed if they are 
mediated by a military strategy. In other words, ascertain the proper criteria of 
validity for CVE strategies in Kenya. There is little information on interplay of CVE 
strategies in Kenya and the attendant dynamics. It is on this basis that the researcher 
sets out to reach a better understanding of CVE strategies in Kenya. Such insight is 
critical in appreciating the philosophy, context and rationale of CVE strategies in the 
country.  
1.3 Research objectives 
The main objective of study was critical analysis of counter violent extremism 
strategies in Kenya. Specific objectives of study were to; 
a. Discuss the philosophy of Global War on Terror,  
b. Investigate terrorism as a conflict in transition,  
c. Examine Counter Violent Extremism in War on Terror, 
                                                          
12 Nye Jr., Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, pp.94-109 
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d. Explore responses to terrorism in Kenya. 
1.4 Research assumptions  
This study argues that contemporary national security policies by states are 
informed by global War on Terror. The ensuing strategies derive from the same 
praxis. This study therefore hypothesizes that: 
a. Counter Terrorism approaches of global War on Terror have shaped Counter 
Terrorism Strategies by states, 
b. Counter/Preventing Violent Extremism approaches of global War on Terror 
have shaped CVE / PVE strategies by states. 
1.5 Scope, limitations and significance of the study 
1.5.1 Scope of the study  
Fieldwork was conducted on diverse dates between 1st March 2020 and 20th 
March 2020, regarding CVE strategies in Kenya. This was informed by temporal 
constraints and objectives of the study. Geographically, the scope of the study entailed 
the entire area under the jurisdiction and boundaries of Kenyan territory. To achieve 
its objective, interviews were conducted Nairobi with senior government officials 
responsible for formulation and implementation of CVE strategies in Kenya, 
particularly within security agencies. Nairobi was chosen due to its convenience in 
meeting the identified target population of the study. Security agencies were chosen 
because they make crucial contribution in CVE processes in Kenya.  
1.5.2 Limitations of the study  
The study met a few challenges beyond its control. Some of these limitations 
include constraints in time and funds, and inability of some respondents to stick to 
interview timetable. To mitigate these constraints, the researcher endeavored to work 
within the work plan and budget to prudently work within the timelines and available 
budget resources. To address the challenges of inability of some respondents to stick 
to interview timetable, the researcher allowed for flexibility and rescheduling of 
interviews.  
1.5.3 Significance of the study  
The findings of this research study will inform CVE policy in Kenya. 
Specifically, the findings will be of significant interest to National Security Council 
(NSC), National Counter Terrorism Centre, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of 
6 
Interior and Coordination of National Government Kenya among others in helping 
them understand issues revolving homegrown violent extremism threat and how to 
overcome it. This will enable them to formulate appropriate policies that match the 
changing security environment to address terrorism. Non-governmental organizations 
and private sector will also find this study useful in formulating grassroot 
development policies which addresses some of issues raised.  
This study will also be of interest to law enforcement agencies. These include 
National Police Service, National Counter Terrorism Centre and Kenya Defence 
Forces among others. With a better understanding of violent extremism threat picture, 
they alongside other stakeholders in this sector, can determine the actions required, 
who needs to do what, and when, to effectively achieve the desired results. 
Stakeholders can assess their strengths and weaknesses to chart out path for 
improvement. This assessment helps to promote synergy, collaboration and increased 
focus on the issues identified thereby increasing effectiveness in countering violent 
extremism.  
This study will also provide a benchmark to which other researchers can base 
their study on this subject. It will make contributions towards filling gaps in the 
availability of sustainable literature on CVE strategies in the country, and their 
interface with realities of security machinery. It will be a reference for future 
researchers on related topics. Certainly, this study will stimulate and provoke further 
studies and debates among the academicians and researchers working in the field of 
violent extremism and terrorist groups at large. 
1.6 Literature review 
The review of literature is grouped under four main sub-headings namely; 
understanding terrorism, War on Terror, terrorism as a conflict in transition, and 
emergence of CVE in War on Terror. 
1.6.1 Understanding terrorism 
 A key theoretical lacuna in conceptualization of terrorism is difficulty in its 
definition. Terrorism is a contested concept. Its many definitions wrought with 
subjectivity. The phenomenon is not causally coherent or autonomous to be solely 
conceptualized as violence itself.13 Terrorism is not all about a violent act.14 It is 
                                                          
13 Jackson, Richard. "The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and 
Future Developments". Political Studies Review. 7 (2):2009: 171-184. 
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rather a phenomenon with cultural and political meanings. These connotations are 
symbolic and only understood with social agreement or a range of intersubjective 
practices.15 What is common among definitions of terrorism is that it entails threat of 
or use of force and violence to achieve underlying ideology, political end or objective.  
 The other contestation is about who commits acts of terrorism. Two schools of 
thought emerge. The first one associates acts of terrorism to groups like Al-Qaeda, 
Islamic State, Taliban, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. This viewpoint mirrors classical 
realist thought that consider states to have monopoly on use of violence. It implies 
that use of violence by any non-state actor constitute acts of terrorism. There are also 
paradigms within this viewpoint. Some initial definitions of terrorism only applied the 
terrorism label to groups that were perceived to be anti-West.16 Others have argued 
that rise of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda network by extension can be traced from 
the support of US government for mujahideen fighters against the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.17 This means that pro-West groups were not branded as terrorists even 
when they commit similar acts. For instance, mujahideen fighters and groups who 
received support from US against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan did not pass the 
threshold for terrorism.18 
 The other school of thought with scholars like Laqueur, argue that states also 
do commit terrorism, even more than groups and individuals.19 Others felt that the 
coercive counter terrorism approach was prone to manipulation by governments. To 
circumvent these complications, some scholars choose to follow practice of states and 
international organizations in defining terrorism. They construe it as violence 
committed by non-state actors and prefer to use terms like repression for similar acts 
by states. This study will only delve into terrorism by non-state actors.   
1.6.2 War on Terror  
The global WoT was precipitated by the events of 9/11.20 To this end, the US 
mobilized and brought together ‘a coalition of willing’ to collectively invent a counter 
                                                                                                                                                                      
14 Schmid, A. and Jongman, A. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, 
Databases, Theories and Literature. Oxford: North Holland.1988 
15 Zulaika, J. and Douglass, W. Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism. 
London: Routledge.1996 
16 Livingston, S.. The Terrorism Spectacle. Boulder CO: Westview Press.1994 
17 Chomsky, Naom.  The Iranian Threat: Who is the gravest danger to the world? NY: 2015 
18 Chomsky, Naom. 9-11 New York: Seven stories. 2001 
19 Laqueur, W. Terrorism. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1977 
20 See transcript of President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Thursday Night, 
September 20, 2001," CNN, 21 September 2001.   
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terrorism strategy.  Literature on WoT is littered with contending scholarly debates. 
Firstly, the contestations begin right from the basis of ‘declaration of the war’ itself, 
which was said to be disrupting terrorist plots by deposing hostile regimes in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.21 There are disagreements on significance and implication of 
naming this problem a 'war'.22 Rosenau et al posit that WoT was an inevitable 
response to protect the state and its population.23 This group of literature see terrorism 
as a testament of the realities of the changed security environment. It is viewed as a 
form of “new war” that symbolizes shift from interstate to intra state wars. This imply 
that following the attacks, the states had to take terrorism threat seriously and had an 
obligation to respond. 
Other literature contends the purity of the declaration on WoT. This group of 
literature also has intra debates and paradigmatic viewpoints within them. It is argued 
that declaration on WoT was about other things other than terrorism. The purist realist 
lenses of interstate conflicts is criticized for its inaptness to capture realities of 
contemporary security environment.24 Others argue that the 9/11 provided convenient 
justification for US to pursue much sought oil resources abroad.25 There are also 
views that WoT is overrated and a mere continuation of cold war politics. It is argued 
that since first World War, US maintained a doctrine that postulated that defending 
Americans entailed engaging in wars abroad.26 These perspectives see 9/11 as having 
provided a platform for another war.  
The viewpoints on declaration of WoT leads to discursive debates on its 
success. The debatable issue is whether WoT suppressed threats posed by terrorist 
groups like Al-Qaeda. Some have argued that WoT characterized by aggressive 
counter terrorism policies after 9/11” disrupted and prevented further attacks by Al-
                                                          
21 Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, "The US Campaign to Squeeze Terrorists' Financing," 
Journal of International Affairs 62, no. 1 (2008); See also Fatma al Sayegh, "Post-9/11 Changes in the 
Gulf: The Case of the UAE," Middle East Policy 11, no. 2 (2004).   
22 Fierke, K. M. "The 'War on Terrorism': A Critical Perspective." Irish Studies in International Affairs 
16 (2005): 51-64.  
23 Rosenau James N. and Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Governance Without Government: Order and Change 
in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2010 
24 Keohane Robert. O. and Joseph S. Nye, “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” World Politics, Vol.40 
(1988) pp.235-251. See also F, Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free 
Press, 1992) 
25 Bronson, Rachel. Thicker Than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006);   
26 Eland, I.. “Protecting the Homeland: The Best Defense is to give No Offense”, Cato Policy Analysis. 
No. 306 May 5, 1998.: 1-43 
9 
Qaeda.27 Johnston and Sarbahi established that drone strikes by US in Pakistan 
undermined activities by radical groups.28 The success of WoT is however contested 
by others who argue that it failed. Jenna et al discredited the aggressive military 
approach terming it counterproductive due to lack of legitimacy and impacts of its 
adverse kinetic actions.29 The failures of US foreign policy on fight against terrorism 
is echoed by other scholars like Jeremy.30 Central argument is that WoT ignored 
underlying dynamics of terrorism conflict. For instance, Thrall and Goepner 
established increase in deaths from terrorism in countries that US targeted for 
invasions or air strikes compared to those it did not.31 
Others have taken middle ground with mixed results for WoT coercive 
activities. The discursive points is political successes by militants despite tactical 
humiliation.32 There is short-term rise in terror attacks due to US air strikes and covert 
operations. The WoT is also criticized for ignoring underlying causes of terrorism 
conflict. This casts doubt on its utility in resolving the problem. It is against that 
background that focus shifted to CVE. The approach emphasizes on conditions that 
promote violent extremism. Its adoption is on the rise at global, regional and domestic 
levels. CVE is hailed as the “soft” side of counter terrorism strategies to address 
drivers of radicalization.  
In 2011, KDF made a military incursion into Somalia in pursuit of Al-Shabaab 
terrorist group.33 It was framed as war against Al-Shabaab. This interpretation derives 
from the global WoT framework. Terrorism and insurgency threats from Al-Shabaab 
were seen to threatens Kenya’s statehood. The problem was perceived to be from 
outside thus necessitated military response. The country previously suffered series of 
cross border terror attacks including kidnapping of foreign tourists by Al-Shabaab 
                                                          
27 Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "The Case for Reassessing America's 43rd President," Orbis 62, no. 1 
(2018).: 83.  
28 Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop K. Sarbahi, "The Impact of Us Drone Strikes on Terrorism in 
Pakistan," International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 2 (2016).   
29 Jenna Jordan, Margaret E. Kosal, and Lawrence Rubin. "The Strategic Illogic of Counter terrorism 
Policy," The Washington Quarterly 39, no. 4 (2017) 
30 Jeremy Pressman. "Power without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in 
the Middle East," International Security 33, no. 4. (2009) 
31 Trevor Thrall and Erik Goepner. "Step Back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from the Failed War 
on Terror," Policy Analysis. 2017 (Cato Institute).  
32 Daniel Byman. A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counter terrorism (New York: 
Oxford University Press: 368. 2011 
33 Ndambo, M. D. Kenya’s intervention in Somalia: Adherence to International Humanitarian Law and 
its unintended Consequences, in Mwagiru Makumi and Morumbasi Kigen (eds). Countering Violent 
Extremism in Kenya: Vol. 1 Strategic and Legal Issues. Thirty-three Consortium Publication on 
International Security. 2018. Chap. 1 pp.8-33 
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militants. KDF’s incursion into Somalia therefore aimed at uprooting the enemy who 
was perceived to be external from the source, once and for all.34 Kenya cited ‘just 
war’ doctrine in international law.35 Some of the justifications of just war includes 
declaration by a lawful authority and good intentions. Others are just cause, last 
resort, reasonable chance of success and that the means used would be in proportion 
to the end that the war seeks to achieve.  
Kenya also cited article 51 of the United Nations Charter on a state’s right to 
self-defense.36 It provides that “nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent 
right of an individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
member of the United Nations”. Kenya alluded to Al-Shabaab’s cross-border attacks 
targeting KDF, tourists and aid workers. Military responses to Al-Shabaab threats 
terrorism by Kenya also engendered expansion of roles of the police and intelligence 
agencies. Legislation like Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 and Security Laws 
(Amendment) Act of 2014 were enacted. These legislations have unclear definitions 
of terrorism. Expanded police powers allowed them to create lists of suspects and 
terrorist organizations without due process.37  
The powers granted to law enforcement were arbitrarily used against the 
public and organizations.38 Police were accused of extrajudicial killings of terror 
suspects.39 Being a non-state actor, Al-Shabaab could not respond militarily to 
achieve their aims. The group had to strategically retreat to the drawing board to re-
examine these emerging realities for an appropriate survival strategy. This retreat 
gave birth to strategic shift in its strategy for Kenya, by introducing radicalization and 
recruitment of Kenyan youth. The enemy ‘without’ metamorphosized into an enemy 
‘within’. These dynamics necessitated Kenya to re-calibrate its response strategies to 
violent extremism, particularly the homegrown threat. As a result, Kenya incorporated 
CVE strategy alongside its military strategies. It is that way since then. 
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Just like the global WoT, Kenya’s war against Al-Shabaab raises serious 
issues strategic and legal issues on response to terrorism and the large problem of 
violent extremism. Characteristically, conventional wars are short. Their success is 
seen in terms of success or defeat.40 They comes to an end when the enemy is 
defeated. However, Kenya’s war against Al-Shabaab is now in its ninth year, with no 
end in sight. The war is a protracted conflict that could even spans over generations. 
Ironically, Kenya’s war against Al-Shabaab must also be sustained as long as the state 
of war exists. Like other states, Kenya does not have infinite resources. So, is it 
feasible for Kenya to fight a war without an end?  
Historically, Kenya’s vulnerability to terrorism was linked to close working 
relations with the West.41 However, recent literature and trends points to a widespread 
homegrown radicalization and recruitment of Kenyan youth into terrorist activities. 
This literature review here finds that the terrain of violent extremism and terrorism 
threat in Kenya has, and is constantly evolving. The traditional coercive approaches to 
these threats do not fit in this environment characterized by logarithmic and 
unpredictable change. It is against this background that Kenya launched a National 
Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in 2016. This tool mirrors framework 
provided for in the United Nations Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism. 
1.6.3 Terrorism as conflict in transition 
There have been many attempts to understand conflict. Conventional analysis 
focuses on conflict profile, its history, actors, and their perspectives. It delves on 
structural, proximate causes and interactions of these elements.42 Two groups of 
literature emerge in conflict analysis. The first group of literature view conflict as a 
short-term phenomenon. It can be resolved permanently through mediation or other 
intervention processes. This perspective pursues processes and outcomes that are 
mutually acceptable to parties involved and self-sustaining.43 It ends in positive 
relationship between parties that were previously adversaries. Proceeding from this 
                                                          
40 See Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (Eds.) Understanding Victory and Defeat in 
Contemporary War. (London and New York: Routledge). 2007. 
41 Mazrui, Alamin, Kimani Njogu, and Paul Goldsmith. Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya: 
Between the Rule of Law and the Quest for Security. Nairobi: Twaweza Communications Ltd. 2018 
42 Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. How to Guide to Conflict Sensitivity. London: Conflict Sensitivity 
Consortium. 2012 
43 Mitchell Christopher Roger and Banks, M. Handbook Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-
Solving Approach. London: Pinter Pub Ltd. 1996 
12 
view, conflict resolution connotes finality: issues are resolved permanently. The 
parties involved are mutually satisfied with the outcomes.  
Best argues that resource-based conflicts can be permanently resolved but 
value-based ones are not.44 From this preoperative, non-resolvable conflicts can only 
be transformed or managed. This makes conflict resolution a protracted pursuit of 
necessary satisfiers to the parties involved. Rapoport’s conceptualizes four waves of 
terrorism beginning with Anarchist 1880s, through Nationalist and Marxist waves in 
the early and mid-twentieth century, to the present Religious Wave.45 Looking at 
terrorism as a resort to revolutionary violence provides a useful tool to categorize and 
analysis terrorist groups and their activities. This framework suggests that terrorism 
rises and falls. Groups naturally dissolve when they can no longer inspire others to 
continue with the struggle or violent resistance to authorities in pursuit of redress of 
their grievances.  
This suggest that terrorism, terrorist groups and their motivations are reflected 
by conditions and changes in social and political contexts. However, this raises 
questions on the character of current social and political context of contemporary 
wave of terrorism. Critical issues that emerge are who defines this context, does it 
require unanimity, or can it be defined in a country-specific context like the current 
WoT, and what are its implications on WoT and its future. From this perspective, the 
strategies and tactics employed by terrorists in each of these waves’ is should be 
mirrored in the strategies adopted by states in responding to these threats.Terrorism is 
a conflict in transition. As the conflict goes on, the actors involved are strategically 
changing their offensive and defensive tools and strategies.  
Given the volatility of the operating environment, terrorism is ever 
metamorphosing with shifting of goals, actors and its terrains. Responding to a 
transforming conflict is daunting task due to the changing character of the conflict, 
actors involved and lack of necessary conditions for successful negotiations, most 
critical being a mutually hurting stalemate.46 This conflict is asymmetric, amorphous, 
borderless and permeates regions, states and localized settings. Hesitation to draw on 
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conflict frameworks deprives this domain the benefits of research in peacebuilding.47 
It leads to rejection of wider conflict management strategies like negotiation in 
terrorism analysis. Intellectualizing on how to navigate this landscape would make 
crucial contribution to expanding the spheres of our understanding of terrorism and 
the attendant response strategies. 
1.6.4 Emergence of CVE in War on Terror 
The change towards CVE as an approach to counter terrorism represents a 
paradigmatic shift. Paradigmatic model of production of scientific knowledge derives 
from the work of Kuhn.48 He argued that in social sciences, it is possible for many 
paradigms to run parallel to another. When older paradigms fail to explain or solve 
certain issues, they are surpassed and scientists’ defect to the new ascendant 
paradigms. For WoT, it was realized that military responses in WoT did not resolve 
underlying root causes of terrorism. New tools had to be sought to address the 
problem at hand. In essence, WoT had focused on coercive measures like military 
action, creation of new police units and expanding their powers as well as that of 
intelligence services. However, these developments did not stop incidences like 
Madrid train and London public transit bombings in 2004 and 2005 respectively.49  
As WoT proceeded, there emerged “homegrown” terrorists, Jihadist networks 
and cells in the US.50 These dynamics demonstrated that the terrorist threat and 
networks, which had earlier been perceived to only emanate only from the Middle 
East, had proliferated to even Western countries. It also demonstrated that it was 
important for whichever solution is preferred to address itself to the conditions that 
are giving rise to the phenomenon. Conceptually, CVE is contested and ill-defined. 
Research on the subject has traditionally been carried separately and disjointedly by 
practitioners, scholarly and non-state actors like civil society groups.  As a result, 
research studies on this area are contextual, event-driven, reactionary and technically 
                                                          
47 Roger Mac Ginty. Look Who's Talking: Terrorism, Dialogue and Conflict Transformation, Critical 
Studies on Terrorism,6:1, (2013) 216-223, 
48 See Thomas Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.1962 
49 Harris-Hogan Shandon, Kate Barrelle and Andrew Zammit. “What is countering violent extremism? 
Exploring CVE policy and practice in Australia”. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political 
Aggression, 8:1(2016), 6-24, 
50 See Schuurman, B., Harris-Hogan Shandon, Lentini, P., and Zammit, A. “Operation Pendennis: A 
case study of an Australian terrorist plot”. Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(2014), 91–99. 
14 
oriented.51 The varied conceptualizations have been exported to policy responses by 
states.   
CVE is now emerging as a catch all phenomenon.52 Literature on CVE is 
characterized by several limitations like disparities and range of research 
methodologies, minimal reliance on field research and primary data, focus on certain 
regions and countries and the domination of Western narratives. The factors have 
engendered inconsistencies and gaps in local CVE theory and practice. This has 
complicated efforts of coherently linking CVE with other programs.53 They include 
development, poverty alleviation, governance, democratization and education. This 
relates to distinctions in the CVE policy spectrum.  
Donor approaches are increasingly shifting to a perspective that sees security 
and stability as an investment.54 This perspective informs thinking that CVE is 
tantamount to investing in poverty reduction and development. What this has led to in 
some cases and contexts is the diversion of funding and resources to fund CVE 
projects and programs.55 This has given rise to a situation where mainstream 
development and peace-building interventions are increasingly facing a crunch. Civil-
society actors have been forced to rebrand their proposals as CVE actions. This 
implies that CVE in terms of its emphasis on structural variables like poverty is easily 
being instrumentalized to draw away resources from other spheres. It is also a 
testament to the increasingly precarious erosion of civil-society neutrality and 
impartiality due to their probably inevitable entanglement in the CVE sphere. 
There also arguments that the idea of use of soft approaches to counter conflict 
were mooted in 1980s in European Exit programs.56 That it was used in Germany, 
Norway and Sweden to neutralize right wing radicalism. However, the current 
conceptualization of CVE was initially deployed by United Kingdom (UK) in 2003. 
                                                          
51 Ranstorp, M.. Introduction: Mapping Terrorism Research - Challenges and Priorities, In M. Ranstorp 
(Ed.), Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction. UK: Routledge. 2006 
52 Heydemann, Steven. ‘Countering Violent Extremism as a Field of Practice’, United States Institute 
of Peace Insights, No. 1 (Spring 2014), pp. 1-5 
53 Neumann, Peter R. Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that lead to Terrorism: Ideas, 
Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region. London: International Centre for the 
Study of Radicalization. 2017 
54 United States Agency for International Development. The Development Response to Violent 
Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice. Washington, DC: USAID. 2011 
55 Kessels, Eecole and Nemr, Christina. “Countering Violent Extremism and Development Assistance: 
Identifying Synergies, Obstacles, and Opportunities”, Global Center on Cooperative Security. UK. Pgs. 
8 No. 12 (2016) 
56 Demant, F., Slootman, M., Bujis, F. and Tilly, J. Decline and Disengagement: An Analysis of 
Processes of Deradicalization. Amsterdam: Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies at the University 
of Amsterdam. 2008 
15 
In that year, the UK launched “CONTEST”. This was a counter terrorism strategy 
which focused on preventing population from becoming or supporting terrorists.57 In 
2004, European Union come up with several CVE-related initiatives like EU 
Declaration on Combating Terrorism and EU Plan of Action on Combating 
Terrorism. To consolidate these efforts, European Commission established Expert 
Group on Violent Radicalization in 2006.58 However, these efforts were only 
addressed itself and was designed and limited in Europe.  
There were also many divergences in the CVE approaches in countries where 
it was adopted. For instance, US used UK case study before gradually shifting its 
tools in counter terrorism efforts. However, military approach was never discarded. 
Vidino notes that the US was initially reluctant to adopt CVE approaches until 2009.59 
It launched its strategy in 2011 with focus on community collaborations.60 Emphasis 
shifted to constructing solutions to the problem through measures that address root 
causes and underlying grievances. The value of definition of push and pull factors 
elicited debates from various quarters. One point of view argues that categorization of 
factors that drive VE as push and pull factors offers a plausible framework to analyze 
drivers of radicalization and VE.  
The International Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT) describes push factors 
behind violent extremism as; reaction to experience of violence, anger based on 
experience of discrimination and injustice, socioeconomic marginalisation and 
political exclusion and frustrated aspiration. It has also listed pull factors as extremist 
ideology, peer-group, adventure, charismatic leadership and image of heroism. Others 
are expectation of success, opportunity to boost one’s image and promise of reward.61 
However, models characterizing push and pull factors are contended. Khalil and 
Zeuthen view them as simplistic and ambiguous. They suggest distinction of 
structural motivators from individual incentives and other enabling factors.62 
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According to this model, ‘structural motivators’ refers to the conditions and 
environment surrounding VE, ‘individual incentives’ refers to the rewards and sense 
of purpose gained by participating in violence or violent extremism, and ‘enabling 
factors’ refers to catalyzing processes of radicalization, recruitment, or both, like 
mentors, charismatic leaders or online forums. 
There are also debates on the conceptual differences between PVE versus 
CVE. The distinction refers to the distance from initial radicalization to participation 
in a VE act. Australia views PVE as being focused more on resilience-building 
measures and large-scale strategies to reduce ‘conditions conducive’ to violent 
extremism.63 They locate CVE to interventions at a localized level that involve 
individuals further along the radicalization pathway. Many states have shifted focus to 
CVE, specifically counter-radicalization, de-radicalization and disengagement 
programmes. It responds to increasing threat of homegrown radicalization and violent 
extremism.64 As a result, CVE has emerged as an idea to suppress terrorism.   
In Kenya, the initial response to terrorism was use of force. This was latter 
seen as counterproductive because it triggered resentment which served to promote 
radicalization and terrorist recruitment by Al-Shabaab in the country. It necessitated 
calibration of response to mirror the changes in tactics and strategies by adopted by 
Al-Shabaab. CVE strategies in Kenya therefore emerged as a response to homegrown 
threat entrenched by Al-Shabaab terrorist group.65  They reflect on the model 
provided by CVE approaches of the global WoT framework.66 Like other states, CVE 
in Kenya refer to use of soft approaches to prevent and address radicalization.  
One of the biggest security concerns for the country is radicalization and 
recruitment of Kenyan youths by Al-Shabaab. The threat became more intricate from 
the time KDF intervened in Somalia.  The group has capitalized on large pool of 
disgruntled and unemployed Kenyan youth to not only wage war in Somalia against 
Kenya, but also waging internal war within the Kenyan territory. The enemy is now 
both “without” and within. CVE discourse in Kenya seeks to reduce the pool of 
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individuals whom terrorist groups radicalize and recruit. NSCVE was designed for 
this purpose.67 However, problem of youth radicalization and recruitment remains a 
major security concern.68  
Initially, terror attacks Kenya did not intentionally target Kenyans. The 
intended targets were Israel and US, even though majority of the casualties were 
Kenyans.  However, with the homegrown threat, the dynamics changed 
fundamentally. However, the threat in Kenya has domestic, regional and transnational 
dimensions. This necessitates the state to use both military and CVE depending on the 
immediate operational environment. The central issue is that as Al-Shabaab’s tactics 
and strategies changed, the strategies adopted by Kenya have not evolved at the same 
speed or correspondingly. Kenya seem to be reactive to the war rather than proactive. 
Terrorism, which is a form of violent extremism, is multidimensional and dynamic. 
The dynamism emerges from transnational networks that are formed and enhanced by 
technology. Mazrui et al argue that recruitment and radicalization into violent 
extremism is driven underlying structural issues.69 These include marginalization, 
socio-economic inequalities and high levels of unemployment in the country.  
CVE aims at countering or reversing adoption of radical ideologies and 
disengaging the already radicalized from participation in terrorist activity. It also takes 
cognizance that different stakeholders and approaches are needed to address the 
problem. The approach has incorporated use of community-based initiatives to build 
resilience and cohesion in the society. The shift in terminology from terrorism to CVE 
show that the problem as then formulated needed new approaches. Softer approaches 
were preferred to address the problem from its roots upwards rather than from top 
downwards. CVE policies and practices in Kenya seems to face challenges. Core to 
these problems is that the state has adopted reactionary strategies whereby when 
terrorists attack, a military strategy is applied; when it doesn’t work, counter 
insurgency is brought on board; when these doesn’t work, CVE is contemplated.70 
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Whereas Kenya is using both military and CVE strategies, there is little 
empirical data on the attendant dynamics. This includes questions about how one 
strategy affects the other. Whether this duality breeds complementarity, cannibalism 
or is a zero-sum game. CVE strategies in Kenya are shrouded with narratives that 
perceive the problem as an external rather than internal. Like other states facing 
terrorism threats, Kenya seem to have reluctantly espoused CVE policies while ‘on 
the run’.71There is a problem with availability of information on the basis and realities 
of local CVE contexts in Kenya. Even in contexts where such knowledge exists, the 
CVE policies and practices are not grounded on it. At the end, Kenya is confronted 
with a wave of unprecedented security challenges. Are counter violent extremism 
tools offered to policy makers working? A critical analysis of CVE strategies in 
Kenya is logical progression in search of solutions to the problem at hand.  
1.6.7 Gaps in literature 
Regardless of lack of unified definition, terrorism threat is ever evolving and 
threatening survival of states. Reviewed literature concedes that WoT is not 
eliminating or reducing terrorism. It is instead aggravating it. Despite these 
acknowledged consequences, states are still using WoT framework to counter the 
terrorism threat. This implies that the policies of states are not based on the realities 
they are confronting. Available literature is not illuminating on the reasons for this 
inconsistency. These dynamics have constrained states in terms policy and strategy 
responses in dealing with the problem. This study is informed by the identified 
inadequacies in rationale of the military approach to WoT, and/or pairing it with CVE 
strategies.  
This research study finds that war against Al Shabab, as currently conceived, 
is not eradicating terrorism. Instead, it is aggravating the problem. There is problem 
with assumptions anchoring this war. These have been imported to responses to the 
problem thus inconsistencies. Violent extremism has a global, regional and localized 
dimensions. Its enablers are multiple, complex, and context specific. They also 
entwined with ideological, political, economic and historical dimensions. This defies 
traditional analysis prisms of understanding conflict. For such reasons, the problem 
remains loosely defined.  
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Although literature concedes that terrorism is an asymmetric conflict, 
perceptions abound that it cannot be investigated using the lenses of conflict 
management, especially conflict in transition. It is dissociated from the study of 
conflict. This dissertation is designed to challenge this perception. Failure to reflect on 
terrorism as a conflict in transition portends serious strategic implications on national 
security policies and attendant strategies by states to tackle the problem, and on 
scholarship. This research proposal aims to provoke debates along these lines by 
contributing to theoretical tenets on how management of conflict in transition can 
inform discourses on CVE strategies. Such conceptions have profound implications 
on study of terrorism and its analysis.  
The other gaps identified is that CVE strategies by states have emerged as ‘fit-
all’. They are not based on varying circumstances of states. This cautions against 
reliance on generic CVE strategies which are not founded on sound philosophical and 
contextual basis. The questions on effectiveness of Kenya’s military-CVE duality 
strategy on the fight against terrorism is a critical one. There is need to look at the 
basis of Kenya’s CVE strategies in milieu of context-specific peculiarities of political, 
social and cultural dynamics, especially homegrown radicalization threat. This is key 
towards achieving effective and sustainable interventions. The evolving character of 
violent extremism calls for a clear understanding of threat interactions as the basis for 
formulating and implementing CVE strategies. This need to be the basis for policy 
and strategy on normative issues which need to be considered. 
CVE in Kenya did not replace use of force. It was instead appended to it. Can 
CVE strategies co-exist with coercive approaches? What are the necessary conditions 
for CVE to succeed? This study sought to respond to these evidential gaps. It 
interrogates underlying criteria for validify of CVE strategies in Kenya. Insights along 
this line will not only illuminate on the philosophical standing of CVE strategies in 
Kenya but will also provoke debates on a more effective set of response and 
interventions to the current problem.  
1.7 Conceptual framework 
A conceptual framework is described as a written or a visual tool that either 
narratively or graphically illustrates relationship between key variables.72 It provides 
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structure that best explains the natural progression of a phenomenon. The construction 
of relationships between key variables maps out what is known, and the actions 
required in the course of the study. A conceptual framework is used to arrive at study 
hypothesis or assumptions.  In this study, the independent variable is global War on 
Terror (WoT) and its attributes. WoT has emerged as the dominant post-cold war 
framework for international and national security of states.  
During the Cold War, state security organs like military, intelligence and the 
larger military-industrial complex in national security were geared towards warlike 
posture.73 However, with collapse of USSR, states lost the cold war philosophy and 
theme as strategic basis for their national security.74 9/11 provided an opportunity for 
re-directing national security industry. WoT filled that strategic gap. Today, many 
states have calibrated their national security policies and strategies on basis of WoT 
framework. The initial attribute of WoT was Counter Terrorism (CT) approaches 
characterized by use of force (military). However, it faced a lot of criticism due to 
inability to address issues at the base of terrorism.75 Adjustments were made to 
incorporate Counter violent Extremism (CVE) and Preventing Violent Extremism 
(PVE). The latter strategies use soft power approaches to co-opt people rather than 
coerce them.76  
 The dependent variable of this study, national security policy of states are 
influenced by WoT.  As frameworks of security for the state and its citizens, national 
security policies reflect on both external and internal environments in which the state 
requires to survive.77 Central to this study is national security policy as a source of 
national security strategies.78 Strategies are designed to implement the policy.79 In the 
context of this study, CT, CVE and PVE strategies are founded on national security 
policy. The policy itself is informed by global WoT and its attributes.  
 The independent and dependent variables of this study are mediated by an 
array of issues in the operating environment. They include unresolved 
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structural/political conflicts; socio-economic marginalization, extremist ideology, 
global geo-politics and contextual dynamics. These issues explain the missing link 
between WoT and national security policies by states. Whereas terrorism conflict 
revolves around these issues, WoT framework is detached from them. On the flipside, 
the issues are inherently aggravating WoT. They qualify terrorism as a conflict in 
transition. Inversely, while national security of states is confounded by these issues, 
their strategies are based on constructs of WoT. This has imported implications on 
both WoT and national security policy by states. 
This framework is not a fixed preposition, but rather a conceptual reference 
point that can provide rationale for critical analysis of CVE strategies. The 
relationship between independent and dependent variables of the study is shown in 
figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Illustration of relationship between dependent and independent variables  
 
[Source: Author’s construct of study] 
In the above framework, attributes of independent variable form the research 
assumptions of the study. They independently or collectively have an impact on 
national security policy and strategies by states. 
22 
1.8 Research methodology 
This section outlines the logic of development of study process and procedural 
framework within which it was conducted. The study was ethnographic.80 Primary 
data was collected through interactions and observation from participants in their real-
life settings. Data was therefore collected from participants as the processes of CVE 
strategies went on. Perspectives on CVE strategies in Kenya were investigated in their 
contexts and meanings that stakeholders ascribed to them. The study deemed this 
design appropriate because the issues being investigated required exploration of 
meanings and insights in their contexts. This enabled scrupulous description, analysis 
and understanding of philosophy undergirding CVE strategies in Kenya. The study 
was an observation of one case; thus, a case study.81 A single case approach allowed 
holistic and in-depth investigation. It provided basis to inquire issues that do not 
require control over events like what, how and why. This entailed search for strategic 
rational that inform policy responses to violent extremism in Kenya.  
1.8.1 Research design 
This study was anchored on tenets of qualitative research design.82 It 
emphasized on understanding meanings that individuals ascribe to social problems.83 
The fact that other countries are also implementing CVE strategies makes a critical 
analysis of CVE strategies in Kenya is a typical case. The case is useful in 
illuminating the contextual dynamics of CVE strategies to generate generic 
knowledge. As such, the study’s sampling procedures, data collection, analysis and 
interpretation were qualitative. The researcher deemed this design appropriate because 
the issues being investigated required critical interrogation, exploration of meanings 
and insights.84 
1.8.2 Target population 
Target population is a unit with observable characteristics of interest to the 
researcher.85 This study involved government officials tasked with formulation and 
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implementation of counter terrorism polices and strategies in Kenya. It specifically 
targeted Ministries of Defence, Interior and Coordination of National Government, 
Kenya Defence Forces, National Police Service and National Counter Terrorism 
Centre. In addition, it sought views of scholars and national security policy 
commentators with expertise on CVE policies in Kenya.  
1.8.3 Description of sample and sampling procedure 
Methodologically, respondents were selected through purposive (also known 
as judgmental) sampling technique.86 This was because the study necessitated 
collection of data from certain individuals who are in possession of deep insight into 
realities of CVE in Kenya. The study interviewed twelve individuals at the strategic 
level within the selected agencies representing the whole.87 The sample size was 
informed by necessity for information from strategic and policy making levels on 
CVE strategies in Kenya. Cadre at this level are few unlike at operational and tactical 
domains. In peculiarity of this, and consistent with objectives of study, only actors 
deemed to have information sought were targeted. This formed basis of two 
respondents for each of the six strata targeted by study.  
The study used stratified sampling techniques to distribute respondents from 
government agencies and stakeholders outside them. The sampling frame was shown 
in Table 1.   
Table 1: Sampling frame 
Segment of Target 
Population 
Department/Office Number of 
Respondents 
Kenya Defence Forces Office of the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) 2 
National Police Service  Office of Inspector General of Police  2 
Ministry of Interior and 
Coordination of National 
government  
Office of Cabinet Secretary (CS)/ Principal 
Secretary (PS) 
2 









Scholars  1 
National security policy commentators 1 










                                                          
86 See Turner III, D. W. Qualitative interview design: A practical guide for novice investigators. The 
qualitative report, 15(3), 2010: 754. 
87 Mugenda and Mugenda, Research Methods, Quantitative & Qualitative Approaches 
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1.8.4 Types of data, research instrument and data collection procedures 
To contextualize the study, primary and secondary data were collected and 
analyzed. Face-to-face interviews collected primary data with help of a pre-planned 
interview guide. Questions were open-ended and unstructured. This allowed greater 
depth and breadth in the responses. Secondary data was collected through content and 
document analysis of CVE strategy in Kenya, published literature and other reports on 
the topic. Before data collection, authorization was sought from Strathmore 
University. The selected respondents were also notified.  
1.8.5 Validity and reliability of research instruments 
Mock interviews were conducted to pre-test the research instrument on a pilot 
group similar to target sample. The group comprised of seven respondents selected 
through purposive sampling technique from the segments of the target population. 
One respondent for pilot study was selected from each segment of the target 
population. Table 2 shows sampling frame for pilot study.  
Table 2: Sampling frame for pilot study 
Segment of the Target Population Department/Office Number of 
Respondent
s 
Kenya Defence Forces Office of Chief of Defence Forces 
(CDF) 
1 
National Police Service  Office of Inspector General of 
Police  
1 
Ministry of Interior and Coordination of 
National government  
Off of Cabinet Secretary (CS)/ 
Principal Secretary (PS) 
1 
Ministry of Defense Office of Cabinet Secretary (CS)/ 
Principal Secretary (PS) 
1 
National Counter Terrorism Centre Office of Director NCTC  1 
Other strategic stakeholders outside 
government 
Scholars  1 
National security policy 
commentators 
1 
TOTAL  7 
 
Mock interviews enhanced validation and appropriateness of the interview guide, 
processes and data.88 They further helped to ensure that final interviews were 
logically organized with necessary questions included. The researcher utilized 
feedback from mock interviews to fine-tune the final interview guide. To enhance 
                                                          
88 Creswell, Research Design Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches (4th ed.) op.cit 
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external validity, this study used audit trail of all activities or decisions made. Data 
collected was subjected to meticulous verification and constant comparison. In 
addition, the researcher self-disclosed inherent assumptions, personal beliefs, and 
biases that could influence the study. These buttressed generalizability of study 
results.89 
1.8.6 Description of data analysis procedures and interpretation 
To achieve its objectives, this study adopted a methodology with three 
component tools of analysis. Firstly, it exploited secondary data analysis through a 
critical review of published materials on counter violent extremism strategies in 
Kenya. Use of such instruments in this case were within case analysis. The other 
component entailed interviews with individuals involved in policy making decisions 
relating to CVE strategies in Kenya. The third methodological component focused on 
select participants on basis of their knowledge and expertise on CVE policy and 
strategies in Kenya. They included scholars and national security policy 
commentators.  
Theoretical considerations and content analysis helped to explain, understand 
and interpret data collected from interviews. This enhanced understanding realities in 
which CVE strategies in Kenya are grounded. The study integrated element of 
documentary analysis and qualitative data generated through interviews. It verified 
accuracy of data in both form and context. This was done through constant 
comparison of emerging themes with existing concepts and theoretical frameworks. 
These measures helped put the study in right context. Once data on CVE strategies in 
Kenya was collected, it was reviewed, sorted and categorized according to patterns 
and themes. The study checked data for consistency and completeness in preparation 
for analysis and interpretation. Analysis was based on the research questions. It was 
done through use of narrative analysis and content analysis.90  
In undertaking narrative and content analysis the study judiciously deduced 
general themes and statements among the collected data. This enabled grouping of 
collected data into various groups for easier analysis and presentation in continuous 
prose. The study first sought to familiarize with data collected by reading and re-
reading transcripts and interview extracts. It then deciphered meanings, patterns, 
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trends and themes according to objectives of the study. Data was coded, processed 
and organized systematically according to merging initial themes. To preserve 
anonymity of respondents, verbatim excerpts in the report were coded in the format 
“CVE_KE. XX”. 
The study then evaluated how initial denotations generated by data fitted 
together into themes. This was done through in-depth probe of data associated with 
each theme. The study further assessed whether emerging themes were supported by 
data. It then scrutinized coherence and distinctiveness of each theme. This allowed 
systematic explanations and objective identification of characteristic messages. The 
same approach was used to relate the trends. The study then refined and ascertained 
what each theme was all about. This entailed asking questions like; what such themes 
were saying, how they interacted and related to others. 
This study judiciously deduced general themes and statements among the 
collected data. It used them to respond to research problem identified in the 
beginning. The last stage of thematization analysis entailed compiling project report. 
It enabled the researcher capture descriptive narratives and meaning attached to them. 
Interpretation of the findings was structured according to themes identified and 
stemming from research objectives. The approach made meaning to the data by 
interrogating interplay of various themes, emergent theoretical underpinnings and 
knowledge gaps.  
1.8.7 Dissemination and utilization of study results  
Dissemination of research findings is the process of transferring and creating 
awareness of research-based knowledge to appropriate audiences who can best use 
it.91 It entails planning and careful consideration of who, where, and how of reaching 
the audiences. For this research study, the main audiences were national security 
decision and policy makers in Kenya responsible for counter terrorism efforts, and the 
academia fraternity.  The study will makee efforts to share copies of results with its 
audiences. This will be through presentations where organizational bureaucracies 
permitted. Utilization of study results is the practical use of findings.92 Although this 
study aims at informing CVE policymaking processes, it takes cognizance of the 
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dynamics of respective institutional discretion, cultures and priorities in utilizing the 
study results.  
1.8.8 Ethical considerations 
This study took cognizance of the sensitivity of research topic and attendant 
ethical implications. Consent to collect data was sought beforehand from the relevant 
institutions and government agencies. The study further took necessary precautions to 
guarantee confidentiality, security and privacy of respondents or information 
provided. Additionally, the study sought informed and voluntary consent from all 
participants before interviews were conducted. Those who declined to be interviewed 
were respected for their views. No identification or photographs of respondents were 
taken. All data obtained was solely used for writing research report and not any other 
purpose.  
1.9 Chapter outline 
This thesis is organized in seven Chapters: Chapter One is introduction to the 
study. It outlines research problem by problematizing policy responses to terrorism 
threat. That terrorists keep changing their tactics and strategies as they advance their 
cause. This shifting of tactics and strategies portend serious implications on tools and 
strategies devised by countries to deal with the problem. The chapter concludes that 
terrorism necessitates new tools.   
Chapter Two discuses global War on Terror. It historicizes and takes a critical 
view of global WoT. It focuses on the fundamental assumptions upon which WoT is 
constructed, and their impact on discourse of terrorism, and counter terrorism efforts.   
Chapter Three is terrorism as conflict. It examines the transitional character of 
terrorism arising from the changing strategies the parties involved adopt. The chapter 
explains CVE strategies, their design and relationship with conflict. It assesses 
flexibility of CVE strategies as terrorism conflict transform.  
Chapters Four examines Counter Violent Extremism framework in War on 
Terror. It begins by discussing its emergence and development, and eventual 
application by states. argues that despite adoption of CVE, coercive approaches were 
retained. The chapter questions the validity of CVE strategies being mediated with 
military strategies and holds that discourses on CVE are still shrouded with narratives 
that perceive violent extremism as an external, instead of an internal threat.  
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Chapter Five presents Kenya’s perception of the War on Terror. The chapter 
begins by discussing Kenya’s interpretation and understanding of War on Terror. It 
argues that like other states, Kenya initially responded to Al-Shabaab’s threats by use 
of force. The chapter further contends that CVE strategies in Kenya take an external 
posture to the problem rather than internal: they are not homegrown.  
Chapter Six is a critical analysis of CVE strategies in Kenya.  It presents data 
collected, findings and interpretation in accordance with objectives of the study. It 
raises legal and strategic issues on the basis and validity of CVE strategies in Kenya 
and the extent to which they can mediate terrorism conflict in Kenya.  
Chapter Seven is conclusions. The chapter presents summary of main findings, 
their implications, and conclusion. Framing of Kenya’s CVE strategies on global 
WoT framework has constrained local responses to the problem. The study suggests 
conflict management frameworks to overthrow WoT as basis of national security 








GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter One outlined research problem in line with the gaps identified in 
literature review. A framework of analysis and methodology guiding this study were 
also presented. This and subsequent chapters take up issues raised by contextualizing 
and problematizing them. Specifically, this Chapter takes a critical examination of 
global War on Terror (WoT) and is organized into five thematic areas. These include 
understanding terrorism, context of global War on Terror, legal aspects on War on 
Terror, criticism on War on Terror, and terrorism as an evolving threat.  
2.2 Understanding terrorism   
To understand global WoT, it is necessary to start from a conceptual basis. 
However, conceptualization is undermined by definitional ambiguities which have 
implications for any discourses. Inability to define terrorism presents legal and 
strategic complexities that makes it difficult to engage on the concept and the implied 
discourses on policies and strategies. The difficulty arises out of the subjective 
construction of terrorism.1 Without a common a conceptualization of terrorism, we 
cannot have meaningful engagement or understand each other. Terrorism is conceived 
as a political act.2 The tasks of defining it or its manifestations is also political. This 
complicates efforts to understand it. However, these complexities are not new. They 
have bedeviled the field for some time.  
The term terrorism was initially coined during the French Revolution (1793-
1794).3 It was used to describe the Reign of Terror. Today, the term has become 
elastic and contested. The many definitions of terrorism complicate rather than 
complement discourses. Legally, the law succeeds when it differentiates what exactly 
something is from what it is not.4 The concept has remained broad and characterized 
by ambiguity. For instance, US Department of Defense defines it as:  
                                                          
1 Sciullo, Nick J. “The Ghost in the Global War on Terror: Critical Perspectives and Dangerous 
Implications for National Security and the Law”, Drexel Law Review, Vol. 3(2011). 
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the Specter of Terrorism”. Cornell Int.’L L.J. 36: (2004) 491 
3 Carter, John Denton. "Interpretations of the Reign of Terror." The Historian 3, no. 1(1940): 79-96. 
4 Cyrille Begorre-Bret., “The Definition of Terrorism and the Challenge of Relativism”, Cardozo Law 
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‘The calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful 
violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate 
governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, 
religious, or ideological’.5 (p.443)  
Such description does not illuminate on who the enemy is or where he is. It is subject 
to diverse interpretations. This has engendered politicization and misuse of the term to 
cover other issues. It also paved way for states to violate international human rights 
law in their counter terrorism efforts. There are nevertheless attempts in statute and 
treaties to define the term. For instance, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
1566 of 2004 designates it as: 
... criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with intent to 
cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the 
purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group 
of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act, ……. (Para. 3). 
This definition was aimed at assisting states to domestic counter terrorism legislations 
under Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). Other definitions like one for African 
Union (AU) Convention have targeted tactical aspects. It views terrorism as 
promoting, sponsoring, inciting, encouraging, threatening, conspiring, organizing, or 
procuring person with the intent to commit acts cited in paragraphs (a) (i) to (iii) of its 
Convention”. But all these have not clarified the situation.  
2.3 Context of global War on Terror 
Following end of cold war, there lacked a theme and a subject for states like 
US to base their international and national security policies on. The period between 
end of cold war and 9/11 marked strategic pause in international security framework. 
States found it daunting because they no longer had cold war philosophy to use as a 
strategic basis. Yet, the military-industrial complex that developed since the end of 2nd 
world war and intelligization were in limbo. They were designed for cold war security 
framework. When 9/11 tragedy struck, US President George W. Bush declared 
                                                          
5 United States Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms”. Joint 
publication 1-02. Washignton DC: DoD. 2002: p.443  
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framed it as acts of war.6 This ‘war’ provided a convenient opportunity to fill the 
strategic gap that end of cold war had caused.  
The issue arising is whether WoT can really replace the cold war as the 
dominating framework for international and national security. The cold war security 
framework worked because some states had nuclear capacity which could destroy the 
world.7 In replacing cold war framework with WoT, there are clearly missing things 
like that existential threat to the whole world. President Bush tried to justify that 
existential threat to the whole world. He argued that Iraq held weapons of mass 
destruction.8 It had none.9 This made it difficult to return to the cold war framework. 
It effectively killed WoT as a strategic basis for international security. 
WoT refers to counter terrorism campaigns that were launched in response to 
9/11. Consequences of the attacks was that US laid out an extensive set of policies 
aimed at pursuing and defeating Al-Qaeda. It focused on coercive measures like 
military action, expanding the powers of the police and intelligence services. In this 
regard, such policies were either outlined in public official speeches or policy 
documents, while others remained confidential. Immediately after 9/11, President 
Bush remarked: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either 
you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."10 It was like rationalizing framework 
of the cold war: that states were either on one side of the war or on the other.  
In addition, US foreign policy required compliance by other states in WoT. It 
also upscaled denial that the effort did not target majority-Muslim states. In this 
regard, US demanded reporting on terrorist activities and responses from some 
countries. Initially, US argued that the primary objectives of the global WoT was 
capturing members of Al-Qaeda thus disrupt potential terror plans.11 It delineated the 
task to entail ousting of “hostile regimes” in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2003, a further 
step was taken by unveiling US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. This 
                                                          
6 See transcript of President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Thursday Night, 
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became the strategic tool to steer global WoT. It aimed at identifying and defusing 
threats overseas.  Underlying this strategy was a broad intention to deter terrorists 
from acquiring or manufacturing WMD.  
Global WoT took multidimensional approach through militaristic invasions 
and covert actions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen. It was reinforced by military 
assistance to cooperative regimes and radical increase in intelligence spending. Other 
aspects of operationalization of WoT policies included capturing and detaining of 
terrorist suspects at Guantanamo Bay. US further enhanced liaison and cooperation 
with foreign intelligence agencies, tracking and interception of terrorist financing. It 
also established and maintained extensive public diplomacy campaigns to suppress 
criticism stemming from counter terrorism activities, particularly in the Middle East. 
Domestically, WoT precipitated legal and institutional reforms geared at the 
anchoring the aggressive counter terrorism policies. This included enactment of 
Patriot Act and establishment of Department of Homeland Security. These were by 
expansion of covert operations and law enforcement. Other measures included 
preventive detainment of terror suspects, capacity building of emergency-response 
capabilities, enhanced protective security at airports, borders and other public 
amenities. An attack on the US mainland become a global issue because it daunted a 
superpower, thus exemplifying no one is safe. It underscores internationalization and 
globalization aspects of the problem at hand. Some of the responses by states are 
informed by this “global” approaches to the problem. Despite these efforts, the world 
continued to witness evolution of terrorism. Groups like Al-Qaeda, Islamic State in 
Syria and Levant continue to hold ground.12 
2.4 Legal aspects on War on Terror  
The US-led WoT was declared and is going on amid conceptual clutter and 
ambiguities. It grapples with difficulties of describing its parameters. President Bush 
stated that it ‘begun with Al-Qaeda but will not end until every terrorist group of 
global reach is found, stopped and defeated.13 Such characterization implied that WoT 
bordered abstraction: no clear enemies or objectives. This mirrors definitional 
ambiguities facing concept of terrorism. The other legal aspect on WoT, relates to 
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framing terrorism as a war. By declaring WoT, President George W. sought to frame 
terrorism as an existential threat. A threat that required extraordinary measures.14  
Debates abound on significance of framing the problem a war. The very 
definition led to adoption military strategies. One point of view regards WoT as a 
hyped continuation of cold war politics.15 That from first World War (WWI), US 
maintained a doctrine that postulated that defending Americans entailed engaging in 
wars abroad. Others argue that the 9/11 provided a convenient justification and a 
perfect cover for US quest for greater global hegemony projection.16 That by framing 
and defining the 9/11 attack as a war, it ought to provide a legitimate language for its 
intention to exercise imperialist powers, at both the domestic and international arena. 
From that perspective, 9/11 is therefore a platform for this war. There are also 
arguments that campaign on WoT has other objectives other than responding to 9/11.  
Rockmore argues that the campaign needs a moral justification that cannot be 
provided for by either the war in Afghanistan or Iraq.17  
From classical security perspective, wars were interstate. They entailed use of 
force. Framing terrorists within this framework credits them as equivalent to states. 
Secondly, war is not conducted in a vacuum. It is confined to international law. The 
law prescribes that only states (as actors) can engage in war, the justifications to go to 
war, rules governing its conduct, how non-combatants should be treated and other 
aspects of war. The law of war (now international humanitarian law), is specified in 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. States are subjects of international law. That 
international law is law; it must be observed.18 Terrorist groups are not subject to 
international law. The point here is that WoT does not fit within both traditional frame 
on war and thresholds of international law. It is an asymmetrical phenomenon that 
depict shift from inter-state to intra state conflict.  
Purist state-to-state realist lenses does not capture realities of wars in the 
contemporary security environment.19 The import of non-state actors, globalization 
and information age define the new terrain of conflicts.  US’ imperialistic reach 
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included invasion and occupation of foreign spaces, detention of terror suspects 
without trial like in Guantanamo Bay, use of torture, and extensive surveillance on US 
citizens among other quasi-legal measures to respond to the problem.20 This was 
complemented with an elaborate program entailing coercion and pressurizing other 
states to crack down terrorism encountered mixed reactions.  
These campaigns had multidimensional implications to US, public, other 
countries, non-state actors and threat evolution.  First, despite framing terrorism as 
threat to international security, they failed delegitimize it.21  States which partnered 
with US in these campaigns strengthened their coercive powers. These included 
expanded legal frameworks to prosecute and disrupt terror activities. However, they 
were criticized for violating human rights.22 The repressive actions by states also 
evoked negative reactions from sections of the population who gradually started to 
identify themselves with the ‘oppressed’, specifically the terrorists, while others 
engaged in activities that highlight their support and commitments to their new 
beliefs, identities, and/or others who hold them.  
Along this line, many states struggled with the pressure to enact anti-terrorism 
measures. Others could not take decisive action against terrorists.23 The US-led 
coalition treated such countries as terror sympathizers and enemies.  It was either 
“you are with us or against us”.24 All these served to aggravate the divide between the 
proponents of WoT and ‘others’. This further widened perceptual dissonance about its 
essence. The other issue is that WoT is now in its 18th year, and no end in sight. This 
raises the question whether it is feasible for states to wage wars without end.25 
Implications of this is that with a war without timeframe and limiting terrain or 
geographical locus, it is not possible to cordon off its parameters. It could imply an 
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infinite task. WoT is not bound by peacetime-wartime frames; it run in perpetuity.26 
Wartime has become the only kind of time states have. 
The vagueness of WoT policy was also reflected in US National Security 
Strategy (NSS) of 2002. It which described terrorism as an ‘enemy’ with a 
political/paramilitary facet and ideological paradigm.27 The strategy listed its 
objectives to be championing of aspirations for human dignity and strengthening 
alliances to defeat global terrorism. Others included working with other countries to 
defuse regional conflicts, preventing threats from WMDs, reforming national security 
institutions to meet challenges of 21st century, promoting free markets/trade, 
development, and democracy.28 Implications of this is that the issues are 
instrumentalized as capitalist ideals which are being imposed by US on other states.  
In 2006, US revised NSS with a clarification of who the enemy was. It branded the 
enemy to be the ‘militant Islamic radicalism’.29 This characterization limited terrorism 
to a particular religion. It clustered Islam with terrorism. This has shaped post 9/11 
national security policies by states with serious implications. For instance, this 
vagueness has complicated responses because an ideological adversary differs from a 
military one.30  
Conduct of WoT is also shrouded with many ethical concerns. Debates on 
respect for rule of law in the conduct of WoT transcend both parties in the conflict. 
The issues revolve around violation of civil liberties in the name of national 
security.31 The US-led coalition faced condemnation over its tactical operations.32 
They were deemed immoral, illegal, or both. Critics cited unlawful detention, torture 
and clandestine oversee prisons. Others faulted use of unmanned drones to kill 
suspected terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan.33 In the name of the sacrosanct WoT, 
wide-ranging anti-democratic and abuses of freedoms like undue surveillance, 
telephone interception, and monitoring of private electronic mails among others were 
imposed. An atmosphere of fear was artificially created and quickly exploited. This 
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led to emergence of “lawfare”: that states fighting WoT are also confronted by both 
the terrorists and by the limitations of the law.   
2.5 Significance of War on Terror 
One of the inescapable debate about global WoT is about its outcomes or 
success. Many scholars and practitioners have vigorously contested whether the 
aggressive counter terrorism policies by US after 9/11 have succeeded in preventing 
further attacks. There are arguments that WoT recorded successes in the first years. 
Eland list overthrowing of Taliban regime, arrests/elimination of terror suspects and 
closure of Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan as key milestones of WoT.34 He 
further observes that it led to enhanced international cooperation in global counter 
terrorism efforts. However, this is contended by others. Alan and David point to its 
ineptness of and lack of legitimacy.35 They argue jihadist groups, number, frequency 
and complexity of terror attacks fundamentally increased after 9/11. Others have cited 
inability of US to reconstruct the ‘conquered’ territories. That US underestimated 
difficulties of rebuilding functional governments after ousting Iraq and Afghanistan 
governments. It led to chaos and civil wars.36 Gen. Powell had warned about Iraq: “if 
you break it, you own it”.37 
There are also views that US got entrapped by responding “how” Osama bin 
Laden wanted.38 That it concentrated too much on Osama’s apocalyptic rhetoric and 
ignored his more specific agenda to divide and portray the world as pitting ‘believers 
and infidels’. They argue that Osama needed active support of states and people who 
share in the sense of grievances. He used terrorism to achieve that objective. This has 
fueled violent extremism groups like Al-Qaeda. The groups have rapidly transformed 
and sired clones and franchises to pursue the jihadist struggle.39  
Others claim that WoT policy by US was aggressive and controversial, but it 
worked. They contend that the campaign registered some successes, but some failures 
overshadowed it.  For instance, war in Afghanistan scattered Al-Qaeda but it also 
precipitated radicalization. This implies that US calculations failed to transform the 
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region. It instead strengthened resolve of other anti-US states like Iran. The region 
remains a terror threat. One of the criticisms on WoT is that it failed to stem 
radicalization or prevent radicalized individuals from becoming terrorists.40 Instead, 
as states upscaled WoT, terrorist groups continued to hold ground. There emerged 
homegrown radicalization, lone wolf phenomena and foreign fighters travelling to 
theatres of war like Iraq, Syria and Somalia. Use of force was reactive, evoking anger, 
frustration and radicalization. The approach was counterproductive: it did not win 
hearts and minds.  
Criticism on WoT extended to level of compliance by US on other states in 
tackling the problem. US pressurized other states especially those suspected to host 
Al-Qaeda members or sympathizers like Pakistan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and 
Algeria to crack down the groups and its activities.41 The targeted states were also 
coerced to reform their policies towards renouncing passive support for terrorist 
groups.42 All these resulted in targeted profiling of some states. It made their populace 
resentful while others evoked anti-US crusades. This shows that WoT ended up with 
unintended consequences. The most prominent of these is radicalization of the people 
it was meant to save. These issues were aggravated by the deliberate and focused 
crafting of moderate Islam messaging targeting Muslim populations.43 The WoT had 
failed to recognize that the threat has no race, region, religion, or otherwise. 
2.6 Terrorism as an evolving threat 
Terrorism is a struggle. A form of warfare resorted to by those who are 
militarily disadvantaged but support a cause they are ready to fight for. Rapoport 
conceptualizes terrorism in four waves.44 They begin with Anarchist in 1880s, 
Nationalist, Marxist in early/mid-twentieth century, to the present Religious Wave. 
This framework is one of most influential explanation in terrorism studies. Looking at 
terrorism as a resort to revolutionary violence provides a useful tool to categorize and 
analysis terrorist groups and their activities. Such conceptualization reflections on the 
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global WoT, particularly understanding the kind of threat the world is faced with. It is 
an ever-evolving threat. A conflict in transition. 
Rapoport’s framework exemplify that terrorists rise and fall. That groups 
emerge and dissolve naturally when they can no longer inspire others to continue with 
the struggle. This suggest that terrorism, terrorist groups and their motivations are 
reflected by conditions and changes in social and political contexts. However, this 
raises questions on the character of current social and political context of 
contemporary wave of terrorism. Critical issues that emerge are who defines this 
context, does it require unanimity, or can it be defined in a country-specific context 
like the current WoT, and what are its implications on WoT and its future. From this 
perspective, the strategies and tactics employed by terrorists in each of these waves’ is 
should be mirrored in the strategies adopted by states in responding to these threats. 
For WoT, the strategies to counter terrorism cannot be one-fit all. The strategies 
cannot be imposed on other, but rather need to be context specific. 
Parker and Nick have argued that it is ‘not waves, it is Strains’.45 They view 
held terrorists learn and emulate each other. There is therefore no clear distinction in 
terrorist violence. It is the same thing driven by successive broad historical trends. 
Concept of strains underscore that terrorist groups learn from both contemporary and 
history. They then design their goals, strategies and tactics based on that knowledge. 
This framework suggests four strains of terrorism. They are socialist, nationalist, 
religious extremism, and exclusionism. This means that terrorism occurs all over the 
world because its actors are motivated differentially.  
It suggests that underlying motivators of terrorist actors are not sequential. 
Instead, the strains can co-exist and work in parallel. They can overlap and motivate 
other networks. What all these means to the global WoT is that terrorism is a complex 
threat which engenders local, national and international networks that can support 
each other or have overlapping goals.  It is against this background that scholars have 
shifted focus to proactive measures to counter terrorism. The measures are dubbed 
Counter Violent Extremism (CVE).46 They entail addressing underlying factors, 
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prevent violent extremism and promote resilience in the societies. CVE focuses on 
use of soft power approaches to co-opting people rather than coercing them.47 
2.7 Conclusions  
This dissertation took a critical perspective on the global WoT. It raised some 
legal and strategic issues that challenging its current conceptualization. These issues 
have impacted on responses designed by states to terrorism conflict. The current 
threat differs from traditional security threats both in scope and complexity. Its 
character is aggravated by change of tactics and strategies by actors involved. This 
means that degardless of lack of unified definition, the threat is ever evolving and 
threatening the survival of the state. WoT is not eliminating or reducing the terrorism 
threat. Instead, it is aggravating it. These dynamics have constrained states in terms 
policy and strategy responses in dealing with the problem.  
WoT is framed to fight in physical terrain. On the flipside, terrorism entail war 
of ideas and motivations. Fighting ideas and a ghostly enemy is almost impossible 
undertaking. This thesis argues that there is a problem with fundamental assumptions 
underlying WoT. Whereas the war is essentially asymmetrical, response policies and 
strategies by states are still caged with the state-centric lens. The WoT will not solely 
be won through military might. The assumptions also include the significance of 
framing the problem a 'war’. The role and effect of inappropriate aggressive strategies 
by states has not been contemplated. At the same time, factors like like deprivation 
and structural conflicts have been ignored. While terrorism endures, the forces of 
contemporary security environment like globalization and information age have 
exacerbated it. This includes how terrorist groups recruit individuals and then use 
them to carry out attacks. The security environment has radically shifted from 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TERRORISM AS CONFLICT  
3.1 Introduction  
This Chapter informs the thesis by creating a focal point to analyze the 
mutative character of terrorism threat, actors, modus operandi and their goals. It 
examines terrorism first as a conflict, and as a conflict in transition. This appreciation 
links and bring to fruition issues that arose in the literature review and debates that 
emerged in Chapter two. The Chapter is organized into five thematic areas; concept of 
conflict, subjective and objective views of conflict, terrorism as a conflict, terrorism 
as a conflict in transition, and ripe moments in terrorism conflict analysis. 
3.2 Concept of conflict 
A clear conceptualization of conflict is important for research, legal and 
policy. However, it is difficult to define conflict because it is shrouded with 
subjectivism and cultural settings.1 What is considered to be conflict in one culture 
may not be considered so in another. The methodologies of conflict management also 
differ from one culture to another.2 Nevertheless, it is possible to outline some shared 
features of conflicts.  Conflict is a struggle or contest between parties with 
incompatible needs, ideas, beliefs, values or goals.3 It has to do with survival of a 
party. The parties or subjects could be states or non-state actors.  
Conflicts are endemic in society; as long as there are human beings in the 
world, there will always be conflict.4 They will always play an important part of 
human life. Conflicts are symptoms of spirit in society.5 It can be good or bad; has 
both destructive and constructive facets.6 This means that it carries both a warning 
and promise. This thesis view conflict as incompatibility of visions, inability and/or 
unwillingness to see other party’s point of view. 
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There are various levels of conflict. These levels reflect the many parties, 
causes and diversity of conflicts. Levels of conflict can broadly be conceptualized 
variedly as inter-personal, family, social/group, industrial, communal, national, 
international, intra-state and inter-state conflicts among others. For instance, in inter-
personal conflict, the parties and causes of the conflict are at individual (personal) 
level.  There are multiple explanations about conflict and its causes. Individual level 
concern with motivations that can lead one to engage in aggressive behavior. State 
level entail decision making processes that can lead to conflict. Needs, motives and 
reasons for conflict transcends these levels. 
Conflicts is classified in many ways. The ensuing types and the attendant 
theories of conflict are reflected in the complexity of human society, its motivations 
and interactions. First, conflicts is classified and dichotomized as violent and non-
violent.7 Violent conflict manifests in physical harm of those affected by it, while 
non-violent conflict is devoid of physical harm. One of the central claims of classical 
realism is about nature of man. He is seen to be aggressive and conflictual by nature. 
This view has not changed.8 This understanding is used to analyze distribution and 
changes in power and interests, in milieu of conflicts among states and system 
stability. States are constantly interacting and influencing each other. They are seen as 
billiard balls: knocking each other constantly.9 The sharp end of violent conflict is 
war. Conflict is thus seen as war that span from traditional state system. 
Non-violent conflict is often invisible or even unimagined, thus more difficult 
to deal with. Curle’s laid foundation for refinement of conceptualization of non-
violent conflict by challenging the traditional dual classification and dichotomy of 
war and peace.10 He typified that it is possible to have no war and not have peace, and 
it is possible to have no peace without being at war; a third condition of 
unpeacefulness. This was later refined as structural conflict.  Although structural 
conflict is informally seen as non-violent, its sharp end is structural violence.11  It is 
thus not less harmful than violent conflict. Structural conflicts can give us early 
warning on issues that require remedy. Addressing structural conflict necessitate 
change of the structure which is responsible for the conflict.  
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3.3 Subjective and objective views of conflict  
Classifying conflict as either violent or structural raises questions of whether it 
must be perceived for it to exist.12 This has elicited debates pitting two schools of 
thought; subjectivists and objectivists. The subjective view posits that conflict exists 
only when incompatibility of goals is subjectively perceived. From this perspective, if 
people cannot subjectively perceive a conflict, they cannot be said to be in a situation 
of conflict. Objectivists argue that its possible to be in a state of conflict even when 
people do not immediately experience it. They view conflict as being embedded in 
social structures thus can exist independently of people’s perception of it. Literature 
posit that underlying conditions of terrorism are structural and cultural dimensions.13 
This situates causal factors of terrorism to objective view. The problem exists with or 
without perception of states.  
The subjective/objective schools of thought have certain implications in 
conflict and its management. To subjectivists, parties to a conflict must first 
experience it. This means that its management revolves on involvement of pertinent 
parties. Objective view posits that conflict exists even without realizing it. This means 
underscores salience of third-party interventions in conflict management. Situating 
terrorism within this school of thought implies that it needs intermediaries. Third 
parties delineate the conflict so that the parties can feel or experience it. As currently 
conceptualized, WoT is devoid of intermediary mechanism to make parties perceive 
the conflict. Subjectivists approach conflict from the perspective of negotiation and 
analysis while avoiding taking sides in a conflict. For WoT, this imply that states and 
terrorists must independently perceive the conflict before entering into negotiations to 
end it.  
Objectivists approach conflict from perspective of taking action to change 
structures. It is thus activist in character. Distinction between subjective and objective 
views to conflict delineates peace research (objectivists) and conflict research 
(subjectivist).14 Conceptually, objective view of conflict imposes its own values on 
the conflict. It is conceivable that two observers who hold different values would 
interpret the same situation differently. This portends serious implications on the 
management of that conflict. The other debatable issue relates to sources of conflict. 
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Sources of conflict inform its responses. Two types of literature is generated in this 
debate. The nature and nurture. Those who argue for the nature school of thought 
contend that human beings are inherently (by nature) violent and aggressive. Violence 
is thus inevitable as it is part of human nature.  
Nurture school of thought contests people being violent or aggressive by 
nature. It argues that people are conditioned by their surrounding environment.  This 
suggests that violence is learned. It means that it can be unlearned by changing the 
environment that caused it. The analytical thrust from these debates is that perception 
of the sources of conflict informs its management. The nature conceptualization of 
sources of conflict could be inclined to use of force and repression. WoT has 
responded to terrorism through use of force. It means that the problem is being 
perceived to be inherent in man (caused by nature). Terrorism is not perceived as 
linked with the environment in which people find themselves in. The nurture view 
responds to conflict vide accommodation and negotiation approaches. A closer 
scrutiny of underlying conditions of terrorism threat, nature, causes, contestations, and 
plausible responses point to structural and cultural dimensions.15 
Classical thinking emphasizes on analysis of symmetric conflicts. It delves 
into role of representation, sovereignty, identity and states system in causing conflicts. 
Such state centric approaches do not capture realities of the contemporary 
environment.16 The period is characterized by proliferation of security actors, means 
of using force, sources and internationalization of internal conflicts.17 With end of 
Cold War, large supply of idle arms led to increase in intra-state/civil wars. This 
prompted United National Security Council (UNSC) to recognize these wars as threat 
to international peace and security.18 It shifted initial meaning of UN Charter that saw 
threats to international peace and security as only emanating only from inter-state 
wars.  
In classical politics, power was associated with states, that had a monopoly on 
bearing arms and hence engaging in wars. However, these dynamics changed with 
non-state actors having access to arms. This broke the state monopoly on bearing 
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arms. The character of the wars was therefore asymmetric in the sense that one party 
has arms, armies, legitimacy and the monopoly of bearing arms; the other has arms 
but not the others: and hence its strategies are different to enable it to make the best of 
its strengths. A new understanding of security emerged.  9/11 underscored these 
dynamics. The power politics theories have not yet come to terms with these 
developments.19 They are still fixated with inter-states conflicts. The state centric 
lenses do not fit in the changed security environment characterized by logarithmic and 
unpredictable change.20 
3.4 Terrorism as a conflict 
The definitional ambiguity of terrorism makes it difficult to engage on the 
concept and its discourses. However, many definitions concede about threat and 
unlawful use of violence with intent to advance political, religious and ideological 
causes. Terrorism is seen as a communicative violence. It is also depicted as a bad 
form of conflict. This suggests that another category (of good conflict) exists. One 
that does not function as terrorism.21 This characterization postulates that political 
violence is disciplined and controllable. It means that despite contentions in defining 
terrorism, it exists as an objective ontological category of conflict. Terrorism conflict 
is intertwined with critical approaches to political violence. The threat is created when 
violent resistance is abstracted from its formative conditions and crude form.22  
Terrorism is a form of political violence directed against civilians with a 
coercive to cause fear. It is also seen as form of dissent. From this perspective, 
national security policy and strategy is a force of dominance to crush this dissent.23 
However, conditions surrounding political violence and how to change it are central 
concerns of peace studies and conflict research.24 This linkage is core to 
understanding direct, structural and cultural violence in which the former is 
embedded.25 
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Terrorism conflict is hinged on idea of mobilization of actors on things like 
history and ideology. Its concern is with individual motivations which can lead to 
conflictual behavior. This makes conflict theory a useful tool for analyzing strategies 
for dealing with terrorists, by seeing terrorism as a conflict. However, terrorism is not 
properly dissected and appreciated as a conflict. Bulk of literature on terrorism have 
not captured the underlying motivations, goals and needs to explain terrorism 
violence. WoT is based on symmetrical thinking.26 Such frameworks falter when 
confronted with violence from non-state actors.  
These problems are exported to national security policies and strategies. The 
strategies are inclined to settlement rather than resolution of conflict. The distinction 
between settlement and resolution of conflict has certain implications for the conflict 
management approach and the nature of resultant peace. While a resolution portends a 
long-term solution, settlement is short-term.27 The conventional strategies for 
confronting terrorism are primarily law and order measures and state-sanctioned use 
of force. They are predisposed to settlement. This does not address root of the 
conflict. Whereas settlement relies on power, resolution negates it. A conflict 
settlement thus addresses causes; but resolution deals with underlying factors of the 
conflict. The relationship between settlement and resolution of conflict is derived 
from methodology used to settle the conflict. Resolution is more permanent, 
settlement is temporal. 
Terrorism conflict has challenged the realist perceptions on both international 
law and International Relations.28 International law is not properly grounded terrorism 
conflict within the larger national security frameworks. It has not reflected on the 
impact of forces beyond the state and legal responses.29 National security policies and 
strategies are confronted with the challenge of adapting to a legal regime to address 
the evolving issues around non-state actors and extra-territorial problems. In legal 
perspectives about the role of international law in war, the law serves to limit the 
dimensions of the war. But in WoT, nobody finds out the causes and its limits of the 
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war within the law.30 It is thus a purely legal and legalistic strategy. For instance, it 
lacks a clear enemy and specific geographic location. This has caused a political 
paralysis of some sort.31  
Terrorism is a political problem. It thus necessitates political solutions as 
opposed to legal ones which are unable to swim in that arena.32 Without a physical 
space to challenge terrorism and WoT, states risk falling into a de-territorialized 
domain against which they are fighting. This renders other actors unable to politically 
engage in this conflict. National security policies have cast terrorism as ‘other’ out 
there, not within or among us. This fear of the “other” has directed states to action 
even when results are displaced. Like other contemporary conflicts, terrorism is an 
internationalized conflict. Even in instances where it may appear to be an internal 
issue, it is internationalized by interests and networks of actors involved. The media 
has served to internationalize conflicts by publicizing conflicts and related activities 
like violations of international human rights law beyond territorial boundaries.33 
Equally, during terrorist campaigns, terrorists and insurgents often target or seek 
refuge in foreign states. This effectively transforms the conflict from just domestic 
contest into an international issue. Explanations why terrorist organizations choose to 
internationalize conflicts are as political their cause. 
Historically, people have used violent revolutions to free themselves.34 The 
thinking here is that violence can achieves beneficial ends; it can lead to restructuring 
of state institutions. This means that when other channels of seeking justice for 
grievances are exhausted, violence is contemplated. It means that violence has 
rationality. This does not make violence right. Terrorists have instrumentalized it to 
highlight structural conflicts. However, classical power politics have not come to 
terms with this development. It is against this background that CVE strategies enters 
this discourse. They pursue non-military approaches to address terrorism. The focus is 
on the underlying structural issues not merely the communicative violence. The actors 
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and manifestation of the conflict vary with time, but the causal factors endure. As 
Kaldor argues, the so called “new wars” are not new.35 This caution against obsession 
with the ‘newness’ of wars at the expense of political elements driving these wars.  
Although literature concedes that terrorism is a form of conflict, perceptions 
abound that it cannot be investigated using conflict management frameworks. It is 
disassociated from study of conflict. This dissertation is designed to challenge this 
perception. Failure to reflect on terrorism as a conflict in transition portends serious 
strategic implications on national security policies and attendant strategies by states to 
tackle the problem, and on scholarship. This dissertation provokes debates along these 
lines by contributing to theoretical tenets on how management of conflict in transition 
can inform discourses on CVE. Conceptualizing terrorism as a conflict has profound 
implications on its study and analysis. This includes conception of probable responses 
to terrorism conflict.  
3.5 Terrorism as a conflict in transition  
Conventional conflict analysis focuses on its profile or history, actors 
involved, their perspectives, structural/proximate causes and attendant interactions.36 
Two groups of literature emerge in conflict analysis. The first group of literature view 
conflict as a short-term phenomenon. This implies that it can be resolved permanently 
through mediation or other intervention processes. Its responses entail outcomes in 
which issues are satisfactorily dealt with. This is through solutions that are mutually 
acceptable to the parties, self-sustaining, and leads to new or positive relationship 
between previous hostilities.37 Proceeding from this view, conflict resolution connotes 
a sense of finality. It means that parties are mutually satisfied with the outcome of a 
settlement and the conflict is resolved permanently.  
A conflict is resolved when needs of parties involved are met and their fears 
allayed. This makes it a protracted pursuit of necessary satisfiers to parties involved. 
For terrorism, this pursuit is intricate because the actors involved are always changing 
strategies, tactics and given the volatility of operating environment. The complication 
emerges because the conflict is in transition. Rapoport’s framework denotes that 
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terrorists rise and fall.38 That the groups emerge and dissolve when they can no longer 
inspire others to continue with the struggle or violent resistance to authorities in 
pursuit of redress of their grievances. Parker and Nick have argued that it is ‘not 
waves, it is Strains’.39 They observe that terrorists learn and emulate each other. It 
suggests that terrorist actors are motivated differentially. Responding to a 
transforming conflict is complex undertaking due to the changing character of the 
conflict, actors involved and lack of necessary conditions for successful negotiations, 
most critical being a mutually hurting stalemate.40 
By framing terrorism as a conflict in transition, this study holds that peace and 
conflict management frameworks can enhance our understanding of terrorism. They 
can also illuminate on the asymmetrical character of the violence and required 
responses. This analyses terrorism and CVE strategies through epistemological and 
ontological aspects on conflict management. This heralds an alternative approach to 
appreciate root causes, expanded responses. Both international relations and 
international law prescribe that settlement of conflicts be done through peaceful 
means. Peaceful settlement of conflicts entails multifaceted methods like negotiations, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement among others.  
Managing conflicts in transition asks which of the transitioning conflicts is 
more amenable to negotiation. This means that CVE strategies need to isolate the 
various contentions of terrorism conflict and frame conceivable ones for resolution. It 
entails construction of an in-built normative dimension that defines the desired end 
state of political change. In “Mediation in transitional conflict: Eritrea”, Ottaway 
brings to live the intricacies of tracking and transiting with conflict during the thirty 
years of Eritrean conflict with Ethiopia.41 In this this case, what had started as a 
bilateral conflict between the government and Eritreans, progressively transited to a 
multilateral conflict thereby complicating negotiations. Transitional characteristics 
diminishes prospects of conditions necessary for successful negotiations, particularly 
a mutually hurting stalemate. What all this means is that mediator need to focus on 
not just the end-state model/solutions, but also interim (transitional) dynamics, policy 
and strategy arrangements that would allow entry points to gradual end of the conflict.  
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3.6 Ripe moments in conflict analysis  
Zartman's ripeness theory illuminates crucial dynamics of conflicts and 
plausible framework to its resolution.42 It outlines ripe moment of a conflict crisis in 
three perspectives. First, there is a mutual painful stalemate that is marked by recent 
or impending catastrophe. The second aspect is when both parties' efforts at unilateral 
solutions or 'tracks' are blocked. This implies that bilateral options or tracks are 
conceivable.  The last aspect is a long slope where the 'ins' start to slip and the 'outs' 
start to surge.43 Still on ripe moments, Mitchell has observed four relevant types of 
structural ripeness.44 They are hurting stalemate, imminent mutual catastrophe, 
entrapment, and enticing opportunity. His analysis of the linkages between objective 
and subjective illustrate that decision making plays a crucial role in creating and 
recognizing ripe moments. This framework could be used to analyze terrorism 
conflict. 
The psychological dimension to the realization of hurting stalemates is not an 
objective thing, but a subjective one. Each party must independently come to the 
realization that it has reached a hurting stalemate. Shift in psychological perception of 
conflict imply that ripeness is not wholly dependent on structural changes. This 
suggests that relationship between psychological perception and structural changes is 
dialectical. They must be there and interact to create ripeness or willingness. The 
issue therefore is how will a third party become privy to this subjective realization. 
Ripeness model suggests that conflict resolution is pegged proper appreciation of 
right moment in an environment of differing patterns and escalation.  
The model gives primacy to proper context analysis of conflict, its relationship 
actors, instability and peace. A ripe moment for resolving a conflict is linked to 
plateaus and precipices which produces varying pressure deadlocks and deadlines.45 It 
is reached when one side is unable to achieve its aims. This cycle is complete when 
the other party reaches similar perception. The parties reach a mutually hurting 
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stalemate. They can no longer escalate their way to victory. The costs of countering 
efforts of the other side make it a costly deadlock.  
Stalemates can emerge from desperation, attrition or frustration.46 It is where 
both sides are completely exhausted, and none can see victory. Stalemate of attrition 
is where neither party is being significantly hurt and none can destroy or neutralize 
the other. Lastly, stalemate of frustration occurs when adversaries realize that they 
cannot achieve a clear victory irrespective of their efforts and resources. A hurting 
stalemate is not a phase for resting or recouping, but an unpleasant terrain that 
stretches into the strategic realm, with no possibility for decisive escalation of the 
conflict or for a graceful exit.47 It calls for negotiating truce and reducing violence 
between the warring parties. Both parties reach a point where they cannot continue 
fighting. When this happens, the situation is ripe for resolution.48 Each party is 
uncomfortable with the costly dead-end it has gotten itself.  
In such circumstances, conflict resolution rests on perceptions of this dead-end 
situation. If parties lack this discernment, a mediator can persuade them that any 
escalation is not possible. Each party has to recognize the strength of opponent and 
his inability to surpass it. With focus on implementation of peace agreements in 
Africa, works by Anyona suggests that the theory of ripe moments is not properly 
appreciated and exploited.49 Through a comparative analysis of similar cases of 
internal conflicts and their mediation in Mozambique and Angola, she analysis why 
the outcomes of mediation in the two cases were different.  She attributes it to 
contextual differences in the timing and dynamics of ripe moments. This implies that 
contextual failure to discern and appreciate ripe moments leads to varied outcomes to 
cases that even look similar. All this points to importance of proper understanding 
conflict with its dynamics, discerning and seizing the ripe moments depending with 
the contexts.  
Neither party in the WoT seem to be winning. The conflict has reached a 
stalemate of a kind. A moment that has kept both parties from achieving their goals. 
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The stalemate in WoT is not necessarily of an identical degree. Central issue is that 
neither party sees likelihood of an end or victory. They have exhausted their resources 
and thus strong incentives to seek resolution of the conflict. Continued fighting is 
painful and costly to both parties. However, these hurting stalemates in terrorism 
conflict are not static. They are always shifting as the operating environment changes 
with the actors involved strategically changing their offensive and defensive tools and 
strategies. As a result, not all ripe moments are acted upon. This is the dilemma that 
ought to bother CVE strategies. They should understand full range of terrorism 
conflict as it evolves.  
CVE strategies need to mirror the character of the operating environment they 
are meant for. Ripeness is a perceptual concept. This means that parties feel a mutual 
hurting stalemate. However, this feeling has a source in the reality of relations 
between the parties. CVE strategies need to identify and isolate the hurting of the 
actors involved and its content as the conflict evolves. This will pave the way for 
eventual adoption of wider conflict management strategies. Timing is a crucial aspect 
in identifying the hurting stalemate and resolving conflicts. The challenge then, is to 
identify conditions where parties perceive more costs than benefits in pursuing 
conflict.50 The attendant strategies must be transient to correspond with the terrain of 
the operating environment. This implies that CVE strategies must be flexible and not 
one-sided; they must be valid for the stage of transition the conflict is at. It also means 
that CVE strategies must no longer be seen from solely a state-centric perspective. 
The ripeness framework is plausible to map requisite multipronged inter-actions for a 
better appreciation of the dynamics of terrorism conflict and eventually grasp the ripe 
moment. 
3.7 Conclusions  
The terrain in which conflicts have traditionally been conceptualized has 
radically shifted to asymmetric and symbolic terrains. This has necessitated scholars 
and policy makers to go back to the drawing board to re-examine at the underlying 
assumptions. This study has analytically situated and categorized terrorism as a 
conflict in transition within the precincts of conflict management. It has exemplified 
that despite clear similarities of actors and the root causes of contemporary conflicts 
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and terrorism. There is a divide between conflict and terrorism analysis. Whereas 
discrete literature on conflict management and counter terrorism exists, there is little 
interaction of the two. Analyzing terrorism as a conflict in transition in relation to ripe 
moments theory illuminates the understanding of terrorism conflict and its resolution.  
By taking advantage of occasional hurting stalemate plateaus, CVE strategies 
can settle terrorism conflict. The issue is how to the capture conflict at the moment. 
The thesis questions whether CVE strategies are designed to capture the conflict at the 
time they are formulated, or they become stale once the conflict transforms. The 
transitional character of terrorism arises from the changing strategies the parties 
involved adopt. For instance, the terrorism that required KDF to enter into Somalia 
was not the same as two years later. Two years later the terrorism had transited to 
radicalization. This implies that CVE strategies must be flexible and not one-sided; 
they must be valid for the stage of transition the conflict is at. They must no longer be 
seen from solely a state-centric perspective. Rather than reconciling the two parties, 
WoT is serving to further to separate them. A challenge for CVE strategies is thus to 





















COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN WAR ON TERROR 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter three examined terrorism as a conflict in transition. It addressed the 
shifting character of terrorism threat, actors, and their strategies. The Chapter argued 
that as a conflict in transition, it necessitates new response tools. This Chapter picks 
up the discourse from there by tracing the origin and development of counter violent 
extremism (CVE) as a strategy in WoT. Beyond historicizing global CVE approaches, 
it critically examines its theory and practice as an aspect of War on Terror. This 
chapter is organized into five. The first examines violent extremism, radicalization 
and their conceptual contestations. It then delves into global CVE practice alongside 
coercive approaches and its implications.  
4.2 Understanding violent extremism 
The aftermath of 9/11 necessitated states to rethink the nature and kind of 
threat the world was facing. Initially, use of force was considered to be an appropriate 
response. However, this response was not solving the problem but instead aggravating 
it.1 Questions arose about emergence of homegrown terrorists and lone wolf 
phenomenon. The 2004 Madrid train bombings and 2005 public transit bombings in 
London exemplified these dynamics.2 This search for plausible explanations found 
that the problem was within. It is this realization that shifted focus towards explaining 
violent extremism and its root causes. This shift had implications on response tools to 
the problem. Central to this new understanding was phenomenon of radicalization to 
violent extremism.  
However, despite this shift violent extremism is defined subjectively. This has 
caused isolation of political, ideological and other aspects of violence. This makes it 
difficult to engage the concept of violent extremism, and the policies and strategies 
designed to address it. However, there are contextual definitions by states, 
organizations and other actors. This means it is interpreted subjectively. This is also 
reflected in the policy responses. What is common is view that the approach seeks 
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policy responses that seek to address push and pull factors that drive individuals and 
groups to extremist violence.3  
There are debates about relationship between violent extremism and terrorism. 
Some have argued that both concepts are synonymous.4 That terrorism was a highly 
politicized term that needed to be replaced to redeem WoT. However, violent 
extremism is interpreted more broadly than terrorism, to include a wider range of 
groups. Literature argue that violent extremism is different from terrorism, but both 
seek to achieve politically motivated goals through violent means.5 However, it is the 
commitment to violence that distinguishes a terrorist from other extremists.6 The 
problem manifests in different forms and expressions depending on contexts where it 
grows. Extremism is context dependent.7 It is viewed as advocating, engaging, 
preparing, and/or supporting ideologically motivated, and justified use of violence to 
further social, economic or political objectives.8 Traditionally, groups like ISIS, Boko 
Haram, Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda formed the global understanding of violent 
extremism.9  
This understanding still shapes many national and international security 
policies. It means that attendant responses target a certain ‘enemy’ out there. Yet, 
recent trends have looped in subtle groups and lone wolfs. This shows that violent 
extremism is not confined to one group, ideology, religion or political goal. Its varied 
contexts and characteristics lead to subjective policies and strategies. This makes it 
difficult for states and international community to respond to it.  Some countries have 
borrowed from generic violent extremism toolkits and strategies with presumptive 
variables and drivers of radicalization. This means that they don’t match the realities 
of threat in the operating environment.  
                                                          
3 Anne Aly and Jason-Leigh Striegher. Examining the Role of Religion in Radicalization to Violent 
Islamist Extremism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35:12, 2012, 849-862, 
4 Refer to Neumann, Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that lead to Terrorism 
5 Frazer O. and C. Nünlist. “The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism”, CSS Analyses in Security 
Policy, No. 183.2015 
6 Maluki Patrick and Seif Rashid. Using soft power to Counter Violent Extremism among the Youth, in 
Kenya, In Mustafa Y. Ali, Mumo Nzau, and Hassan Khannenje (eds). The changing dynamics of 
terrorism & violent extremism. An Analysis. (Nairobi: International Conference on Terrorism and 
Violent Extremism. HORN International institute for strategic studies, 2018). Chap.5. 
7 Fiore Geelhoed, “Fundamentalism,” in Jeffrey Ian Ross, ed., Religion and Violence: An Encyclopedia 
of Faith and Conflict from Antiquity to the Present (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2011), p. 368 
8Frazer and Nünlist, The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism 
9 United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, 
United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, General Assembly, p. 4, December 24, 2015. 
55 
In Kenya, Al-Shabaab has upscaled radicalization and information warfare 
with the purpose of influencing its followers. This entails exploiting perceived socio-
political grievances and global jihadist narrative. It blends truths and falsehoods to 
construct narratives that subvert reality. The group’s propaganda strategy is linked to 
Somali nationalism and Kenya’s Operation Linda Nchi intervention.10 These are 
combined with local narratives that exploit structural grievances, injustices and anti-
Muslims rhetoric. Al-Shabaab in Somalia seek to overthrow government and establish 
an Islamic caliphate. Though it focuses on East Africa, its dream is akin to Al-
Qaida’s.  Kenya’s response to Al-Shabaab should be grounded on knowledge of these 
context realities to capture the moments of the conflict.  
4.3 Understanding radicalization 
There have been many attempts to explain radicalization as a key component 
of violent extremism. For instance, Anne argue that the concept of radicalization is a 
predictor of violent behavior.11 It is also described as the stage when one accepts 
violence as a possible and legitimate course of action.12 This process entails 
indoctrination with narratives that provide easy answers to causes and solutions to 
grievances. It makes individuals derive fulfilment, meaning, belonging, acceptance, 
purpose, value, esteem, dignity and pride in defending their cause. This perspective on 
radicalization have largely focused on ideology. From this understanding, its 
antithesis is de-radicalization. Ideology and action are occasionally linked; but not 
always.13 This is a narrow perception. It suggests radicalization is a necessary 
precursor to for violent behavior.  
New literature suggest that terrorism and violent extremism are beyond 
ideology. That some individuals harbor radical justifications but don’t necessarily 
engage in violent extremism. This means that there are many pathways for different 
people in diverse periods and in varying contexts.14 Violent extremism is now 
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examined through a framework of push-pull factors.15 However, the commonly 
referenced drivers/push-pull factors to violent extremism are too generic to adequately 
and consistently explain radicalization. Some literature view radicalization to violent 
extremism as a process involving series of successive stages.16 That it is an ordered 
path where terrorism is ultimate manifestation of radicalization. Among the common 
model is the four phased account.17 It has pre-radicalization, self-identification, 
indoctrination and violent extremism phases. Pre-radicalization is entry point for 
individuals and groups in that progression. They are induced and exposed to radical 
ideology by recruiters. During the self-identification recruits begins to explore new 
ideology. They subscribe to the group’s cause and gravitate old identity. 
The indoctrination stage entails progressive intensification of radical beliefs 
and adoption of extremist ideology. They unconditionally believe that action is 
required to support a cause through violence. In the last phase of violent extremism, 
recruits willingly use violence to justify their causes. They embrace a mindset that 
legitimizes and encourages violence to address issue that are against their belief. It is 
argued that these phases are autonomous. Recruits do not necessarily go through a 
linear sequence of progression. They may abandon the path at any point. However, 
individuals who complete the process are more likely to commit terrorist acts.18 
However, others have contended this phased process of radicalization. Instead, 
they argue that it is not an exact progression.19 That individuals may engage in 
extremist behavior for various reasons. They may be radicalized before or after 
joining the group. This school of thought faults notion of violence being adapted only 
as an end. It argues that framing radicalization as a pre-terrorism phenomenon risks 
alienating groups that may never become violent.20 It exacerbates drivers of 
extremism like identity, polarization and marginalization. Despite criticism, the four-
phased radicalization model remain a crucial explanation for radicalization. The 
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model explains how individuals can become terrorists. It is therefore used to construct 
psychological reforms like de-radicalization and disengagement programs.21 
Growth in lone wolf violence and use of social media to recruit has changed 
perceptions on what used to be considered domestic terrorism or violent extremism.22 
Globalization, exploitation of social media and lone wolf phenomenon has challenged 
the traditional lenses of looking at violent extremism. Against these conceptual 
challenges, violent extremist groups like Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab 
have exploited these developments to their advantage. This has contributed to 
insecurity in Sahel, Lake Chad basin and Greater Horn of Africa. These dynamics 
have complicated efforts to understand and pace with the threat as the actors involved 
change strategies.  There have also been misconceptions that link violent extremism 
to Islamist violence.23 Its implication is that violence by other religious ideologies are 
not considered as violent extremism. Linking of Islamist extremism or radicalism with 
terrorism has inevitably profiled and elicited stigma to the Muslim community. 
Conceptually, such division of violence is faulty. If an extremist from 
wherever attacks, we need to look at the outcome without really distinguishing to 
religious affiliation. These biases have made most Muslim communities in West, 
Middle East and Greater Horn of Africa to view global WoT as a veiled attack against 
Islam. Africa’s vulnerabilities to radicalization are multifaceted and entwined with its 
history. They are shaped issues like underdevelopment, exclusion structures, 
incomplete peacebuilding and disjointed nation-building.24 The continent is also 
confounded by complexities of delivering peace and stability, particularly linked to 
managing its increasing youthful population. Some argue that a key impediment 
facing current CVE in Africa efforts is the lack of funding.25 At the center of Africa’s 
threat picture are narratives with multifaceted grievances and injustices at individual 
and communal level. Consequently, violent extremist ideologies exploit these 
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injustices, deprivation, low levels of education and desperation to challenge to the 
status quo. The recruiters tailor the messages to suit different contexts and individuals 
targeted. 
4.4 Counter Violent Extremism 
Assessment on global WoT pointed to an indicting judgement. Despite 
disrupting terrorist plots, WoT failed to defuse global violent extremism threat. There 
was consensus that traditional counter terrorism policies were reactive and overlooked 
underlying factors.  Furthermore, coercive counter terrorism was generating and 
adding into the pool of radicalization. As WoT proceeded, many homegrown Jihadist 
networks and cells emerged.26 Terrorist threat and networks, which were earlier 
perceived to only emanate only from the Middle East, proliferated to other 
jurisdictions. With emphasis on coercive approaches, terrorist continued to hold 
ground with increased radicalization; the threat was persistent, not fixed to regions or 
territories.27 
Developments like rise of ISIS, home-grown terrorism, proliferation of foreign 
fighters, and exploitation of cyberspace pointed to failure in WoT.28 It is against this 
background that CVE approaches were devised. However, there is no consensus on its 
definition. This means it is explored diversely in theory and practice.29 CVE reflects 
on soft power approaches to counter terrorism. It seeks to win hearts and minds of 
people rather than coerce them. Shandon argues that CVE emphasizes on non-
coercive attempts to reduce involvement in violent extremism.30 These include pre-
emptive and preventive measures like ideological and communicative interventions.31 
Others are political approaches to address grievances, nation building and social 
cohesion.32  
CVE need to be conceived in the realm policies. This entails programmes and 
interventions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violent extremism. It 
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refers to banner of efforts to prevent radicalization and possibly help individuals to 
disengage. This general conception of CVE means it lacks precision.33 It need not to 
be generalized because it is determined by local settings. Although violent extremism 
is often associated with groups like ISIS, ISIL, Al-Qaida, Al-Shabab and Boko Haram, 
it is not new.  
As early as 2001, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) had advocated for alternative approaches to counter terrorism. It decried the 
failure by military approaches to addressing root causes of problem.34 However, 
urgency and emphasis for CVE was accelerated by bombing in Madrid and London in 
2004 and 2005 respectively. There were upscaled efforts in Europe to respond to 
homegrown Islamist terrorism. Some literature suggest that United Kingdom’s 
Prevent Programme was the first applied CVE initiative in prevention of jihadist 
radicalization. It accelerated clarion for holistic approaches to address conditions 
conducive to terrorism. United Nations Development Program rooted for strategies to 
tackle factors that that make people engage in violent extremism.35 Lack of definition 
brought challenges of distinguishing CVE from other programs.36 These include 
development, poverty alleviation, governance and democratization and education.  
Despite these complications, CVE approach in the WoT represented an 
evolution thinking. It aims at changing behavior, ideas and beliefs to build a cohesive 
society.  It was first tested in Europe when United Kingdom launched ‘CONTEST’ in 
2003.37 Under its Prevent pillar, it emphasized on discouraging and preventing 
terrorism. It was followed by European Union Declaration on Combating Terrorism in 
in 2004. In the same year, European Union Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism 
was launched. These developments popularized dangers of radicalization in European 
Union policy realms. This culminated in efforts to institutionalize responses. In 2006, 
European Union Expert Group on Violent Radicalization was established.38 
Within the African continent, US, European Union and Global CT Forum 
actively supports states to domesticate CVE frameworks.  These efforts have also 
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looped in Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. To this end, IGAD has 
formulated a regional strategy dubbed ‘Preventing and Countering Violent 
Extremism’ and established a Center of Excellence for P/CVE. However, only one-
member state (Kenya), has formulated a national CVE strategy. EU has a program 
dubbed ‘Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism’ in the Horn of Africa. It 
focusses on engagement with non-governmental organizations and capacity building 
in Somalia and Kenya. USAID and DFID are also engaged in CVE related programs 
in the Greater Horn of Africa. Several civil-society organizations are also 
implementing CVE projects and programmes in the Horn of Africa.  
P/CVE should define its methodologies in local contexts of push and pull 
factors and design interventions to reduce or downplay these factors. It should 
inculcate resilience-building measures or skills that protect against these issues. 
Structural, environmental, economic, socio-cultural and political conditions create 
environment for violent extremism and its ideology. CVE should take many forms 
like dialogue, inclusion and social cohesion. This necessitates concerted efforts from 
states, public and private sector players. The measures also include aligning fields like 
education, development and religion to CVE objectives. Overarching theme of violent 
extremism revolves around socialization of individuals. The triggers of violent 
extremism can be foreign or domestic, national or international. There are many 
threads to violent extremism. An individual may be radicalized but not engage in 
violent extremism. The challenge for CVE is to identify the violent extremism nexus 
between the two divides.  
4.5 CVE Approaches in War on Terror 
Violent extremism continue to be a major security problem in many regions 
and jurisdictions. This has made CVE to be a global concern that has necessitated 
international responses. UN Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism 
describes it as a diverse phenomenon that is not exclusive to a region, nationality and 
belief.39 This means that the world is confronted by a complex and amorphous threat 
that is entwined with religion, ethnic and political dimensions. Its spread across 
borders poses serious contemporary challenges to diverse and multi-cultural societies. 
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UNDP describes CVE as deterring radicalized and vulnerable people from becoming 
violent extremists.40  
Normative frameworks have emphasized on comprehensive approaches to 
terrorism, especially its prevention. For instance, UN Global Counter Terrorism 
Strategy of 2006 highlights need to address conditions that are conducive to 
propagation of terrorism.41 It also denotes salience and protection of human rights. 
Equally, UNSC resolution 2178 of 2014 highlights centrality of CVE in tackling 
threats to international peace and security.42 However, this is contextualized on basis 
of foreign jihadist fighters. The Council emphasized on involvement of non-state 
actors and local communities in developing CVE strategies. Conceptually, UN 
General Assembly Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism of 2015 associates 
the problem with historical, political, economic and social circumstances.43 It also 
enlists geopolitics and globalization. The Plan cites growing horizontal inequalities 
like unemployment, poverty, injustices and human-rights violations. Other drivers of 
violent extremism are marginalization, corruption and failure by state to provide 
services to the populace.44 The weak states and failed political transitions, with weak 
institutions provide a fertile ground for violent extremism groups.45 
To guide states in tackling violent extremism, UN Security Council has 
provided frameworks like UNSC Resolutions 2178 of 2014, 2242 of 2015 and 2250 
of 2015. It describes root causes of violent extremism as complex and multifaceted 
phenomenon. The Council advocates for long term approaches in addressing 
underlying causes of radicalization and violent extremism. It emphasizes on programs 
like peace, education, development, leadership, human rights advocacy and health 
targeting special interest groups. These include youth, women, civil society and local 
communities. UNSC resolutions and strategies are complimented by other UN organs. 
For instance, UNDP takes a development approach to the Prevention of Violent 
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Extremism (PVE).46 This perspective denotes an upstream approach by engaging the 
wider contextual and societal issues. These responses are largely premised on 
development principles.  
Various regional establishments like EU have come up with CVE frameworks. 
They are premised on pillars like Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond. In Africa, 
most frameworks are largely imported from West. For instance, UNDP designed 
Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa in 2015. The program 
works with governments, regional organizations, and civil society to augment PVE 
interventions. It targets societal conditions that can lead to radicalization. This 
includes emphasis on good governance, human rights, democracy, education, 
economic prosperity and conflict resolution. They also target inter-cultural dialogue 
and long-term integration. Calls are made for AFRICOM to change its WoT mindset 
in Africa. It has framed the continent as a haven for international terrorist and violent 
extremism groups.47 In the midst of this dissonance, the terrain of violent extremism 
in Africa is ever changing. Groups like Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, LRA and 
Ansaru have upscaled their activities through regionalized networks.48 They have 
radicalized and recruited locals in various parts of the continent. There are also issues 
foreign fighters travelling to jihad theaters in support of violent extremist activity.  
4.6 Pairing CVE with military strategies in War on Terror 
Discourse on efficacy of CVE in War on Terror is wrought with contentions. It 
can be approached from perspective of their conceptual and philosophical basis. The 
literature review on War on Terror deduced that military operations and similar 
offensive strategies were deficient in addressing the problem.49 CVE was therefore 
innovated to cure what coercive approaches could not; a paradigm of some sort.50 
However, despite recognition, emphasizes and adoption of CVE, countries did not 
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completely defect to the new paradigm; coercive approaches were retained.51 Since 
then, countries are engaging both military and CVE approaches.  
This military-CVE duality presents strategic dilemmas about character of the 
threat faced and responses required. It also points to concerns on the relationship 
between the two approaches. This raises questions on the supposed efficacy of CVE 
strategies; what works, how and why. The second aspect is that inconsistencies and 
gaps in CVE theory and practice has certain implications. It is hardly surprising that 
definitional ambiguities are extended into policy realms.52 CVE has emerged as an 
imprecise catch-all policy category. Despite shift towards CVE approaches, many 
countries cannot outline specifics of what they are preventing, how they are doing it 
and whether they are meeting that end.53 There seem to be a disconnect between CVE 
strategies and realities of their environments. As a paradigmatic shift, CVE ought to 
have overthrown use of force in counter terrorism efforts.  
Literature concedes that use of force is aggravating radicalization and its root 
causes. This suggests that many countries have borrowed form generic CVE strategies 
with presumptive variables and drivers of radicalization like religious affiliation, 
poverty and unemployment. Rationale for CVE strategies need to be pegged on 
proper appreciation of local contexts.  However, research on the problem is event-
driven, reactionary and technically oriented.54 This has brought about several 
limitations like disparities and in range of research methodologies, minimal reliance 
on field research and primary data, focus on certain regions and countries and the 
domination Western narratives. It is difficult to tell what works and doesn’t. Whereas 
the normative frameworks provide generic guidelines, it’s effectiveness and 
sustainability lie with member states.  They need to meet obligations.  
Pairing CVE with military strategies has implications. Literature posit that 
despite increased global efforts in CVE, radicalization persists.55 It suggests that the 
‘alternative’ is not addressing the problem. Although many states countries have 
launched CVE action plans, there are no universal metrics to assess these efforts. It is 
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therefore difficult to speculate configurations between context, mechanisms and 
outcomes of these interventions.56 There are concerns among many communities that 
CVE approaches are being used to profile and discriminate sections of society.57 This 
mirrors the coercive approaches of WoT. For instance, sections of Muslim community 
feel targeted and victimized by CVE mechanisms.58 This suggests that counter 
terrorism efforts have securitized relationship some communities and the state.  
4.7 Conclusions 
CVE strategies were devised and adopted following failure by the coercive 
approaches to address radicalization and the root causes of terrorism and violent 
extremism. Coercive approaches were found to be part of the problem. However, even 
with the adoption of CVE, countries have not dropped the coercive approaches; CVE 
and military responses are coexisting in the war against terrorism. The basis of 
mediating CVE strategy with a military strategy is a critical question in addressing 
terrorism threat. Equally, as the terrorism threat evolves to include radicalization of 
local population, countries are still held in state-centric lenses in their responses to the 
problem. This has constrained policy and strategy responses in dealing with terrorism 
and violent extremism.  
CVE policies and strategies are not working. The problem is the fundamental 
assumptions upon which these policies and strategies are constructed and 
implemented.  They are still shrouded with narratives that perceive threat as an 
external, rather than internal. Whereas terrorism conflict is on transition, response 
policies and strategies by states are still caged with generic CVE strategies and 
borrowed lenses. There is a problem with availability of information on realities of 
local CVE contexts. Even in contexts where such knowledge exists, the CVE policies 
and practices are not grounded on it. Terrorism is characterized by an ever shifting of 
strategies by the enemy and the security operating environment. CVE strategies need 
to match if not shape the terrain these shifts. This research study aimed at responding 
to these gaps.  
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KENYA’S STRATEGIES IN WAR ON TERROR 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter four examined emergence of counter violent extremism (CVE) in War 
on Terror (WoT). It argued that despite emergence and adoption of CVE as a tool in 
the WoT, countries retained coercive approaches. It raised issues of CVE policies and 
practices being shrouded with narratives that perceive the issue as an external rather 
than internal problem. This creates disconnect that renders the approaches ineffective. 
This Chapter examines strategic aspects of terrorism threat in Kenya by tracing its 
history. It then delves into Kenya’s responses to that threat over time, and issues 
arising.   
5.2 Context of terrorism threat in Kenya 
The context of examining terrorism threat in Kenya and how it has been 
responded to, is multidimensional. It can be approached from appreciation of global 
trends, Kenya's neighbourhood, and internal/domestic dynamics. This appreciation 
provides anchorage to Kenya’s national security policies and strategies. There a clear 
linkage between global WoT, and the security intricacies within Kenya’s 
neighbouhood and its national counter terrorism policies and strategies. Although 
contemporary terror attacks in Kenya are mainly perpetuated by Al-Shabaab terrorist 
group, the Al-Qaeda group initially targeted US and Israel interests in Kenya.59 The 
group, which was waging terrorism attacks against these countries considered Kenya 
as a close ally of US and Israel.60 The Al-Qaeda link prompted Kenya to join WoT 
crusade. Like other states, Kenya remain vulnerable to terrorism threats from groups 
with religious and ethnic motivations. 
The other aspect entails Kenya’s neighborhood specifically the Horn of Africa 
which continue to reel in a complex web of interminable conflicts and security 
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challenges.61 It is a region seen in milieu of intermittent historical, current and latent 
fragilities. These have made it a ‘regional security complex’, where ‘durable patterns 
of amity and enmity take form of sub-global, geographically coherent patterns of 
security interdependence’.62 The issues range from territorial border disputes, civil 
wars, piracy, terrorism and maritime border dispute disputes among others. Some 
scholars have argued that the problem with Africa is that its borders border on war.63  
These factors portend a bleak outlook on peace and security both within and 
outside Africa. The continent is confounded with perennial conflicts involving 
countries and non-states.64 These dynamics are interconnected with local, national, 
regional and global social processes. Volatility in the Horn of Africa have led to 
proliferation of arms, arms flow, intensified militarization among other adverse 
security implications. There are rare intra-state conflicts that are exclusively internal 
matters; virtually all internal conflicts are internationalized.65 Relationship between 
insecurity in Horn of Africa and Kenya is exemplified by its proximity with Somalia, 
the jihad theater of Al-Shabaab. On its part, Al-Shabaab emerged in the East African 
region as an offshoot of Al-Qaeda. When it descended into civil conflict in 1991, it 
gave rise to Al-Shabaab and other groups. These are also affiliated to international 
extremists like Al-Qaeda and ISIS.66 This precipitated piracy, refugee crisis and 
insurgency in Kenya.  
Although terrorism threat from Al-Shabaab is Kenya’s biggest national 
security challenge, radicalization of youth is the long-term problem.67 Initially, the 
enemy was believed to be emerging from Somalia hence anti-radicalization efforts 
were aimed at the Somali youth. However, the problem has since shifted to an internal 
problem thereby portending serious strategic consequences for the conduct of the War 
on Terror in Kenya. Radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism are complex and 
multifaceted phenomenon which are constantly transforming and mutating. In Kenya, 
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the problem takes advantage of the large pool of unemployed, disenfranchised and 
loosely managed youth.  
Al-Shabaab have invented grievances revolving around narratives of Muslim 
persecution in the country and elsewhere.68 It leverages on exclusion, jihad and 
historical marginalization of coastal and northeastern parts of Kenya.69 Botha argues 
that other than ideological causes, youth unemployment and repressive state counter 
terrorism initiatives had “pushed” many youths to radicalization.70 These findings are 
echoed by a research study by ACTS! who linked youth radicalization in Kenya with 
factors like proximity to Somalia, marginalization and influence of radical Muslim 
clerics and institutions.71 In a 2012 video featuring Kenyan recruits, the then Al-
Shabaab leader, Ahmed Godane, urged “the Muslims of Kenya” to “boycott the 
general elections and wage Jihad against the Kenyan military”, which had started 
operations against the group in Somalia in October 2011.72 All these implies that 
radicalization problem overshadows the War on Terror.  
5.3 Use of force as response to terrorism in Kenya  
Terrorism and insurgency threats from Al-Shabaab threatens Kenya’s 
statehood. They prompted it to take active role in regional security. Eventually, it 
became a anchor state in global WoT.73 In both the global and regional strategic 
aspects of terrorism threat picture in Kenya, the enemy was perceived to be from 
outside. As a matter of necessity, Kenya responded to these threats. Like other states, 
Kenya first responded to terrorism through the military means. One of the prominent 
features of this approach is Operation Linda Nchi in 2011. The main aim of the 
offensive/incursion was to uproot the external enemy from the source, once and for 
all.74 It was an offensive war against Al-Shabaab and aimed at protecting territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and sanctity of national values and principles. Similar to the 
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global WoT, KDF’s incursion into Somalia raised strategic, legal and political issues 
on the nature of conflict faced and the appropriate responses. 
In spite of the consistent use of hard power to counter violent extremism, 
Kenya’s young people continue to join terror groups.75 This points to third dimension 
of strategic aspect of terrorism threat in entailing Al-Shabaab group infiltrating, 
radicalizing and enlisting Kenyan youths into terrorism. Al-Shabaab, being a non-
state actor could not respond to the military means to achieve their aims. The group 
strategically retreated to the drawing board and re-examined its survival options and 
strategy. This retreat gave birth to strategic shift in its strategy for Kenya, by 
introducing radicalization and recruitment of Kenyan youth. The enemy ‘without’ 
metamorphosed into an enemy ‘within’.  
5.4 Counter Violent Extremism in Kenya   
Despite deployment of military strategy, Al-Shabaab remained an active and 
dangerous threat in the country.76 It was realized that despite significant territorial 
defeats in Somalia, Al Shabab continued to hold ground, radicalize and recruit 
through various platforms. The changing dynamics associated with the character of 
WoT in Kenya necessitated calibration of response strategies to CVE, particularly to 
deal with the homegrown threat. The failure of hard power to stem the rise of violent 
extremism shifted the policy focus to soft power approaches. The soft power 
approaches seek to address the problem from its root causes upwards rather than to 
downwards. It is premised on the idea that the problem begins from the individual 
who for various reasons has become prey to processes of radicalization.  
CVE was therefore incorporated alongside military strategies to counter 
violent extremism. It has been that way since then. Its aim was to dissuade people 
who are already in radical movements to abandon the same. At the end, Kenya has 
responded to terrorism threat from Al-Shabaab in dual pronged approach; use of force 
and CVE. Part of the radicalization problem was blamed on the violence meted on the 
civilian by the military and the police in the course of responding to terrorism. It is 
argued that the use of force by the state fueled resentment. Al-Shabaab took 
advantage of the this to radicalize and recruit the disfranchised. The enemy without 
metamorphosed into an enemy within.  
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Conceptually, CVE denotes use of soft approach, to that addresses the root 
causes rather than the ‘hard’ approach that is security oriented.  It is against this 
background that in in September 2016, Kenya launched NSCVE. This Strategy seek a 
change in approach through participation of non-state actors. It focuses on soft 
approaches like job creation, economic development and enhancing life skills to 
reduce radicalization.77 Core to CVE is understanding the drivers of radicalization and 
violent extremism in their local contexts. In Kenya CVE strategy homegrown 
radicalization, the dilemma foreign fighters and returnees.78 Mwagiru argues that the 
biggest terrorist risk to Kenya is Al-Shabaab. However, the country’s longer-term 
threat is youth radicalization.79 Initially, the enemy was believed to be emerging from 
Somalia, thus anti-radicalization efforts were aimed at the Somali youth. However, 
radicalization now targets the Kenyan youth.  
This exemplifies a shift in perceived source of problem from outside to within. 
The fact that the youth being radicalized are now Kenyans has serious strategic 
implications. It means specifically that now the enemy is within and is one of us. 
Kenya’s failure to contextualize the local dynamics particularly on radicalization has 
resulted in generic CVE strategies that are at best based on operational aspects. CVE 
have also not perceived as a policy spectrum. Counter radicalization has not been 
given policy emphasizes nor linked with other policies like education and job 
creation.  This has exacerbated radicalization problem, especially amongst the youth. 
It underscores necessity for CVE discourses in Kenya to be homegrown. Their 
assessment should go beyond perception to engage with factual data and verifiable 
observation based on strategic contexts.  
5.5 National security policy and strategy making in Kenya 
Incursion into Somalia raises serious strategic legal and political consequences 
on the nature of conflict faced and utility of the responses. Among the issues that arise 
relates to counter terrorism and CVE policy/strategy making processes in Kenya. The 
issues are core to national security policy and decision making in Kenya. National 
security policy making entails decision making, creating of laws, setting standards, 
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and operationalization of these policies.80 Strategy making begins (or should begin) 
with identifying the strategic objectives namely the long-term goals or objectives that 
are being sought by the policy.81 Several issues arise relating to the counter terrorism 
policy and strategy making in Kenya. The debatable issue here is whether the counter 
terrorism and CVE policy/strategy in Kenya are homegrown or externally influenced, 
and whether they are ad hoc or institutionalized.  
Although Kenya adopted CVE strategies, it did not abandon military ones. 
This raises questions philosophical basis to ground the battle of on philosophical basis 
of CVE strategies. It is argued that Kenya’s responses to terrorism and by extension 
the regional fragility are externally leaning policies meant to contain transnational 
terrorism. The country is perceived as US designated anchor state in global WoT.82 Its 
profile in fighting affiliates of Al-Qaeda in the region is on the rise. Prior to 1998 US 
embassy attack, there was disinterest by the West in Kenya’s counter terrorism issues. 
This is attributed to perceptions that earlier incidents were not considered as threats to 
West interests. From this analytical thrust, KDF incursion into Somalia is serving 
external interests. Affiliation of Al-Shabaab to international terror group like Al-
Qaeda link the country with global WoT lenses.  
However, there are also arguments that the incursion into Somalia was pre-
planned, and Kenya’s intention were to create a buffer zone between Kenya and 
Somalia.  Kenya’s security is a key national interest. Its ability to maintain its 
independent identity and functional integrity is  core.83 Al-Shabaab in Somalia seek to 
capture territories and implement sharia.84 Outside Somalia, the group focuses on 
creating foci and networks which can fan the objectives into a regionalized and 
internationalized levels. It is thus argued that Kenya faces both a domestic and 
transnational threat. This perspective frames Kenya’s military-diplomatic framework 
in responding to conflict in Somalia.  
The most noticeable aspect of this approach was diplomatic negotiations for 
creation of state of government in Jubaland region which would act as buffer zone to 
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Kenyan border regions, whereby the military was to help in pacifying the region.85 It 
was envisioned that as soon as administration in Jubaland was functional and 
guaranteed security, KDF would exit Somalia. Kenya’s diplomatic aspect also 
entailed reaching out to countries particularly Uganda and Ethiopia to support the 
intervention in the Region. At the international level, Kenya reached out to US and 
EU.86 Consequently, it benefited from intelligence and technical support from foreign 
countries like US, Israel, United Kingdom, and EU among others. 
Kenya leveraged on structures of IGAD and hosted several consultative 
meetings to discuss strategies to solve the terrorism problem.  Indeed, Jubaland was 
created under the auspices of IGAD. Kenya also delved in tackling the security 
complex in Somalia through the Eldoret and Mbagathi peace processes.87 The 
Somalia National Reconciliation Conference in Eldoret and Mbagathi entailed 
negotiations to pacify the country. Although the mediated diplomatic process led to 
among other things creation of the Somali transitional charter, and the transitional 
federal government, it collapsed along the way.88 The process was infiltrated by 
Kenyan Somalis, lost goodwill from the federal government in Mogadishu amid turf 
wars by relevant the security agencies in Kenya. What remained is the military aspect. 
The military-diplomatic framework was however undermined by confluence 
of bureaucratic turf wars and interests among security actors managing the 
processes.89 What emerged is that the strategies were reactionary; emergency 
strategies that are resorted to whenever problems appear. Coordination among and 
within inter-ministerial or interagency concerned with the national security issues is 
lacking.90 Kenya’s ad hoc and reactionary strategies in responding to emerging issues 
lack coordination aspect because they are founded on crisis thinking.91 The necessity 
for Kenya to formulate CVE policies and strategies is that in their absence, threats are 
not properly conceived. This process entail input of many relevant agencies and 
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institutions. Iron rule of interagency denote that no national security or international 
affairs issue can be resolved by one agency.92 Like other national security policy 
issues, formulation and implementation of counter terrorism/CVE policies and 
strategies is an exclusive affair of a few: national security organs. This has excluded 
other crucial players.  
Others have raised issues of ethics and leadership in the national security 
discourses in Kenya. It is argued that strategic conceptualization and 
operationalization of national security policy in Kenya is lacking across security 
sectors.93 Responses to terrorism threat in Kenya have not appreciated the bigger 
picture of the interests of the country. The country’s strategic culture and environment 
is nested on internal vulnerabilities like corruption, inefficiency, nepotism, and 
negative ethnicity among others. Inclusion of ethics, nationalism and national values 
is missing in Kenya’s political leadership. This is imported in discourses on national 
security policies and strategies.  
Corrupt leadership has engendered leadership issues that threaten the survival 
of the country relative to inability to strategically conceive national threats bedeviling 
the country. Developing a security conscious leadership begins with commitment to 
theory to give it insight and ability to discern and conceive the big picture. Rosenau 
argues that criteria to determine national interests is elusive.94 It is therefore difficult 
to trace them in ssubstantive policies. The caveat here is that certain decisions and 
conceptualization of security threats or national interests coincide with those of 
individuals and some sub- national groups. 
It is impractical to examine Kenya’s responses to terrorism without resorting 
to appreciation of the philosophy and architecture of national security. Constitution of 
Kenya 2010 anchors discourses on national security and supporting statutes. The 
question here is about the constitutional basis for CVE policies and strategies. 
Constitutional philosophy provides boundaries and guidelines about what precisely 
should be looked in national security policies. It is from this frame that arguments on 
issues like whether the policy is right, the basis of the inherent problems, whether it 
should continue or be discontinued, or even how to set right the policy. Such a 
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framework offers lenses of assessing utility of counter terrorism/CVE policies and 
strategies in responding to terrorism threat.  
There is an underlying philosophy and architecture of national security in 
Kenya. It is anchored on Chapter Fourteen of the constitution.95 Article 238 (1) 
defines national security as the protection against internal and external threats to 
Kenya’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, 
property, peace, stability and prosperity, and other national interests.96 This 
understanding addresses itself to the physical/ traditional security conceptualization. It 
is a state-centric approach to national security.97 This worldview emphasis on state as 
referent object of national security.98 KDF incursion into Somalia is informed by the 
necessity of physical security. Attacks from Al-Shabaab had threatened Kenya’s 
statehood.99 In the circumstances, Kenya sought to protect its statehood and safety of 
Kenyans. It was an offensive war against Al-Shabaab. 
Kenya’s state-centric conceptualization of security is further emphasized by 
the constitutional provisions that form basis and legal framework guiding the 
establishment organs of national security, their structures and functions. Article 239 
(1) establishes three organs of national security namely. They are Kenya Defence 
Forces (KDF), the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the National Police Service 
(NPS). 100 The primary object of the National Security Organs and security system is 
to promote and guarantee national security in accordance with the principles of the 
constitution as stipulated in Article 238 (2). Article 240 (1) establishes National 
Security Council (NSC). It is then given some functions. These includes integrating 
domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security. Up to this point, 
this provision attempts to give a broader view of national security. However, 
subsequent provision says that the purpose of that integration is to enable national 
security organs to co-operate and function effectively. This takes way what the earlier 
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provision had given like idea of human security and reinstates the physical/traditional 
view of national security. 
The other function as per the first part of Article 240 (6) (b) provides for NSC 
is to assess and appraise objectives, commitments and risks. It relates to aspects of 
risk analysis, assessing and appraising the content of national security, and a SWOT 
analysis of national security capabilities in milieu of realities of Kenya’s operating 
environment. However, the subsequent provision provides that the rationale of this for 
this assessment is in respect to actual and potential national security capabilities. This 
excludes other dimensions of national security. It thus reverts the viewpoint to the 
physical/traditional view of security. The Constitution does not define “other” 
national interests. It leaves security as the only national interest. This shows 
predisposition to physical security concerns. 
It is clear that the constitutional philosophy in Kenya is very traditional in its 
conceptualization of national security. It gives prominence to physical security. In 
linking this aspect with CVE policies and strategies in Kenya, it becomes even clearer 
that this predisposition has surely shaped Kenya’s response to this environment. This 
traditional perspective to national security does not suffice the demands of the 
dynamism and complexities of terrorism threat. CVE strategies are shaped by 
constitutional philosophy and conceptualization of national security. This has 
disconnected it with issues underlying terrorism conflict. These are about individual 
motivations, structural inequalities and unresolved grievances.101  
Kenya responded to Al-Shabaab, a non-state actor using state-centric 
approaches. Contemporary conceptualization to national security resonates with the 
human security approach to security. It seeks to identify and address cross-cutting 
challenges to survival, livelihood and dignity of people.102 This calls for people-
centered and context-specific responses to issues that strengthen people. For Kenya, 
the problem and the attendant responses is not perceived as one pitting non-state 
actors or as linked with human security conceptualization. Kenya’s responses to 
violent extremism lacks the dynamism that matches the character of the threat faced. 
This is the missing link and explains the sub-optimality of Kenya’s national security 
policies in responding to terrorism threat.  
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5.6 Emerging issues on CVE strategies in Kenya 
In examining Kenya’s strategies in WoT, several issues emerge. The issues 
include initialization of CVE in Kenya, actors and coordination aspects of CVE 
strategies in Kenya. It also entails the role of public in CVE in Kenya. The context of 
examining discourses on actors, institutions and coordination in Kenya’s CVE 
strategies can be approached from the perspective of the country’s architecture of 
national security. This architecture is anchored on Chapter Fourteen of Constitution of 
Kenya.103 CVE strategies seek to respond to concerns of national security. The 
constitution defines national security as the protection against internal and external 
threats to Kenya’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, 
freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity, and other national interests.104 
This conceptualization addresses itself to physical security interpretation of national 
security.105 The State is considered as the referent object of national security. 
Article 239 (1) establishes national security organs namely the KDF, NIS and 
NPS. This shows predisposition to physical security concerns. This provision sheds 
light on who the actors and institutions involved in national security in Kenya. It is 
unsurprising that CVE discourses in Kenya are still perceived as extensions of 
physical security conceptualization.106 National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) is 
designed as focal point of CVE policies and strategies in Kenya. However, it is nested 
on the physical security conceptualization; it’s a multi-agency instrument security 
agencies. This conflation of surrounding CVE actors in Kenya has excluded other 
players like the public, private sector, academia, potential and existing victims of 
violent extremism.  
It is argued that the challenge for Kenya’s national security policy making and 
its leadership is its disdain for theory, antipathy for knowledge generation, alienation 
from the public, and impunity.107 Strategic culture which undergirds the logic of 
strategic responses is often lacking among many leaderships thus complicating pursuit 
of desired outcomes.108 Kenya’s CVE policies and strategies ought to be rooted in 
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plurality of actors, and strategic thinking in what is already known about terrorism 
conflict. A study by Mkutu et al on devolution and security in Kenya established that 
it can significantly address peace and cohesion at grassroots.109 Others argue that the 
Kenyan government has incentive to tolerate infrequent attacks.110 That CVE 
discourse in the country get lip service at the expense of angling to benefit from 
foreign aid for CVE related programs. This is potent of undermining CVE efforts. The 
analytical thrust of such complexities presents dilemmas to policy making and 
scholars in identifying suitable tools.111 
National security institutions need a functional and a well-coordinated system 
to function smoothly.112 The necessity of strategic organ to coordinate national 
security policy for containment of national security threats to Kenya is found in NSC. 
NCTC operates under auspices of NSC. The argument here is that there exists an 
institutional infrastructure to coordinate and address concerns of CVE in Kenya. 
However, one of the major setbacks to responses to terrorism in Kenya is the problem 
of inter-agency coordination at the domestic, inter-state, regional and international 
levels.113 It is argued that the fact that NSC has not formulated a National Security 
Policy exemplifies lack of shared understanding on some core national security issues.  
One of the core functions of NSC is to integrate domestic, foreign and military 
policies.114 The integration here implies harmonization, coordination and 
collaborations to enhance better functioning of the security organs and inter-agency 
co-operation. Without it, implementation and coordination will be unfeasible. In 
Kenya, there are fundamental problems with the coordination mechanism and 
processes. The events leading to and the responses to Westgate terrorist attack 
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typified the deficiencies of coordination at both strategic and operational levels.115 
Coordination ensures that there is collaboration, liaison and interoperability among 
the various elements of the grand strategy to respond to the threats identified.  
Kenya’s counter terrorism/CVE policies and strategies does not operate in a 
legal vacuum. The issues arising is whether the counter terrorism/CVE policies and 
responses adhere to the utility and doctrinal compatibility with norms of both 
international and domestic laws. The entry into Somalia for instance raises several 
core legal and strategic issues. These issues include the basis of framing it as a “war”, 
questions of application of war powers in Kenya, use of force, and strategic shift from 
counter terrorism to CVE. Like other states, Kenya is subject to international law. 
That international law is law.116 This means that CVE policies and strategies should 
not infringe on norms of international law.  
Article 238 (2) (b) denotes that national security shall be pursued in 
compliance and respect for rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. That rule of law also means rule of international law, given the provisions 
of Article 2 (5), which says that the general rules of international law forms part of the 
law of Kenya. This means that international law is part of national security laws of 
Kenya. 
First, fight against Al-Shabaab in Kenya is framed as a war. This way, an 
existential threat was securitized, requiring extraordinary measures.117 War is seen as 
an extraordinary measure to respond to that threat.  There are debates regarding the 
significance of naming this problem a 'war,' and the potential for transforming a 
military logic into a political one. Like the global WoT, there are debates on whether 
Kenya’s intervention into Somalia conforms to the classical war definition as 
delineated by the international humanitarian law. The concept of war was an 
important feature of international law prior to the creation of the United Nations.118 
Kenya cited article 51 of the UN Charter on a state’s right to self-defense viz:  
“nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of an 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
member of the United Nations. If a nation takes measures to exercise 
the right to self-defense, it shall be immediately reported to the 
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Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security council under the UN Charter.  The 
action taken by a member state must be in the interest of restoration of 
peace and security”119 
In classical terms, war pitted two states and entailed use of military force to 
conquer the opponent. Countering terrorism within the ‘war’ framework suggests that 
the terrorist group represents the equivalent of a state. With the establishment of the 
UN, war ceased to exist as a legal condition to create a state of war and would be 
incompatible with the prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter.120 The UN Charter created a new order within which the traditional 
"rights of war" cannot be enthroned. Members states pledged to refrain from the threat 
or use of force, except on behalf of the purposes of UN. However, the Charter 
characterized armed conflict and the criterion for engaging in the same. Armed 
conflict gives leeway to states to use force. Armed conflict is the new term for war. 
Kenya’s war against Al-Shabaab is going on amid conceptual clutter and ambiguities 
surrounding terrorism. 
The war against Al-Shabaab in Kenya grapples with difficulties in plainly 
describing its parameters.  This implies a war against abstraction. Conceptualization 
of responses to terrorism in Kenya have failed to take cognizance of the evolving, 
asymmetric, amorphous and borderless threat that states are confronted with. It is still 
fixated with rigid state-centric lens. It is argued that save for Al-Shabaab being a non-
state actor and lack of protraction of violence, the dichotomy violence by the state and 
Al-Shabaab in Kenya mirrors that of international armed conflict.121 It was like 
violence between from another state with conventional military. Al-Shabaab could not 
respond through military means to achieve its aim. The group strategically retreated to 
the drawing board and re-examined its survival options and strategy. This retreat gave 
birth to strategic shift in its strategy for Kenya, by introducing radicalization and 
recruitment of Kenyan youth. The enemy ‘without’ metamorphosed into an enemy 
‘within’.  
There is also imports of external influence on domestic counter terrorism 
efforts. The effect Kenya’s partnership with the US in the counter terrorism efforts 
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was domestication of coercive powers of the state. These includes expanded legal 
frameworks to prosecute terrorist activities and aggressive disruption of terrorist 
supporters. This gave birth to laws like Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012; the 
Security Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014; the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money 
Laundering (Amendment) Act 2017 among others. Implementation of some of these 
laws raised concerns of human rights violations.122 Questions have arisen on whether 
these statutes conform to norms of international and domestic laws particularly 
violation of civil liberties in the name of national security.123 In the end, in conceiving 
appropriate responses to the issues in its operating environment, Kenya is confronted 
by both the enemy (Al-Shabaab) and by the limitations of the law.  
Kenya’s intervention in Somalia also challenged the traditional distinction 
between international and non-international conflict. Somalia was a total collapse of 
state structures typifying anarchy. In a bid to occupy the power vacuum in Somalia, 
there was eruption of numerous armed groups trying to occupy the power vacuum.  
Like other states, Kenya intervened in Somali through the armed conflict paradigm. 
Its is premised on the notion that the threat posed by terrorism is commensurate to an 
armed conflict.124 Operation Linda Nchi depicts the nature of the conflict faced as a 
non-international armed conflict. It involves a state and a non-state actor.125 Initially, 
Kenya alluded that the operation was carried out with the consent of Somalia. This 
was later refuted by Somali’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Kenya’s 
unilateral move into Somalia was later on endorsed by TFG as support to the latter in 
fighting Al-Shabaab.126 Unilateral in this case means without international support. 
There are arguments that the unilateral action worked really well in the first year 
(based on use of force), and almost delivered the mission as it was planned.127 
The other debatable issue relates to the application of war powers in Kenya. It 
is argued elsewhere that Kenya framed (and still does) terrorism threats as an act of 
war. This makes Kenya’s military intervention into Somalia a subject of war powers 
                                                          
122 See KNHRC, The Error of Fighting Terror with Terror 
123 Mockaitis, Winning Hearts and Minds in the ‘War on Terrorism, pp. 21-38 
124 Yuval Shany, “Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as Competing Legal paradigms for figting 
terror” in Orna BEN-NAFTALI (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law. Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 
125 Sassòli, Marco, The Role of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of 
Armed Conflicts, in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 
126 Capital Digital media, “Kenya, TFG jointly agree to fight Al-Shabaab” 18 October 2011. 
https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2011/10/kenya-tfg-jointly-agree-to-fight-al-shabaab/ 
127 Mwagiru, Written communication 20 February 2020 
80 
in Kenya. The underlying philosophy and architecture of national security in Kenya is 
anchored on Chapter Fourteen of the Constitution.128 Article 238 specifies the 
principles upon which national security should be anchored. Specifically, article 
238(2) designates that “national security is subject to the authority of this constitution 
and Parliament”. This implies that discourses and practices of national security like 
counter terrorism/CVE policies must be grounded on the constitution.  
In examining application of war powers in Kenya, many issues arise. 
Language of article 238(2) implies that in cases where the use of force may be 
contemplated to protect the country against specified threats, the authority of 
parliament is crucial.129 The issue is that if Kenya’s offensive against Al-Shabaab is a 
war, it needs a presidential declaration. This is in tandem with article 239(5) 
proclaims that the national security organs are subordinate to civilian authority, and 
article 131(1)(c) designating the president as the commander in chief of KDF. 
Presidential declaration can only be done with the approval of parliament. On the 
other hand, if it is about self defence, then it is not necessary for have parliamentary 
approval because it is an emergency that can’t wait for parliamentary processes. 
Controversy abounds as to whether Kenya’s military incursion into Somalia received 
prior nod of the Parliament. Policies and strategies that are not guided on the 
principles of the constitution.  
Other issues emerge in view of dynamics of the policy and plurality of actors 
in operating environment. When KDF re-hatted and joined AMISOM, the offensive 
assignment metamorphosed into a peace keeping mission under auspices of AMISOM. 
Article 240 provides that peace keeping missions can only be given by NSC with the 
approval of parliament. If these things are not done, it raises questions on decision 
making capacities of NSC. These issues are further confounded by lack of a coherent 
document on that clearly sets objectives being sought, and the attendant decision-
making milestones. The fight against Al-Shabaab inside and outside Kenya as 
presently conceived lacks a clear enemy and specific geographic location.  
The other issue arising is Kenya’s exit from Somalia. The protracted character 
of war against Al-Shabaab raises questions on wartime-peacetime frames. It is now in 
ninth year; there is no end in sight. There is no clear exit strategy from Somalia. The 
                                                          
128 Constitution of Kenya 2010 op.cit 
129 Mwagiru, Makumi. “Framing war powers in the Kenya Constitution (2010)”, Occasional Paper on 
National Security. No. 1 May 2019. Nairobi: Three Legs Consortium  
81 
war against Al-Shabaab seem not to be bound by peacetime-wartime frames; it runs in 
perpetuity.130 Wartime has become the only kind of time states have.  It is infinite. 
This raises questions of feasibility of this war, ethic and citizenry support. The 
vagueness of counter terrorism/CVE policy in Kenya is exported to the attendant 
strategies: they are not founded on clear and strategic underpinnings. The analytical 
thrust of such a phenomenon is that without timeframe, limiting terrain, enemy, time 
or geographical locus, it is not possible to cordon off the parameters of war against Al-
Shabaab.  
Kenya cannot afford a war without an end. The exit strategy for Somalia is 
core and urgent national interest issue for Kenya. Yet, this decision is no longer in the 
hands of Kenya. Kenya’s continued stay in AMISOM inclines more towards the 
interest of other actors like AU and AMISOM. As Kenya is stuck with AMISOM, Al-
Shabaab has changed tactics and started massive radicalization and recruitment of 
Kenyan youths. These recruits have become the enemy within. It is argued that the 
attack at Garrissa University College was a testament to this strategy by Al-Shabaab.  
This puts to question the primacy of an external war, when the enemy is also within. 
Kenya’s military strategy in Somalia and being in AMISOM should be recalibrated 
with dynamisms of the operating environment. As part of AMISOM, KDF is likely 
remain in Somalia in the foreseeable future. 
Public plays a crucial role in discourses of national security.131 Role of public 
in informing policy is as diverse as the intended policy objectives. In Kenya, public 
participation in policy and decision-making processes is anchored in the Constitution. 
From this perspective, question of public participation in national security policy and 
decision making is not an option. It is demanded by the constitution. Article 1 (2) 
proclaims that sovereign power belongs to the people of Kenya. They may exercise 
their sovereignty directly or through their elected representatives. This implies the 
public ought to participate in national security policy making contributions either 
directly or through parliament. Role of the public is further emphasized in article 10 
(2) (a), (b) and (c) which outlines national values and principles of governance. These 
include; democracy and participation of the people; inclusiveness; good governance, 
integrity, transparency and accountability. 
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Issues of deficiencies in ethics and competence leadership have been raised in 
Kenya.132 This has engendered misrepresentation of the interests of the public.  There 
is also lack of awareness by the public on the issues being discussed. Responses to 
terrorism in Kenya are developed and implemented without input of key stakeholders. 
Engaging public in formulation and implementation of CVE policies could enhance 
initiatives aimed at addressing the push and pull factors of violent extremism in 
Kenya. Citizens must be carried so that they can support the chosen national security 
policy and its financial implications.133 
The role of public and non-state actors in national security making is crucial. 
This includes media, civil society, religious groups, business community and 
educational institutions to broaden understanding about violent extremism. They also 
promote tolerance and coexistence in society. The repressive actions by Kenyan 
security agencies evokes negative reactions from the public.  They gradually start to 
identify with the ‘oppressed’ (Al-Shabaab). Kenya’s efforts have profiled Al-Shabaab 
as Muslim Somalis. All these have amplified perceptual dissonance on CVE strategies 
in Kenya. Engaging public as part of this concerted effort is critical.134  
5.7 Conclusions  
This study finds that current conceptualization of CVE strategies in Kenya to 
be suboptimal. They are state-centric and not homegrown. The country has taken an 
external posture to the problem rather than internal. Externally leaning policies only 
serve to contain transnational terrorism, while ignoring the local dynamics. Kenyan 
CVE strategies need to be homegrown, flexible and customized to its contexts. It is an 
opportunity to do things differently with greater participation that capture the 
transiting conflict with greater impact. Responses and strategies on WoT in Kenya are 
hybridized. It entails use of force and CVE approaches. The country treat terrorism as 
a war, normal crime, social-economic and political problem. Diagnosis and 
responding to a conflict in transition necessitates appreciation of its dynamics.  
The shifting character of terrorism threat especially radicalization is conceived 
narrowly. It has ignored the fact that it is within us. The country’s internal issues 
contributing to the problem have been overlooked. As a result, CVE has not been 
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entrenched in policy realm. The external posture of Kenya’s strategies in WoT, 
ignores the body of relevant research on localized contexts and trends. As a result, the 
strategies do not provide the answers to the contemporary problem facing the country. 
Widening the lens of the strategic level perceptions on radicalization and terrorism 
could offer ways to enhance effective response mechanisms. This necessitates 










CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
STRATEGIES IN KENYA 
6.1 Introduction  
 Chapter five presented case study of Kenya in War on Terror (WoT). It scrutinized 
how it has conceived, analyzed and responded to Al-Shabaab in and outside Somalia, and 
the emerging issues. This Chapter presents a critical analysis of CVE strategies in Kenya 
based on data collected and an interpretation of the data. In accordance with the objectives 
of study, in-depth interviews were done with 12 respondents from five national security 
institutions, scholars and public policy commentators with expertise on CVE strategies in 
Kenya. Secondary data was collected through a comprehensive review of published and 
unpublished materials on CVE strategies in Kenya. The study adopted a methodology with 
two component tools of analysis; narrative analysis and content analysis.  
6.2 Demographic characteristics of respondents  
Although not part of the objective of study, demographic data was collected to help 
assess its influence on finings. The demographic data captured was age, gender, years of 
experience and level of education. The 10 respondents were derived from the target 
population through stratification into five national security institutions namely Ministry of 
Defence, Ministry of Interior, Kenya Defence Forces, National Police Service and 
National Counter Terrorism Centre. Two other respondents drawn from scholarly and 
public policy commentators with expertise on CVE. This represented a one hundred 
percent response rate of the targeted sample size. Selection of the respondents was done 
through purposive sampling technique. Collectively, the study interviewed ten men and 
two women. Although male respondents were more compared to female, the spread was 
valid enough for the study since from the findings, there was no bias based on either 
gender. The issues under study had no bearing with gender orientation.  
Whereas the age categories of the twelve respondents ranged between forty-eight- 
and sixty-years, the duration worked in national security agencies ranged from twenty-four 
to forty-one years. This indicates that the respondents had a good understanding on CVE 
strategies in Kenya. All the respondents interviewed were at least graduates. This 
enhanced communication and engagements during the interview discussions. The age, 
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work experience and level education were therefore valid in meeting the objectives of the 
study.  
6.3 Data on CVE in Kenya 
This section presents data on CVE strategies in Kenya as was established in the 
field. In line with the objective of the study, the data is presented in four thematic areas 
which were constructed from the interview narratives and content analysis.  
6.3.1 Terrorism threat in Kenya  
Most respondents traced the history of terrorism threat in Kenya from the attack at 
Norfolk Hotel in 1975, where blasts at the Starlight nightclub and near Hilton hotel 
exploded. The blasts were considered to be domestically instigated and associated with the 
disappearance of JM Kariuki. Details about the attackers and their motivations are 
unknown. Others recounted the 1980 terror attack outside Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi. It was 
reported that the hotel was targeted by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and 
internationally linked terror group due to its affiliation with Israeli. Prior to the attack, 
Kenya had assisted Israel in 1976 during the hostage crisis operation at Entebbe 
International Airport, and this logistical assistance infuriated Islamic extremist groups like 
PLO.1  
The study established that terror attack on the United States (US) embassy in 
Nairobi in 1998 was part of the Al-Qaeda’s global campaign targeting US interests. It was 
however established that majority of casualties in the attack were Kenyans. The study 
established that the 2002 Kikambala Hotel bombing and the Arkia Airlines missile attack 
in Mombasa targeted Israel interests in the country. It was reported that between 2010 and 
2011 Kenya experienced a surge in kidnapping of tourists in coastal towns and sporadic 
grenade attacks in North eastern region. The new wave of attacks largely targeted Kenya’s 
interests and were perpetuated by Al-Shabaab insurgents from Somalia.2 It was established 
that when Somalia descended into civil conflict in 1991, it gave rise to groups like Al-
Shabaab, refugee crisis, piracy in Indian Ocean and terror attacks in Kenya.3  
The collapse of government in Somalia resulted in anarchy. This had implications 
at local, national, regional and global levels, Kenya being the biggest casualty.4 Data 
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collected show that Al-Shabaab insurgents initially used cross-border tactics to launch 
attacks in Kenya, but has since changed tack by radicalizing Kenyan  youths who stage 
attacks locally as well as participate in foreign missions (foreign fighters). Respondents 
following KDF intervention in Somalia, the country experienced increased grenade attacks 
from Al-Shabaab. Post-KDF incursion into Somalia attacks include the Westgate Mall 
attack in 2013, series of terror attacks in Mpeketoni in 2014, Garissa university College 
attack in 2015, and Dusitd2 Hotel Complex attack in 2019.  
The study learnt that terrorism remain a risk in Kenya. Data obtained indicated that 
Al-Shabaab had infiltrated, radicalized and enlisted Kenyan youths into terrorism. The 
attacks on Garissa University College and Dusitd2 Hotel Complex in 2015 and 2019 
respectively relied on Kenyan youths enlisted by Al-Shabaab. The group had tapped into 
the historical and perceived grievances like marginalization, poverty, and state oppression 
among others to radicalize and recruit.5 Some respondents felt that the volatility in 
Northeastern part of Kenya was giving Al-Shabaab terrain to blend and camouflage 
amongst the locals.  As noted, this local dimension of Al-Shabaab in Kenya has seriously 
impacted on the country’s response strategy. Kenya went into Somalia to protect itself 
from further terror attacks from Al-Shabaab group. However, the group has found its way 
into Kenya and recruited youth in Mombasa, Kwale, Garissa, Nairobi, Mandera and Isiolo 
among other regions.6 
6.3.2 National security policy making processes in Kenya  
The study established that the constitution of Kenya 2010 lays the legal framework 
guiding the establishment of organs of national security, their structures and functions. 
Article 239 (1) of the Constitution establishes three organs of national security namely; the 
Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the National 
Police Service (NPS).7 This showed organs of national security are the main actors in 
national security matters in Kenya. However, respondents added that besides these organs, 
there were other critical players, who correlated with national power and work together 
with the organs of national security in policy and strategy making in Kenya. 
“Other actors have also been recognized as important contributors in 
formulation and implementation of national security policy and strategy. 
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These include diplomatic element, economic element, other departments 
like Ministry of Interior, parliament, think tanks, the media, NGOs, 
universities and even the public.”8  
Core to the structure and mechanisms of coordination of national security policy making 
and implementation in Kenya is National Security Council (NSC). It serves as the 
President's forum for considering national security policy matters with principals of 
national security organs. The study established that these other actors were critical players 
in the discourse of national security policy and decision-making processes. According to 
the constitution of Kenya 2010, when the President makes a policy decision, he needs to 
transmit the information in writing to the relevant cabinet secretary or parliament for 
appropriate action. Data collected show that Prevention of Organized Crime Act of 2010, 
Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2011, Prevention of Terrorism Act 
of 2012, and Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014 were among the prominent legal 
framework under which counter terrorism/violent extremism are prosecuted. 
 These legislations are state-centric and constructed within the framework of the 
global WoT. They are predisposed to use of force and other legalistic measures to counter 
terrorism conflict. Kenya lacks a documented national counter terrorism or violent 
extremism policy. However, it was learnt that it is ad hoc presidential and senior 
government pronouncements that drive issues of terrorism and violent extremism in the 
country. Data collected revealed that CVE strategies in Kenya are formulated and 
implemented by and through organs of national security. Role of public and other non-
state actors like media, civil society, religious groups, business community and 
educational institutions is yet to be fully appreciated. Opinion is divided on considerations 
made during formulation and implementation of CVE strategies in Kenya. Some reported 
that derivation of factors or issues considered in the formulating and implementing CVE 
strategies was issue and context based. The problem at hand determine how to respond to 
the problem. For instance, the decision for incursion into Somalia was made based on the 
circumstances that the country faced at the time.9 
6.3.3 Responses to terrorism in Kenya  
Kenya approaches terrorism threat in various ways. Based on data collected, 
initially the country responded by crafting and implementing a number of counter 
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terrorism measures. This section examines responses terrorism in Kenya through use of 
force and CVE strategies. 
Use of force and external intervention   
Kenya initially responded to terrorism threats from Al-Shabaab through use force 
and external intervention in Somalia. This was veiled under various security-related laws 
and operations.10 All of them were state-driven and predominantly characterized by use of 
force. Respondents repeatedly cited Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) incursion into Somalia 
in 2011 to tackle Al-Shabaab, in a security operation dubbed Linda Nchi. The main aim of 
this offensive/incursion was to uproot the external enemy from the source, ‘once and for 
all’.11 It was an offensive war against Al-Shabaab in the sense that it sought to invade the 
terrorists in their turf. The operation therefore aimed at protecting territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and sanctity of national values and principles. In justifying its case, Kenya 
argued on the right to self-defense as embodied in Article 51 of the UN Charter.   
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.”12 
The provision recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense 
in the wake of an armed attack against a member of the UN.  Following this, Kenya 
enacted and strengthened relevant counter terrorism legislations. It also enhanced 
capacities of law enforcement agencies, increased security patrols and vigilance especially 
along the Kenya-Somalia border. These were aimed at responding to Al-Shabaab terror 
threats. It emerged that use of force was however to blame for triggering new wave of 
attacks in the country as Al-Shabaab sought reprisal on the operative measures.  
To counter the new wave of attacks, the government adopted raft of measures such 
as increased police operations and use of force in areas suspected to harbor terror suspects. 
Security operations like Usalama Watch in 2014 was meant to rid the country of the many 
terror suspects and illegal immigrants in the country.13 This operation began in Nairobi’s 
Eastleigh and its neighborhood, before spreading to other parts of the country. It targeted 
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arrest of foreign nationals who were in the country unlawfully as well as terror suspects. 
However, the operation was castigated over claims of profiling Somalis and Muslims. It 
was also shrouded with human rights violations and breaches of the law by security 
agencies. Others accused police of corruption and demanding bribes from ‘detainees’ to 
secure their release.  
In March 2014, the Kenya government followed these measures by ordering 
refugees residing outside designated refugee camps to immediately move to Kakuma and 
Dadaab refugee camps.14 It further ordered immediate closure of all refugee registration 
centers in urban areas. These measures were further bolstered by deployment of additional 
police officers in Nairobi and Mombasa to enhance security and surveillance. These 
developments were followed by further government directives ordering enforced closure 
of Dadaab refugee camp and repatriation of refugees back to Somalia. Kenya justified the 
decision by claims that Al-Shabaab were recruiting members and planning attacks from 
the Dadaab refugee camp, citing Westgate Mall terror attack. The Dadaab refugee camp 
had become a breeding ground for terrorists and their accomplices.15 
Use of force faces various challenges like hostility from communities who feel 
targeted/profiled by security operations. It has also resulted in radicalization and 
disfranchisement among the youth. Other options had to be explored.16 Opinion is divided 
on the impact of use of force in realization of the intended objectives. Some argued that 
the state-driven counter terrorism measures succeeded in averting unrestrained cross 
border incursion by Al-Shabaab insurgents from Somalia. 
There were also arguments that the initial unilateral action by KDF in Somalia 
worked really well in the first year (based on use of force), and almost delivered the 
mission as planned.17 However, others express centrally opinion. They pointed out that use 
of force compromised security of citizens due to violation of human rights committed by 
security agencies involved in countering terrorism. It was established that Anti-Terror 
Police Unit (ATPU) conducted raids in mosques and arrested suspected Al-Shabaab 
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members.18 The raids were linked with targeted killings and forced disappearances of 
Muslim clerics suspected to have links with terror groups.19  
The raids and targeted killings led to increased terrorist attacks in the country. The 
attack on Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi on 21st September 2013, which left 67 
people dead and over 170 injured, was a response to the raids. The study learnt that a 
section of the Somali-Muslim community in the country felt aggrieved by the war on Al-
Shabaab and profiling on grounds of religion. The raids thus exacerbated rather than 
mitigated radicalization problem in the country. Whereas some respondents argued that 
there were no other options other than military incursion into Somalia in 2011, others feel 
that the decision was rushed and did not explore other options. The decision for incursion 
into Somalia was made based on the circumstances that the country faced at the time.20 
They reported that there was no trace of government authority in Somalia, thus 
constraining other means of responding to the problem. The recurrent cross border 
incursions and provocations by Al-Shabaab insurgents left Kenya with no other choice 
other but to pursue the enemy at the source.21  
The other view that the military incursion into Somalia was rushed and failed to 
explore other options pointed that previous military interventions had failed to solve the 
problem in Somalia.22 It had occasioned despair. The crisis in Somalia had attracted 
regional and international interventions over the years like UNOSOM I in 1992 and US 
joint operations with Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in 1992. Others that followed were 
UNOSOM II in 1993, Ethiopia military intervention in 2006, and African Union Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007 among others. The study learnt that previous military 
interventions in Somalia had failed to win the hearts and the minds of the local populace. 
Kenya needed to consider this and explore other options. Some were viewed as attempts to 
impose regime change in the country.23 
Opinion on the processes that sanctioned KDF intervention in Somalia is divided. 
Some argue that the intervention was in the offing following deterioration of security in 
                                                          
18 Ndambo op.cit pp.8-31  
19 See Human Rights Watch,  Kenya. 
20 Interview with CVE_KE- [MoD]_ 01, Top administrator Office of the Cabinet secretary, Ministry of 
Defence. March 2, 2020, Nairobi. 
21 Interview with CVE_KE- [NPS]_ 01, Assistant Inspector General, National Police Service (NPS) March 
3, 2020, Nairobi. 
22 Human Rights Watch. Somalia no Mercy in Mogadishu:  The Human Cost of the Conflict and the Struggle 
for Relief. Nairobi: HRW. 1992.  
23 Interview with CVE_KE- [S/PP] _ 01, National security policy expert/commentator. March 6, 2020, 
Nairobi. 
91 
Somalia.24 They alluded that the matter was a subject to deliberations of National Security 
Council (NSC). Others argued that the mission was an emergency that was sanctioned by 
the President to respond threats on the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Data 
collected show that Parliament was notified after the incursion. When asked whether there 
was an exit strategy, some respondents reported that the exit strategy was there.  They 
stated that the initial intention of Kenya’s occupation in Somalia was to create a buffer 
region within Jubaland thus effectively cutting off Al-Shabaab spilling into Kenya. KDF 
was to withdraw after Jubaland is fortified and able to manage security issues along that 
corridor.25 This strategy however changed when KDF re-hatted to AMISOM. The study 
established that Kenya’s exit from Somalia now lies with AMISOM. Others reported that 
since the incursion was an emergency, exit meant when the mission is accomplished.   
CVE strategies in Kenya  
 As the study learnt, use of force to fight Al-Shabaab brought  serious legal and 
strategic challenges. These dynamics necessitated Kenya to incorporate counter violent 
extremism (CVE) approaches alongside military strategies in 2016 in responding to the 
problem. This has been the case since then. The study established that CVE in Kenya uses 
soft approach to addresses the root causes of the problem.  Kenya launched National 
Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) in 2016 with emphasizes on soft 
approaches like job creation, business opportunities, and life skills to tame recruitment of 
youth to violent extremism.26 The study found that NSCVE mirrors the framework  
provided for in the United Nations Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism.  
Consequently, Kenya increased its efforts and coordination with international 
partners on countering the financing of terrorism (CFT), promoted CVE efforts, especially 
with focus on de-radicalization and reintegration of returnees.27 NCTC is the designated 
coordinating mechanism for NSCVE. It is the focal point for external partnerships on CVE 
related matters. For a long time, there was no overarching mechanisms in Kenya to guide 
CVE efforts. NCTC was created to meet that need.28 It works with security agencies, and 
other government ministries and departments, local communities, civil society, private 
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sector, bilateral and multilateral partners in supporting CVE efforts in the country. Data 
collected show that Westgate Mall attack brought to the fore issues of information sharing 
and coordination in counter terrorism in Kenya. ‘It was just a matter of time; the attack 
prompted the government to initiate process to establish a multiagency framework on 
counter terrorism issues.29 Core to the mandate of NCTC is develop NSCVE and 
spearhead its coordination mechanism. NSCVE aims at rallying all sectors in efforts to 
discredit violent extremist ideologies. It targets to minimize opportunities for terrorist 
groups to operate, radicalize and recruit in Kenya.30 
CVE efforts in Kenya are facing challenges. It was reported that Somalia was not 
keen in cooperating with other stakeholders in the fight against Al-Shabaab.31 It was 
observed that difference between Kenya and Somalia in counter terrorism were apparent 
from the first year of KDF intervention. Creation of autonomous states like Jubaland irked 
Somalia.32 It wanted to have centralized system of governance. This precipitated KDF 
joining AMISOM. Respondents also reported corruption, lack of proper inter-agency 
coordination and cooperation as the threats to effective strategies on terrorism and violent 
extremism in Kenya, and national security at large. Laxity and culture of corruption in 
security and other related agencies was facilitating movement of illicit weapons and 
insurgents in the county.33 For instance, bribery at Kenya-Somalia border was cited as 
avenue that exposes the country to security threats. The other shortcoming cited was lack 
of capacity in state policing personnel.  
Counter terrorism and CVE efforts in Kenya need to incorporate more players 
especially private sector, civil society, media and the public. Respondents reported that 
security agencies were making effort to embrace multi-agency approach in counter 
terrorism. They cited NCTC and ad hoc Joint Operations Command Centres. Data 
collected show collaboration, coordination and cooperation among and between national 
security agencies was necessary to improve efficiency and synergy both at the strategic 
and operational levels.  
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6.4 Critical analysis of CVE strategies in Kenya 
This section brings order, structure and meaning to collected data.34 It synthesizes 
issues raised during interviews and secondary data sources, in order to understand their 
context and what they mean in discourses of CVE strategies in Kenya. This study used 
narrative analysis and content analysis to search for answers about relationships among the 
categories of data collected on CVE in Kenya. The ensuing discussions emerged from 
both theory and practice, with the former helping to explain, understand and later interpret 
reality of CVE practice in Kenya. This informed basis for the study’s findings.  
A proper conception of strategic threat picture of terrorism is core to understanding 
and analysis of CVE strategies in Kenya. It is until this is done, that one can enter debate, 
make any progress and/or expect the reader to share in one’s views. Kenya has been 
waging two wars: externally and internally. A distinction between the two war 
environments is crucial for theory and practice. Externally, terrorism is a global problem. 
Like other countries, Kenya is not immune to the vagaries of the global terrorism threat. 
Indeed, the country is caught up in a precarious position due to its affiliation with 
crusaders and supporters of the global WoT like US and Israel. This has exposed the 
country to attacks from anti-US movements like Al-Qaeda terror group. The attacks on the 
US embassy in Nairobi in 1998, Norfolk Hotel in 1980 and the 2002 Kikambala Hotel 
bombing are a testament to these dynamics.  
Other studies argue that part of the terrorism threat in Kenya is attributable to 
global geo-politics, regional instability, global Islamic fundamentalism and 
globalization.35 The collapse of the state in Somalia degenerated into regional and global 
security crisis with Kenya bearing the biggest burden.36 The anarchy that followed  in 
Somalia eased launch of cross-border attacks by Al-Shabaab to Kenya. KDF’s 
intervention in Somalia which began in 2011 is an external offensive war against Al-
Shabaab. This war is still ongoing, and KDF remains in Somalia.37 
Internally, Kenya is facing radicalized/homegrown Al-Shabaab networks who 
stage attacks in various parts of the country. This is not unique to Kenya. There is a shift 
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in concentration from terrorism sponsored by organized groups like Al-Shabaab, ISIS, Al-
Qaeda and Boko Haram to terrorism by lone wolf-phenomenon (individuals).38 The 
internal dimension is the contemporary and most immediate terrorism threat to Kenya. 
Indeed, the Dusit2terror attack was enlightening with regards to the profiles of the 
militants. Ethnicities of the perpetrators were not the often-assumed Somali and Bajuni 
backgrounds. Kenyan youths have been radicalized and joined Al-Shabaab and are staging 
attacks locally as well as participating in foreign jihadist missions (foreign fighters). This 
underscores problem of homegrown radicalization and dilemma of returnees.39 
Profound political, socioeconomic inequalities and grievances are at the core of 
radicalization in Kenya. Non-manageability of youth bulge, coupled with rising 
unemployment and social-economic injustices continue to disfranchise sections of the 
population.40 Al-Shabaab has tapped into the historical and perceived grievances like 
marginalization, poverty, and state oppression among others to radicalize and recruit.41 
Local communities are not helping fight Al-Shabaab. Relations between national security 
machinery and the public is characterized by environment of suspicion, hostility and 
conflictual. This has made the locals fear sharing information about their concerns.42 
Others accuse police of demanding for bribes from terror suspects to secure their release. 
There are also concerns that police don’t act on intelligence provided by locals.43 This has 
enabled the enemy to live amongst the people undetected. 
Some studies argue that some of Kenya’s responses to terrorism violates its own 
constitution.44 They raise issues of violation of human rights and “not made in Kenya”. 
The issues are core because the problem at hand requires homegrown solutions. This 
raises questions on the basis and whose interests these policies and strategies serve. When 
considering Kenya’s responses to Al-Shabaab terrorism threats, it is constructed within the 
framework of global WoT. It is a “war against Al-Shabaab”. This imports legal and 
strategic implications especially informing how the war is waged and its tools. For 
instance, use of force has been the dominant theme of the global WoT to terror threats. 
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KDF incursion into Somalia is framed along this thinking. However, the country justifies 
that its survival in its core operating environment was threatened and the response had to 
be through military means.   
Actors in counter terrorism are yet to embrace deeper coordination, interaction and 
synergies among themselves.45 These manifest at both the inter and intra-institutional 
levels. Bureaucratic turf wars and suspicion amongst agencies is common during the 
formulation and implementation of national security policies in Kenya.46 To cure such 
problems, the country is struggling with multiagency framework in counter terrorism 
efforts. The multi-agency framework is geared towards improving coordination, resource 
and operational efficiency as well as end rivalry among agencies.47 However, there is 
improvement along these lines. Comparison of operational response to terror attack at 
DusitD2 and Westgate Mall show significant improvement.48 Majority of the respondents 
felt that CVE efforts in Kenya needed to be all-inclusive to defeat Al-Shabaab in and 
outside Kenya. They opined that the country should use local people and their leaders to 
de-escalate the conflict.  
From the interviews and secondary data collected, it is clear that the philosophy of 
national security policies in Kenya are conceived in the traditional conception of security. 
They are predisposed to physical security. The architecture of national security in Kenya is 
anchored on Chapter Fourteen of the Constitution of Kenya 2010.49 Article 238 (1) defines 
national security as the protection against internal and external threats to Kenya’s 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, 
stability and prosperity, and other national interests.50 This understanding of security is 
state-centric approach to national security.51 It emphasis on state as the referent object of 
national security.52 From this perspective,  Kenya’s military incursion into Somalia can be 
explained by the necessity of physical security.  
Kenya’s responses to terrorism are inclined outwards rather than inwards. They 
perceive the problem to be external rather than internal. This posture is an import of the 
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global WoT. Attacks from Al-Shabaab are viewed as threatening Kenya’s statehood.53 In 
the circumstances, Kenya sought to protect its statehood and safety of Kenyans. It was an 
offensive war against Al-Shabaab. The response to this problem ignored crucial internal 
dynamics that are enablers to radicalization like marginalization and other political and 
socio-economic inequalities. There is a deficiency in appreciation and conception of the 
problem as being ‘within’ and devising customized policy responses according to the local 
context.  Such an appreciation also necessitates a coherent policy. The ad hoc 
pronouncements by the president and senior government officials on counter terrorism 
issues is fleeting.  
This shows that the country lacks an overarching strategic perspective on the kind 
of threat faced. Despite increased radicalization of Kenyan youths since 2011 following 
KDF incursion into Somalia, there was no policy stance on this shift. Formulation and 
implementation of counter terrorism and CVE strategies in Kenya is state-centric. Such 
posture excludes other perspectives from other players in the discourses of counter 
terrorism and CVE. Players like the public are kept on the periphery of security issues in 
Kenya.54 NSC which offers structures and mechanisms of coordination of national security 
policy making and implementation in Kenya is also caged in an exclusionist posture. It is 
dominated by members of national security organs. All these means that the content of 
CVE policies and strategies are state-centric. There are little or no perspectives from non-
security players. Recent literature emphasizes salience of plurality of perspectives and 
actors in CVE discourses.55 The purist realist lenses of conflicts has been criticized for its 
inaptness in the contemporary security environment.56  
There is dearth of information on realities local violent extremism contexts in 
Kenya. Even where such knowledge exists, CVE policy and practice are not informed by 
that reality. Other studies emphasizes the uniqueness of each CVE environment.57 In 
Kenya for instance, structural effects of marginalization, economic disenfranchisement, 
poverty in the Coast and Northeast regions are attributed to the near absence of formal 
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employment opportunities and low student enrollment in these regions.58 This uniqueness 
of contexts need to be reflected in the attendant strategies by states. CVE in Kenya is also 
not been perceived within the policy spectrum. It is only seen narrowly through national 
security laws, legislations and operations.  
The analytical thrust of this stance is that it is dissociated from development and 
poverty alleviation, governance and democratization, and education programs.59 This 
makes it difficult to rallying all sectors of social, religious, and economic life to 
emphatically and continually embrace peace and democracy and reject violent extremist 
ideologies and aims in order to eliminate opportunities for terrorist groups to operate, 
radicalize and recruit in Kenya.’60 
Distinction between the external and internal dimensions of the terrorism threat 
picture in paves way to scrutiny of the appropriate policy responses in the two 
environments. This study finds that responses to Al-Shabaab terrorism threat in Kenya 
lacks the distinction of the two ‘war’ environments. Although Kenya applies both military 
and CVE in responding to terrorism, the former dominates the latter. The value of CVE in 
mediating Al-Shabaab conflict in both Somalia and Kenya is yet to be appreciated.  This 
renders Kenya’s strategies to be reactionary and ad hoc. When terrorists attack a CT 
strategy is applied, when that does not work, counter insurgency is reigned in, when that 
proves overwhelming, CVE is contemplated.61 This has constrained policy development 
and enhancement.  
Data collected revealed that adoption of CVE in Kenya has not overthrown the use 
of force. An understanding into the forces that led shift to CVE is core. The use of force 
was seen as aggravating the problem of radicalization and failing to address root causes of 
the problem. Al-Shabaab takes advantage of disfranchisement and hostility from security 
forces to radicalize and recruit from the pool of aggrieved Kenyan youths.62 At the end, 
use of force and CVE is running concurrently. This duality in strategy raises critical policy 
and empirical questions. Use of force and CVE strategies have conflicting ends. The latter 
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seeks to win hearts and minds, but the former undermines this objective. Mediating CVE 
with a military strategy begs questions on the proper criteria of validity of CVE praxis.  
Working relationship between and among and the various components of the 
duality strategy is core to realization of envisaged national security objectives. Use of 
force and CVE seem to be working separately with little or no shared aims. Security 
agencies seem frustrated by the lack of cooperation by local communities in tackling Al-
Shabaab. ‘In northeastern region, we suspect that these people are known but the locals 
don’t divulge anything’.63 Even initiatives like Nyumba Kumi did not helped much due to 
suspicion between members of public and security agencies. Volatility in Northeastern 
part of Kenya is also seen to be aiding Al-Shabaab to blend and camouflage amongst the 
locals.  
Security agencies are facing hostility from communities. The later feel 
targeted/profiled by security operations. This has served to undermine legitimacy of the 
government among the people it is seeking to help. The nascent multi-agency framework 
on national security matters in Kenya is also confounded with bureaucratic turf wars.64 
This has constrained coordination of national security issues in Kenya.  Analysis of 
narratives and secondary data collected in this study raises a number of legal and strategic 
issues on CVE practice in Kenya. one of them is the legal justifications for KDF incursion 
into Somalia. Many studies have delved into debates on the legal implications of Kenya’s 
decision to intervene in Somalia. Some explore justifications for and consequent 
implications of the invasion of Somalia by the KDF, especially in light of an existing 
African Union (AU) mission in Somalia.65 Kenya’s justification for intervention in 
Somalia invoked provisions Article 51 of the UN Charter. The provision recognizes the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in the wake of an armed attack 
against a member of the UN. This legal justification raises a lot of questions regarding 
what constituted an armed attack against Kenya and whether such actions necessitated an 
invasion of that magnitude.  
This study finds that Kenya’s military intervention Somalia was done in haste. ‘Al-
Shabaab had intensified cross border incursions. We had to move in fast because things 
were getting out of hand.’66 This suggests that decision could was made in an emergency 
and crisis environment. Decisions conditioned by crisis thinking often overlook some 
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considerations. These findings are reinforced by Tams who argue that Kenya did not 
follow the right procedures in pursuit of the right to self-defence because it did not report 
its intended actions to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).67 Others  draw 
comparisons between intervention in Somalia and the 2003 invasion of Iraq by US.68 This 
analysis suggest that Kenya’s intervention was to achieve other political goals like 
maritime resources.  
This leads to the question of war powers in Kenya. Although Kenya has framed the 
intervention in Somalia as a ‘war’ against Al-Shabaab, this war was not rightly declared. 
Article 132 (4)(a) provides that the president with the approval of parliament declare war. 
The declaration of war under the constitution of Kenya 2010 is provided for under article 
95(6). Under this provision, the National Assembly approves declarations of war and 
extensions of states of emergency. This means that the declaration of war powers in Kenya 
require action by both the parliament and the president. This study finds that in the case of 
KDF intervention in Somalia, this did not happen.  These omissions are being blamed in 
temporal dynamics. We had to move in fast because things were getting out of hand.’69 
The other issue is that the lack of a coherent and formal national security or 
counter terrorism/CVE policy in Kenya, begs the question of the basis of CVE strategies. 
This denotes lack of a shared vision about count counter terrorism and CVE. In absence of 
a formal CVE policy or national security policy in Kenya, this study questions the basis of 
CVE strategies in the country. Policy making involve decision-making and the interactions 
among the various actors involved in national security. 70 A policy forms the basis of a 
strategy. What policy does the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) 
implement? This question is important because there is need to be clear on the kind of 
threat faced.  
This analysis finds that CVE strategies in Kenya based on operational issues. They 
are reactionary and ad hoc, with short of a clear strategic perspective. ‘The Westgate Mall 
attack prompted the government to initiate process to establish a National Counter 
Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in 2014’.71 The agency was mandated to formulate a NSCVE. 
However, the strategy that emerged largely reflects the generic framework provided for in 
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the United Nations Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism. The strategy is not 
homegrown. This imply that CVE policies and strategies in Kenya are devoid of strategic 
assessment of the country’s operational environment.  
6.5 Understanding CVE strategies in Kenya 
This section interprets and give meaning to issues that arose in data analysis. To 
understand CVE strategies in Kenya, the study judiciously constructed themes and 
statements that emerged from analysis and explained them. This entailed grouping 
analyzed data into categories. The study first familiarized with data collected and its 
analysis through detailed scrutiny to decipher meanings, patterns, trends and themes 
according to objectives of the study. Interpretation was based on theory and practice, with 
the former helping to explain, understand realities of CVE practice in Kenya. It explored 
emergent theoretical underpinnings and knowledge gaps. This entailed asking questions 
like; what generated themes were saying, their interplay and interactions. This study 
constructed understanding of CVE strategies in Kenya in four thematic areas. They are 
Kenya’s dyadic terrorism threat, philosophy of counter terrorism and CVE strategies in 
Kenya, Military – CVE duality response to terrorism in Kenya, and legal and strategic 
issues on CVE strategies in Kenya.  
6.5.1 Kenya’s dyadic terrorism threat  
This study finds that Kenya has been waging two wars: externally and internally. 
Externally, Kenya is in Somalia to fight Al-Shabaab. The country is also exposed to 
vagaries of the global terrorism threat from groups like Al-Qaeda. Terrorism is a global 
concern for all states.72 This is especially milieu of affiliation with crusaders and 
supporters of the global WoT like US and Israel. All this denoted an enemy from 
“outside”. Internally, the country is confronted with radicalized/homegrown Al-Shabaab 
networks. The group has radicalized and recruited Kenyan youths.73 They are not only 
staging attacks locally but also participating in foreign jihadist missions (foreign fighters). 
There is also threat posed by lone wolf-phenomenon.74 The enemy is now from “within”.  
Traditionally, Kenya’s terrorism threat has been perceived to be from the external 
dimension. It was associated with typical global terrorism threat and volatilities in 
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Somalia.75 Little of no attention was given to Kenya being a source of terrorism threat. 
Today, as pointed by analysis, the internal dimension is the most immediate and urgent 
terrorism threat to Kenya. Radicalization and problem of returnees is driving local terror 
attacks. Although terrorism threat from Al-Shabaab is the biggest national security 
challenge for Kenya at the moment, the longer-term threat is the problem of the 
radicalization of the youth.76 Radicalization will outlive the War on Terror, thus 
necessitating urgent and strategic response. The fact that Kenyan youth are radicalized has 
serious strategic consequences for the conduct of the War on Terror. It means specifically 
that now the enemy is within and is one of us.  
This analysis distinguishing the dyadic terrorism threat for Kenya has implications 
for theory and practice. It implies that Kenya needs to have distinct strategies for each 
environment. Without forgetting the external dimension, urgency for search of a 
homegrown strategic response to internal dimensions of terrorism threat in Kenya cannot 
be overemphasized. State-centric and security lenses are unfit for this realm. Probable 
solutions to the internal problems and underlying causes and grievances can be found 
through conflict management frameworks.  
6.5.2 Philosophy of policy responses to terrorism in Kenya 
It is necessary to ascertain philosophy of national security policy in Kenya because 
it points to the basis of its justification.77 National security strategies are derived from 
national security policies of states. Identifying philosophy of policy responses to terrorism 
in Kenya is useful in many ways. First, it enables asking question of about their contents 
and its conceptual analysis.78 Secondly, it promotes rational national security policy 
analysis by facilitating comparison with others. Philosophy facilitates scholarly 
communication by establishing common ground between those with disparate views.  
Data analyzed postulate that philosophy of national security policies in Kenya 
disposed to physical/traditional conceptualization of security. This conception is an import 
of the cold-war frameworks disposed to use of force. Article 238 (1) of Constitution of 
Kenya 2010 defines national security as the protection against internal and external threats 
to Kenya’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, 
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peace, stability and prosperity, and other national interests.79 This understanding of 
security is state-centric approach to national security.  
Kenya’s responses to terrorism are constructed within the framework of global 
WoT. It is a “war” against Al-Shabaab”.80 The philosophy of WoT framework is 
conceived in realist thinking.81 It is state-centric. Just like global WoT, framing the 
problem as war has implications. An asymmetrical ‘war’ was responded to using 
symmetrical lenses. This response perceives the problem to be external rather than 
internal. It also presumes the enemy to have capabilities similar to states. This cautions 
against rushing for quick fixes with fixated state-centric mindset to the problem. 
Considering counter terrorism and CVE policy within ad hoc presidential and ministerial 
directives in Kenya point to lack of an overarching strategic policy.  
Kenya’s responses to terrorism are informed by necessity of physical security. 
‘Recurrent cross border incursions and provocations by Al-Shabaab insurgents left Kenya 
to pursue with no other choice other than pursue the enemy at the source. It had to protect 
territorial integrity and sovereignty.82 To protect the state, use of force was deployed.83 
The response did take consider the character of the enemy or the realm in which the threat 
operates. Wolfers raises concerns about ambiguity of national security and its pursuit if 
not founded on firm specifications.84 Following intervention in Somalia, Al-Shabaab 
embarked on radicalization of youths. However, this shift was not contemplated by 
Kenya’s policy responses. This suggest that CVE in Kenya as a reactive response. 
Traditionally, coordination and information sharing on counter terrorism was constrained. 
‘Westgate Mall attack prompted the government to initiate process to establish a NCTC.85 
This was a mechanism to ease coordination and information sharing on counter terrorism 
efforts.  
Analysis of Kenya’s NSCVE revealed it mirrors the generic framework provided 
for in the United Nations Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism. The Strategy is 
not homegrown. It is outward rather than inward- looking. This has dissociated it with 
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trends like dilemma of returnees, homegrown radicalization and structural conflicts 
underlying the problem. Importance of homegrown solutions lie in taking cognizance of 
cultural values, trends and contextual dynamics.86 This is yet to be appreciated in 
discourses on CVE in Kenya. The external posture of CVE strategies in Kenya does not 
capture moments of the conflict as it transits. They are not flexible to match the character 
of the threat.    
Exclusion of non-security actors in discourses on CVE in Kenya suggest that CVE 
is perceived at the policy spectrum. It is dissociated from development, poverty 
alleviation, governance and democratization, education and peace programs.87 This has 
made it difficult to ‘rally all sectors of Kenyan social, religious, and economic life to 
emphatically and continually embrace peace and democracy and reject violent extremist 
ideologies and aims in order to eliminate opportunities for terrorist groups to operate, 
radicalize and recruit in Kenya.’88 Kenya’s response to violent extremism fell into the 
traps of Al-Shabaab narratives by depicting security policies and strategies as targeting 
Somalis and Muslims.  This creates dissonance about the character of the war against 
terror and the strategies being used.  
6.5.3 Military-CVE dual response to terrorism in Kenya 
Analysis show that Kenya applies both military and CVE strategies in responding 
to terrorism in its operating environment. This consideration is constructed within the 
framework of global WoT. Despite adopting CVE approaches, states did not abandon use 
of force.89 For Kenya, the problem is confounded by use of force even on own population. 
This suggests lack of distinction between internal and external war environments for 
Kenya. The strategic imperative of distinction between these two dimensions is core in 
analyzing and designing policy responses. It means that appropriate and distinct strategies 
conceived for each environment. Use of force in Somalia and within Kenya suggests that 
responses to terrorism threat in Kenya lacks the distinction of the two ‘war’ environments.  
Military-CVE dual strategy in Kenya raises critical policy and empirical questions. 
Use of force and CVE strategies have conflicting ends. The latter seeks to win hearts and 
minds, but the former undermines this very praxis. Conceptually, CVE emerged as a 
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paradigm to solve a problem that military strategy failed to address.90 Use of force was 
aggravating radicalization and not addressing its root causes. Mediating CVE with a 
military strategy begs questions on the proper criteria of validity of CVE strategies. This 
study finds that adoption of CVE in Kenya did not overthrow use of force. This means that 
CVE has not been properly appreciated as an important and distinct response to terrorism 
threat in Kenya. Military strategy in Kenya outshines CVE.  
This finding echoes Macharia who argues that Kenya has adopted reactionary 
strategies; when terrorists attack a CT strategy is applied, when that does not work, 
counter insurgency is reigned in, when that proves overwhelming, CVE is contemplated.91 
Deeper sentiments are expressed by Ogada who argue that the content of Kenya’s NSCVE 
is generic.92 This has deprived it of touch with the realities of the threat. There is a 
disconnect in the military-CVE duality strategy in responding to Al-Shabaab threats in 
Kenya. Use of force on own population has evoked criticism over claims of profiling 
Somali-Muslims, human rights violations and breaches of the law by security agencies.93   
Working relationship between and among various components of the duality 
strategy is another problem. Local communities for example are not cooperating or sharing 
information on Al-Shabaab.94 The nascent multi-agency framework on national security 
matters in Kenya is also confounded with bureaucratic turf wars. This has constrained 
coordination of national security issues in Kenya. This analysis cautions against a one-fit-
all approach in Kenya’s counter terrorism and CVE strategies. A proper appreciation of 
uniqueness of internal (or better put CVE) environment in Kenya is lacking. It is only after 
such assessment that strategies can be based on. This means that existing policy responses 
to this environment are suboptimal.  
6.5.3 Emerging issues on CVE strategies in Kenya  
Like global WoT, practice of CVE in Kenya raises legal and strategic issues. First, 
is about legal justifications for KDF incursion into Somalia and framimng it as a war. 
Many studies debate legal implications of Kenya’s intervention in Somalia. Some explore 
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justifications for and consequent implications of the invasion of Somalia by the KDF, 
especially in light of an existing African Union (AU) mission in Somalia.95 Kenya’s 
justification for intervention in Somalia invoked provisions Article 51 of the UN Charter  
raises questions regarding what constituted an armed attack against Kenya and whether 
such actions necessitated an invasion of that magnitude. 
This study finds that Kenya’s “war against Al-Shabaab” simply replicated the 
global WoT. It does not fit the frame of classical war, thus a defective war. This finding 
implies that the Kenya’s responses to Al-Shabaab are grounded on flawed conception of 
war.  Secondly, Kenya’s military intervention Somalia was done in haste. ‘Al-Shabaab had 
intensified cross border incursions. We had to move in fast because things were getting out 
of hand.’96 This suggests that the decision could was made in an emergency and crisis 
environment. Decisions conditioned by crisis thinking often overlook some considerations. 
These findings are reinforced by Tams who argue that Kenya did not follow the right 
procedures in pursuit of the right to self-defence because it did not report its intended 
actions to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).97  
These issues lead us to question of war powers in Kenya. Kenya’s ‘war against Al-
Shabaab’, was not rightly declared. Article 132 (4)(a) provides that the president with the 
approval of parliament declare war. The declaration of war under the constitution of 
Kenya 2010 is provided for under article 95(6). Under this provision, the National 
Assembly approves declarations of war and extensions of states of emergency. This means 
that the declaration of war powers in Kenya require action by both the parliament and the 
president. This study finds that in the case of KDF intervention in Somalia, this did not 
happen.  These omissions are being blamed in temporal dynamics. We had to move in fast 
because things were getting out of hand.’98 
Lack of a coherent and formal national security or counter terrorism/CVE policy in 
Kenya, begs the question of the basis of CVE strategies. It denotes lack of a shared vision 
about count counter terrorism and CVE. In absence of a formal CVE policy or national 
security policy in Kenya, this study questions the basis of CVE strategies in the country. A 
policy forms the basis of a strategy.99 National security policies need to be clear and 
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grounded on sound underpinning of threats facing the state.100 What policy does the 
National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) implement? Such a question is 
important because there is need to be clear on the kind of threat being faced. This study 
finds that CVE strategies in Kenya grounded on operational and tactical issues.  
6.6 Study findings  
This study began by faulting global WoT framework as basis for national security 
policies by states. It argued that WoT framework does not provide a strategic perspective 
to national security of states. The study proposed that terrorism can be analyzed and 
responded to through peace and conflict management frameworks. That analysis paved 
way for possibility of negotiated or diplomatic solutions for terrorism. The conceptual 
framework constructed by the study at the beginning hypothesized that contemporary 
national security strategies by states are informed by global WoT. This frame enhanced 
investigations on inherent relationship between study variables and its implications.  
From literature, it emerged that conditions underlying terrorism conflict are not 
unique. They revolve around political, structural and cultural dimensions. Literature on 
terrorism did not explain why peace and conflict management frameworks cannot be used 
to design responses to terrorism. The only objection raised against negotiating with 
terrorists is that it legitimizes terror groups, their goals and their means; thus, the anecdote 
‘we don’t negotiate with terrorists!’101 This does not mean that this literature was 
unusable. It provided valuable insights that enriched analysis of this study and draw 
conclusion. 
6.6.1 Findings on philosophy of global War on Terror 
This study took a critical perspective on the global WoT.  A clear 
conceptualization of philosophy of national security is crucial. A philosophy of a society is 
fashioned out of a climate of beliefs, behavior and actions. It is the basis that inform why 
the society do what it does. This understanding is important to illuminate on the whys and 
wherefores of behavior. This study finds that the US-led WoT has emerged as the 
dominant post-cold war framework for international and national security. The philosophy 
of national security for US during the Cold War was containment. In that framework, the 
role of state security organs like the military, intelligence and the larger military-industrial 
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complex in national security was geared to that goal.  With the collapse of the USSR, 
states lost cold war philosophy as a strategic basis. There lacked a theme and subject for 
states to base their security policies and 9/11 provided an opportunity for re-directing the 
national security industry. WoT is constructed along this frame and was intended to fill 
strategic gap caused by end of the cold war.  
There is a problem with the fundamental assumptions upon which WoT is 
constructed. These assumptions begin with the significance of framing the problem as a 
'war’. WoT does not fit in classical conceptualization of war. It is a war that runs on 
perpetuity, has no clear enemy, and negates the conventional laws of war. This raises 
serious legal and strategic issues with implication on responses to the problem. The study 
finds that despite lack of unified definition and current responses, terrorism is ever 
evolving and threatening survival of states. Instead of eliminating or reducing the problem, 
WoT is aggravating it. These findings are collaborated by Fierke who hold that WoT is a 
defective war.102 States responded to non-state actors as though they are states. The current 
problem differs from the cold war threats both in scope and complexity.  
Whereas the problem is asymmetrical, states are responding through state-centric 
lens. WoT cannot solely be won through military might. The role and effect of 
inappropriate aggressive strategies by states, socio-economic factors like deprivation and 
poverty in fanning this conflict have been overlooked. While terrorism remains enduring, 
globalization and information age has further fueled its character, including how terrorist 
groups recruit individuals and then use them to carry out attacks.103 The security operating 
environment has radically shifted from the traditional conceptualization of physical 
terrain. These dynamics have constrained states in terms policy and strategy responses in 
dealing with the problem.  
This study holds that an alternative strategy like negotiation or mediation is 
necessary to give WoT a convincing political purpose by transforming battlefield 
successes into peace. This strategy needs to go beyond mere reactionary and anticipatory 
frameworks to uncharted waters of shaping an alternative environment devoid of need for 
violence. The basis of this assertion is that the scope and complexity of terrorism requires 
a more complex approach, clear, comprehensive and coherent strategy. Devoid of such a 
strategy, states run risk of formulating and pursuing policies grounded on operational and 
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tactical issues. End result is that states risk countering and responding to illusory threats 
and challenges. 
6.6.2 Findings on terrorism as a conflict in transition 
The terrain in which conflicts have traditionally been conceptualized has radically 
shifted to asymmetric and symbolic. Terrorism epitomizes a struggle for a cause: a form of 
conflict. Given volatility of operating environment, actors are always changing tactics and 
strategies. As such, terrorism threat is always mutating. It is a conflict in transition 
characterized by complex peculiarities, that makes it challenging to respond to. As the 
conflict goes on, the actors involved are strategically changing their offensive and 
defensive tools and strategies.104 Responding to a mutating conflict is a daunting task 
because the of its changing character, actors involved and lack of necessary conditions for 
successful negotiations, most critical being a mutually hurting stalemate. 
This has necessitated scholars and policy makers to go back to drawing board and 
re-examine underlying assumptions. Despite clear similarities of actors and root causes of 
structural conflicts and terrorism, there is a disconnect between conflict analysis and 
analysis of terrorism. This study sought to challenges this divide. It analytically situated 
terrorism as a conflict in transition within peace and conflict management frameworks. 
Despite misgivings about whether states can negotiate with terrorists, current literature 
argues that it is possible to negotiate a solution. Literature on peace and conflict 
management is rich with strategies to solve political, structural and cultural contestations. 
This study argues that CVE strategies need to mediate the terrorism conflict by importing 
new dimension as opposed to use of force.  
CVE strategies can condition certain frameworks that can lead to negotiation, or 
mediation of those negotiations. In early 2020, the US signed a deal with Taliban, setting 
the stage for withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.105 This was an actual negotiation 
leading to a peace agreement, and ultimately to a USA exit strategy from the Afghanistan 
theatre. It will mark the end of US’ longest war in Afghanistan that began after 9/11. To 
this end, case analysis and cross analysis can be useful tools to draw comparative 
perspective and detailed analysis along these lines.  
                                                          
104 Interview with CVE_KE- [S/PP] _ 01 Senior lecturer and consultant on governance, conflict and security. 
March 4, 2020, Nairobi. 




Framing terrorism as a conflict in transition and relating its analysis to ripe 
moments theory illuminates understanding of terrorism conflict and its resolution. 
Zartman’s model rests on idea that conflict resolution depends on identification of the ripe 
moment in differing patterns of conflict and escalation. The model gives primacy to a 
proper context analysis of conflict and relationship of the issue with conflict, instability 
and peace.  The point when a conflict is ripe for resolution is linked to ‘plateaus’ and 
"precipices", which produces varying pressure; deadlocks" and deadlines.106 This means 
that CVE strategies must be flexible and not one-sided; they must be valid for the stage of 
transition the conflict is at. It also means that CVE strategies must no longer be seen from 
solely a state-centric perspective. The ripeness framework is plausible to map requisite 
multipronged inter-actions for a better appreciation of the dynamics of terrorism conflict 
and eventually grasp the ripe moment. 
By taking advantage of occasional hurting stalemate plateaus, CVE strategies can 
contribute to settlements of terrorism conflict. The transitional character of terrorism arises 
from change of strategies by parties involved and vicissitudes of operational environment. 
For instance, terrorism that prompted Kenya to intervene in Somalia was not the same as 
two years later. The problem transited to radicalization. The issues arising is how to 
capture moments of conflict and whether CVE strategies are dynamic or may become stale 
once the conflict transforms. This study finds that negotiation and mediation of transitional 
conflicts in transition can provide a framework for terrorism conflict. While considering 
security and devolution, Mkutu et al reckons that devolution is portent of altering balance 
of power at the grassroots levels.107 This means that structural issues underlying terrorism 
conflict can be addressed through alternative approaches.  
De-escalation of conflict is conceivable when one of the parties conjures the 
significance of the conflict, and the incentive to continue fighting declines.108 As the war 
proceeds, Al-Shabaab group has been changing strategies and tactics. It resorted to 
radicalization and recruitment of Kenyan youth. The enemy ‘without’ has now changed 
face to an enemy ‘within’. The shift in tactics by Al-Shabaab have serious implications on 
the policies and strategies devised to deal with the problem. Use of force in Kenya was 
seen to be contributing to the very radicalization of youths that the state seeks to address, 
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thus making them receptive to recruitment by terrorist organizations and networks.109 Al-
Shabaab has tapped into the historical and perceived grievances like marginalization, 
poverty, and state oppression among others to radicalize and recruit.110 The study found 
that the initial plan in Kenya’s occupation in Somalia was to create a buffer region within 
Jubaland. This was to effectively cutoff Al-Shabaab spilling into Kenya. However, these 
were disrupted re-hatting of KDF into AMISOM and problems of homegrown 
radicalization.  
6.6.3 Findings on CVE approaches in War on Terror 
The overarching theme in violent extremism is the socialization of individuals and 
groups into a radical or extreme worldview. The triggers of violent extremism can be 
foreign or domestic, national or international. There are many threads of radicalization of 
which violent extremism is one; an individual may be radicalized but not engage in violent 
extremism. The challenge for CVE is to identify the violent extremism nexus between the 
two divides. CVE strategies were devised and adopted following failure by the coercive 
approaches to address radicalization and the root causes of terrorism and violent 
extremism. Coercive approaches were found to be part of the problem.111 However, even 
with the adoption of CVE, countries have not dropped the coercive approaches; CVE and 
military responses are coexisting in the war against terrorism.  
Besides Al-Shabaab threat from Somalia, Kenya is also confronted with the 
problems of homegrown radicalization. This has complicated responses, particularly 
identifying the enemy among your own citizens. Questions are also raised on the 
consequences of subjecting own citizenry to use of force, and what does this mean their 
support for this war and radicalization. If this war continues, its will lose citizenry support. 
The thesis here is that the military strategy is problematic and ineffective in the light of the 
contemporary security environment.  
The basis of mediating CVE strategy with a military strategy is a critical question 
in addressing terrorism threat. Equally, as the terrorism threat evolves to include 
radicalization of local population, countries are still held in state-centric lenses in their 
responses to the problem. This has constrained policy and strategy responses in dealing 
with terrorism and violent extremism. CVE policies and strategies are not working. The 
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problem is the fundamental assumptions upon which these policies and strategies are 
constructed and implemented. They are still shrouded with narratives that perceive threat 
as an external, rather than internal. Whereas terrorism conflict is on transition, response 
policies and strategies by states are still caged with generic CVE strategies and borrowed 
lenses.  
Implementation of CVE strategies is contextual. Like other states, Kenya is 
experimenting CVE: it is trial and error undertaking.  The legal and policy dimensions of 
CVE in Kenya are also complex because there is no single answer to the problem at 
hand.112 It is confronted by rapidly evolving security challenges that are unprecedented. 
Initially, the country responded to terrorism from the Al-Shabaab terrorist group by use of 
military means. However, Al-Shabaab, changed tact and resorted to radicalization and 
recruitment of Kenyan youth.113 There is a problem with availability of information on 
realities of local CVE contexts. Even in contexts where such knowledge exists, the CVE 
policies and practices are not grounded on it. Many CVE approaches lack evidence of 
success, and this can undermine their efforts. Terrorism is characterized by an ever 
shifting of strategies by the enemy and the security operating environment. CVE strategies 
need to match if not shape the terrain these shifts. This research study aims at responding 
to these empirical gaps.  
6.6.4 Findings on CVE strategies in Kenya 
This study finds that strategic terrorism threat picture in Kenya is dyadic. The 
country confronts both an external and internal war. Externally, terrorism is a global 
concern for all states and like other states is vulnerable to this problem. Kenya’s affiliation 
with crusaders and supporters of the global WoT like US and Israel exacerbates Kenya’s 
threat from outside with groups like Al Qeda, ISIS and ISIL among other being targeted by 
WoT, seek reprisals on US allies. Kenya’s intervention in Somalia is a thread of tis 
external dimension threat. Internally, homegrown radicalization of youths by Al-Shabaab 
networks poses the biggest threat to Kenya’s national security. Kenyan youths have joined 
Al-Shabaab. They are staging attacks locally and participating in foreign jihadist missions 
(foreign fighters). There is also threat posed by lone wolf-phenomenon. The enemy is now 
from “within”.  This study finds that the threat within (radicalization) is the most 
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immediate and urgent terrorism threat to Kenya. It necessitates urgent and strategic 
response. The study heard that an enforced repatriation of Somalia refugees, Usalama 
watch and construction of the Somalia-Kenya border were meant to wade of terrorists.   
As the study found out, Kenya’s “war” against Al-Shabaab” is constructed within 
the framework of global WoT. Just like WoT, framing the problem as war has serious 
implications. First, the problem is perceived to be external rather than internal. 114This 
implies that Kenya has traditionally conceived the threat to be from Somalia. As a result, 
the response to the problem are designed for that environment (external). This has mainly 
focused on military tools. Secondly, aggressor is considered like one with capabilities held 
by states. An asymmetrical ‘war’ is responded to using symmetrical lenses. This means 
there is a rushing for quick fixes with fixated state-centric mindset to the problem. Hence, 
this study found that Kenya lacks a coherent approach to counter terrorism and CVE 
issues. The coherence can be found in a proper appreciation of the operating environment 
and the attendant dynamics. Such appreciations seem to be lacking.  
In absence of a formal CVE policy or national security policy in Kenya, this study 
questions the basis of CVE strategies in the country. What policy does the National 
Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) implement? Such questions are 
important because we need to be clear on the kind of threat being faced. These findings 
suggest that Kenya’s responses to terrorism and violent extremism are based on 
operational and tactical issues.  Such strategies are reactive response and ad hoc. 
The study established that the philosophy of national security policies in Kenya is 
inclined to physical/traditional conceptualization of security. It is states-centric mirrors 
just like the pre cold war security frameworks. Threats to national security are thus 
responded through use of force.115 This philosophy informed by the constitutional 
conception of national security. For instance, article 238 (1) defines national security as 
the protection against internal and external threats to Kenya’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity, 
and other national interests. The emphasis is on the state. From this perspective, Kenya’s 
military incursion into Somalia on necessity of physical security. Responses for concerns 
of physical security are designed in use of force paradigm. 
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Preoccupation with physical security is emphasized by domination of national 
security organs in discourses of formulation and implementation of counter terrorism and 
CVE. For instance, NCTC, the national focal point for CVE is under control of organs of 
national security organs. This posture excludes perspectives of other players outside 
security organs. Such exclusion of non-security actors in discourses on CVE in Kenya 
suggest that CVE in Kenya has not been perceived as a broader policy spectrum. It is 
dissociated from other programs targeting structural inequalities like development, poverty 
alleviation, governance and democratization, education and peace programs. National 
security institutions need a functional and a well-coordinated system to function 
smoothly.116 This seem to be constrained in Kenya.  
It was established that despite use of force, Kenya continue to endure terrorist 
attacks by Al-Shabaab. The most prominent incidents include the September 2013 attack 
on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, which killed at least 69 people and injured 
almost 200; the 2014 Mpeketoni attack, in which nearly 50 people died; and the 2015 
attack on Garissa University College in Garissa County, which left 147 people, mostly 
students, dead. It was realized that traditional CT policies are reactive and overlooked the 
underlying factors. Others argue that Kenya had been held hostage to governance crisis 
because of the instrumentalization of violence and the scourge of corruption.117 It These 
have restrained strategic thinking in policy and strategies to address terrorism threat.  
This study argues that CVE strategies in Kenya are not homegrown. They are 
blueprints from elsewhere thus lacking in customized local contexts. The framework 
provided in Kenya’s National Strategy on Counter Violent Extremism largely mirrors the 
template of United Nations Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism. This posture 
fails to capture terrorism conflict as a conflict in transition. It means that the responses are 
misdirected because they are not valid for the moment of the conflict. This study finds 
CVE strategies in Kenya to be outward rather than inward- looking and devoid of strategic 
assessment that appreciates the local contexts. Without appreciation of local contexts, they 
are inflexible to match the character of the threat.    
As the study established, Kenya applies both use of force and CVE to responding 
to terrorism. This duality-strategy raises questions. Use of force and CVE strategies have 
conflicting ends. The latter seeks to win hearts and minds, but the former undermines this 
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very praxis. This study finds that CVE practice in Kenya lacks a convincing philosophy. 
Application of military-CVE duality strategy in Kenya is skewed with former eclipsing the 
latter. This means CVE has not been properly anchored and appreciated as an important 
and distinct response to terrorism threat in Kenya. Secondly, use of force in both Somalia 
and within Kenya suggests that Kenya has not appreciated distinction of the two ‘war’ 
environments. This omission is exported to designing response strategies like use of force 
on own population. This makes the population not to support the war. The nascent multi-
agency framework on national security matters in Kenya is also confounded with 
bureaucratic turf wars. This has constrained coordination of national security issues in 
Kenya.  
This study argues that war against Al-Shabaab in Kenya faces a replica of 
questions in WoT. These range from framing it a war, legal justifications for incursion, 
and strategies deployed. This resonates with findings of Samuel that Kenya’s war against 
Al-Shabaab is a copy of the global WoT.118 As the study established, invoking provisions 
Article 51 of the UN Charter by Kenya raises questions regarding what constituted an 
armed attack against Kenya and whether such actions necessitated an invasion of that 
magnitude. Kenya’s war against Al-Shabaab does not fit the frame of classical war. It is 
thus based on a defective conception. Secondly, Kenya’s military intervention Somalia 
was done in haste. This suggests that the decision was made in an emergency and crisis 
environment. All this implies that if Kenya’s responses to terrorism continues in this 
direction, they may fail. This failure means aggravation of the threat.  
The other finding relates to question of war powers in Kenya. This study finds that 
Kenya’s ‘war against Al-Shabaab’, was not rightly declared. Whereas article 132 (4)(a) 
provides that the president with the approval of parliament declare war, this did not 
happen in the case of Somalia incursion. Under article 95(6), the National Assembly 
approves declarations of war and extensions of states of emergency. This means that the 
declaration of war powers in Kenya require action by both the parliament and the 
president. This did not happen.  These omissions are being blamed in temporal dynamics 
there reinforcing crisis and emergency conditioning in policy making processes.  
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6.7 Conclusions  
This study examined terrorism as a conflict in transition through a critical analysis 
of CVE strategies in Kenya. What emerges is that Kenya’s CVE strategies are constructed 
within the global WoT framework. They are not homegrown. The global WoT framework 
does not address issues underlying terrorism conflict. For instance, structural conflicts, 
grievances and social-economic marginalization are outside purview of WoT. These issues 
explain the missing link between WoT and national security policies by states. Whereas 
terrorism conflict revolves around such issues, WoT framework is detached from them. 
They are aggravating WoT and qualify terrorism as a conflict in transition.  
Adoption of CVE by states did not overthrow use of force. This is despite 
recognition that the latter had failed to address root cause of the problem. Indeed, it was 
seen as part of the problem. This challenges the rational of CVE strategies in WoT.  
Conflict theory offers strategies to address issues like structural conflicts, grievances and 
social-economic marginalization. The study argues that CVE strategies can mediate 
terrorism conflict by importing a new dimension as opposed to use of force. They can 
condition certain frameworks that can lead to negotiation among the actors, or mediation 
of those negotiations. It finds that Kenya can use conflict management frameworks like 





















7.1 Introduction  
This study started by reviewing how states responded to terrorism after 9/11. It argued that 
global War on Terror (WoT) is the dominant theme anchoring national security policies of 
states. The study further argued that WoT lacks a coherent strategic basis to anchor 
national security framework. WoT framework was also faulted for overlooking issues 
underlying issues like structural conflicts, grievances and social-economic 
marginalization. Chapter six focused on a critical analysis of Counter Violent extremism 
(CVE) strategies in Kenya. It found that Kenya’s CVE strategies are constructed within 
the global WoT framework. This Chapter outlines summary of main findings, their 
implications, and conclusion based on objectives of the study.  
7.2 Summary of main findings 
Debates on the kind of threat facing the world are imperative. This is because the 
current tools inadequately explain the problem. This presents dilemmas to both theory and 
policy making. Terrorism epitomizes a conflict in transition because of shifting strategies 
by actors involved and changes in the operating environment in which it occurs. A 
complex and transitional conflict can only be managed through a complex but flexible 
methodology. Such a methodology involves diversity of perspectives and isolating the 
amenable issues underlying the conflict. This will pave way for designing of appropriate 
tools for identified issues. Plurality of perspectives will engender enrichment and diversity 
of options to deal with the problem.  Terrorism is a war of ideas and can only be fought 
and won by providing better ideas. The future of CVE efforts in Kenya lie with 
homegrown solutions.  
The praxis of global WoT is mediated by an array of issues in the operating 
environment. They include unresolved structural/political conflicts, socio-economic 
marginalization, extremist ideology, global geo-politics and contextual dynamics. The 
issues epitomize the missing link in WoT. Terrorism conflict is grounded on these issues. 
However, the current conceptualization of WoT is detached from these underlying issues. 
This has imported implications on both WoT and national security policy by states. This 
study finds that issues underlying terrorism conflict can be addressed through conflict 
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management approaches. CVE strategies in Kenya can condition frameworks that can lead 
to negotiation, or mediation of those negotiations. 
Contemporary events and cases helped circumvent criticism about single cases 
thereby validating their findings. Reliability is also achieved since its conclusions are not 
derived from this case alone but rather incorporate observations of other cases elsewhere. 
There is need to grow interest in interrogating alternative frameworks to address 
underlying issues in terrorism conflict. Similar studies can be conducted in other countries. 
A comparative and cross-sectional analysis of other countries provokes debate among 
scholars thereby enriching literature on the subject. This also reveals critical issues and 
aspects brought about replicate research on different contexts.  
Though a case study, this study finding may be generalizable. This is because it 
drew from contemporary events and cases elsewhere which enabled sufficient latest data. 
Generalization can be done through use of many cases which ensure validity and 
reliability of data collected. Thus, this study can generalize that conflict management 
approaches can be used to resolve aspects of terrorism. In February 2020, US signed a deal 
with Taliban, setting the stage for withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.119 Even the 
British government maintained a secret back channel to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
even after the latter had launched a mortar attack on 10 Downing Street that nearly 
eliminated the entire British cabinet in 1991. In 1988, the Spanish government sat down 
with the separatist group Basque Homeland and Freedom (known by its Basque acronym 
ETA) only six months after the group had killed 21 shoppers in a supermarket. By taking 
into consideration these contemporary cases, this study creates a generic base for multiple 
observations.  
7.2.1 Philosophy of global war on terror 
This study concludes that WoT is the dominant contemporary framework 
anchoring national security policies of many states, especially in regard to terrorism. 
However, WoT has been faulted due to its inadequacies to anchor national and 
international security framework. It is seen as a war about other ‘things.120 It has been 
associated with US imperialist reach and continuation of cold war politics.121 This posture 
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makes it loose touch with the realities of the issues underlying the terrorism conflict.122 
This study found that national security policies of states are facing problems and not 
working. The study linked this dilemma to the underlying philosophy of WoT. With the 
end of cold war, there lacked a theme, subject or strategic basis for national security 
policies by states.  The 9/11 provided an opportunity for re-directing the national security 
industry. This study established that WoT framework sought to incompatibly carry over 
the philosophy and liabilities of cold war security framework. Some underlying baggage 
of cold war framework like new role of the larger military-industrial complex required 
reinvention. There is also question of how to sustain and spread certain ideals like 
capitalism.123 WoT assumes that the liberal or capitalist side of the cold war won, thus the 
whole world can be made to subscribe to that one side.124 
In replacing cold war framework with WoT, other things like existential threat to 
the whole world are clearly missing. This makes it difficult to return to the cold war 
framework. It lacks strategic perspective. This study further concludes that there are 
problems with fundamental assumptions upon which WoT is constructed. First, is the 
significance of framing the problem as a 'war’. WoT does not fit in classical 
conceptualization of war. One of the implications of this is that states responded by use of 
force. The study found that the current problem differs from the cold war threats both in 
scope and complexity. Whereas Cold War’s enemy was easy to identify, analyze and 
respond to, contemporary terrorism defies this frame. It is amorphous and borderless.  
The WoT has no clear enemy and negates the conventional laws of war. Instead of 
eliminating or reducing the problem, use of force, the overriding face of WoT is 
aggravating it.125 This study further finds that terrorism will not solely be won through use 
of force. Despite the asymmetrical and shifting character of the problem, states are stuck 
with state-centric and inflexible responses. An alternative strategy like negotiation or 
mediation is necessary to give WoT a convincing political purpose. It can transform 
battlefield successes into peace. This strategy needs to go beyond mere reactionary and 
anticipatory frameworks to uncharted waters of shaping an alternative environment devoid 
of need for violence. The basis of this assertion is that the scope and complexity of 
terrorism requires a more complex approach, clear, comprehensive and coherent strategy. 
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Devoid of such a strategy, states run risk of formulating and pursuing policies grounded on 
operational and tactical issues. End result is that states risk countering and responding to 
illusory threats and challenges. 
7.2.2 Terrorism as a conflict in transition 
Neither party in the WoT seem to be winning. As the conflict goes on, the actors 
involved are strategically changing their offensive and defensive tools and strategies.126 In 
Kenya, Al-Shabaab strategy has changed from tactical cross border incursions to 
radicalization of local youth.127 To respond to this, Kenya changed its strategy from 
exclusive use of force to incorporate. This has created a stalemate. Although the stalemate 
is not necessarily of an identical degree, the issue is that neither party sees likelihood of an 
end or victory. They have exhausted their resources and thus strong incentives to seek 
resolution of the conflict. Continued fighting is painful and costly to both parties. 
Debates on the issues underlying terrorism conflict begs questions regarding 
effective management of such conflicts. This study finds that there are similarities in 
actors and root causes of structural conflicts and terrorism.128  It analyzed terrorism as a 
conflict in transition within peace and conflict management frameworks. The study 
challenged existing misgivings about whether states can negotiate with terrorists and 
argues that it is possible to negotiate a solution. This assertion is premised on frameworks 
in peace and conflict management that offer infinite strategies in which contestations that 
have political, structural and cultural dimensions can be addressed.  
This thesis questions whether CVE strategies are designed to capture the conflict at 
the time they are formulated, or they become stale once the conflict transforms. It suggests 
that CVE strategies can mediate terrorism conflict by importing new dimension as 
opposed to use of force. They can condition frameworks that can lead to negotiation, or 
mediation of those negotiations. This provides opportunity for doing things differently, 
greater participation and solutions that capture the transiting moments with greater impact. 
The US recently signed a deal with Taliban, setting the stage for withdrawal of US troops 
from Afghanistan. This entailed actual negotiations leading to a peace agreement, and 
ultimately to a USA exit strategy from the Afghanistan theatre. It will mark the end of US’ 
longest war in Afghanistan that began after 9/11. To this end, case analysis and cross 
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analysis can be useful tools to draw comparative perspective and detailed analysis along 
these lines.   
This study suggests that time is ripe to consider alternative conflict management 
approaches to deal with terrorism. It holds that CVE strategies can contribute to 
settlements of terrorism conflict. Policy experts should not just pay attention to 
radicalizing ideologies that lead individuals to join extremist groups. This study 
established that while ideologies are important, many youths are joining violent extremist 
for material reasons. Material conditions or lack of opportunities open up the youth to 
greater vulnerability for recruitment into extremist agendas. The transitional character of 
terrorism arises from change of strategies by parties involved and vicissitudes of 
operational environment. For instance, terrorism that prompted Kenya to intervene in 
Somalia was not the same as two years later. The problem transited to radicalization. The 
issues arising is how to capture moments of conflict and whether CVE strategies are 
dynamic or may become stale once the conflict transforms. 
7.2.3 Counter violent extremism in War on Terror 
The study found that although CVE was devised and adopted following failure by 
the coercive approaches the root causes of the problem, states did not abandon use of 
force. This is despite recognition that use of force is part of the problem. This study 
concludes that coexistence of CVE and use of force weakens the rational and basis of the 
CVE in WoT. The overarching theme in violent extremism is socialization of individuals 
and groups into a radical or extreme worldview. The study found that there are many 
threads of radicalization of which violent extremism is one; an individual may be 
radicalized but not engage in violent extremism. It concludes that the challenge is for CVE 
is to identify the violent extremism nexus between the two divides.  
This study suggests that CVE policies and strategies are not working. It sees the 
problem as being informed by fundamental assumptions upon which these policies and 
strategies are constructed and implemented. Assumptions in this case are the enemy is an 
external one. The enemy is presumed to have capabilities like a state. This has 
complicated policy responses by states to the problem. The CVE strategies designed by 
states are caged generic pull and push factors. They don’t capture realities of environments 
in which they are implemented. They are borrowed blueprints from global WoT 
approaches.  
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There is a problem with availability of information on realities of local CVE 
contexts. Even in contexts where such knowledge exists, the CVE policies and practices 
are not grounded on it. Many CVE approaches lack evidence of success, and this can 
undermine their efforts. Terrorism is characterized by an ever shifting of strategies by the 
enemy and the security operating environment. CVE strategies need to match if not shape 
the terrain these shifts. This research study aims at responding to these empirical gaps.  
7.2.4 CVE strategies in Kenya 
The role of a strategic national security policy is key in anchoring CVE strategies and 
collective effort of instruments of national power towards meaningful goals. Such 
framework needs to be founded on realities that terrain in which conflicts were 
traditionally conceptualized has radically shifted to asymmetric and symbolic. There are 
concerns that the tools provided to combat terrorism are still not working.129 This 
necessitated scholars and policy makers to go back to drawing board and re-examine the 
problem at hand and strategic responses required. A distinction of the strategic threat 
environment for Kenya is important for policy and practice. This study established that 
Kenya faces a dyadic terrorism threat. It is confronted with two and external and internal 
war. Externally, terrorism is a global concern. However, Kenya’s risk is aggravated by its 
affiliation with crusaders and supporters of the global WoT like US and Israel. Its 
intervention in Somalia epitomizes this external dimension threat. 
Internally, Kenyan youths have been radicalized and joined Al-Shabaab. The enemy 
is now from “within”. The internal dimension is most immediate and urgent terrorism 
threat to Kenya. This study concludes that Kenya needs an urgent and strategic response to 
this dimension of terrorism threat. These findings suggest that Kenya’s responses to violent 
extremism are based on operational and tactical issues.  They are reactive response and ad hoc. 
This is further exacerbated by the country’s philosophy of national security. This philosophy is 
predisposed with physical conceptualization of security. The implications are preoccupations with 
use of force to respond to threats to national security.   
Kenya’s military incursion into Somalia on necessity of physical security. Responses 
for concerns of physical security are designed in use of force paradigm. Preoccupation 
with physical security is emphasized by domination of national security organs in 
discourses of formulation and implementation of counter terrorism and CVE. This posture 
excludes perspectives of other players outside security organs. This suggest that CVE in 
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Kenya has not been perceived as a broader policy spectrum. It is dissociated from other 
programs targeting structural inequalities like development, poverty alleviation, 
governance and democratization, education and peace programs.  
This study concludes that CVE strategies in Kenya need to be homegrown. They 
need to capture terrorism as a conflict. This entails assessing its operating environment. 
Such assessment will negate the current outward to inward- looking posture. The study 
challenges the hybridized use of force and CVE to respond to terrorism in Kenya. It argues 
that use of force and CVE have conflicting ends. Mediating the CVE with use of force 
undermines the former. The study concluded that CVE practice in Kenya lacks a 
convincing rationale. The country has not properly appreciated its strategic responses to 
radicalization of local youths. This has cofounded the threat dimensions. Kenya needs to 
provide alternative narrative to discredit the ones offered by Al-Shabaab. Counter 
narratives need to be founded on knowledge of local contexts. Terrorism is a war of ideas 
and can only be fought and won by providing better ideas.  
There are concerns that Kenya has an incentive to tolerate infrequent attacks.130 
That the country was only giving lip service to CVE while angling to benefit from donor 
funded security programs. The study found that CVE initiatives in Kenya are shrouded 
with claims of profiling, discrimination, and resentment in the individuals they were meant 
to help. The analytical thrust of such complexities presents dilemmas to policy making and 
scholars in identifying suitable tools to deal with the problems arising from the 
phenomenon.131 Use of force in both Somalia and Kenya suggests that Kenya has not 
distinguished the two ‘war’ environments. This omission has led to problems like use of 
force on own population that has undermined public support for war against Al-Shabaab. 
The study established that coordination of use of force and CVE, and within the distinct 
elements remains a challenge in Kenya. This constrains responses to the ever-evolving 
threat. Lastly, the study found inconsistencies in application of war powers in Kenya. It 
established that despite framing incursion into Somalia as a war, it was not rightly 
declared.  
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7.3 Implications of the findings  
The findings of this study have implications for policy and practice. As currently 
conceptualized, WoT framework does not provide a strategic perspective for national 
security policies of states. It is pegged on operational and tactical issues. Many states are 
being coerced to align with this framework. There is urgent need for states to go to the 
drawing board and re-examine the basis of their national security policies and attendant 
strategies. Such revisit necessitates a proper appreciation of kind of threat faced from both 
external and internal environments and design appropriate responses. Urgency for search 
of homegrown strategic responses to radicalization in Kenya cannot be overemphasized. 
That search needs to accommodate and aboard diversity of perspectives from non-state 
actors, scholarly, media and the public among others.  
In search for new solutions to Al-Shabaab threats, Kenya must go beyond the 
comfortable platitudes and state-centric mindsets. An alternative strategy like negotiation 
or mediation are necessary to give war against Al-Shabaab a convincing political purpose 
by transforming battlefield successes into peace. The scope and complexity of terrorism 
requires a more complex approach, comprehensive and coherent strategy. Devoid of such 
a strategy, states run risk responding to illusory threats and challenges. This cautions 
against rushing for quick fixes with ‘borrowed generic’ and fixated state-centric responses 
to the problem. It is only after such assessment that strategies can be designed. This imply 
that existing policy responses to this environment are suboptimal.  
CVE strategies are facing challenges or simply not working. They are not 
capturing transitions in terrorism conflict. Timing is a crucial aspect in identifying the 
hurting stalemate and resolving conflicts. CVE strategies need to be agile and transient. 
They must be alive to the realities of the operating environment, flexible and not one-
sided; they must be valid for the stage of transition the conflict is at. It also means that 
CVE strategies must no longer be seen from solely a state-centric perspective. The ripe 
moments approach offers a systemic view to map out multipronged inter-actions of the 
terrorism conflict. It enhances a better appreciation of the dynamics of terrorism conflict 
and eventually grasp the ripe moments. This way it opens up linkages that can be 
exploited by CVE strategies to end the conflict. Counter terrorism and CVE strategies 
need to be anchored on a strategic national security policy. This implies that a strategic 
national security policy for Kenya is overdue. Responding to terrorism necessitate a shared 
vision about the kind of threat being faced, and responses required.  
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7.4 Gap for further research and recommendations 
This study made inferences after examining CVE strategies in Kenya. Few studies 
have explored terrorism conflict using conflict management frameworks. There is need for 
more research on the standing of related areas like defense policies/military strategies and 
intelligence policies and strategies among others. Comparison and cross-sectional analysis 
will enhance insights and promote sharing of best practices. This will also reveal critical 
issues and aspects brought about replicate research and different contexts. Despite 
growing interest in CVE research, there is a significant need for more detailed models 
related to address radicalization and problems arising from lone wolf phenomenon. Very 
few studies have investigated this link. This cautions against a one-fit-all approach in 
CVE.   
Radicalization and returnees present new strategic dilemmas to counter terrorism 
efforts. The enemy becomes an integral part of the society rather than being an outsider. 
Future research should thus focus on further developing both, focused models examining 
key relationships as well as critically interrogating violent extremism. Comprehensive 
frameworks on this area will provide guidance to practitioners and policy makers. Few 
authors have investigated the link between application of various frameworks and models 
and their impact on the policies formulated by the state. More insights to refute the 
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Appendix C: Consent form 
TERRORISM AS CONFLICT IN TRANSITION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM STRATEGIES IN KENYA 
I ………………………………………………………………………………, do agree 
to participate in the research project titled “Terrorism as conflict in transition: A 
critical analysis of counter violent extremism strategies in Kenya”, conducted by 
Stephen Gachoki Gichira who has discussed the research project with me. 
I have received, read and kept a copy of the information letter. I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about this research and I have received satisfactory 
answers. I understand the general purposes, risks and methods of this research. 
I consent to participate in the research project. The following has been explained to 
me: 
 The research may not be of direct benefit to me, 
 My participation is completely voluntary, 
 My right to withdraw from the study, any time without any implications to me, 
 Risks including possible inconvenience, discomfort or harm as a consequence 
of my participation in the research project, 
 Steps that have been taken to minimize any possible risks, 
 Public liability insurance arrangements 
 What I am expected and required to do 
 Whom I should contact for any complaints with the research or the conduct of 
the research, 
 I am able to request a copy of the research findings and reports 
 security and confidentiality of my personal information. 







Appendix D: Research instrument 
TERRORISM AS CONFLICT IN TRANSITION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CVE STRATEGIES IN KENYA 
Dear Participant, 
This is an interview guide on a research study on “Terrorism as conflict in transition: 
A critical analysis of CVE strategies in Kenya”. You have been identified to 
participate in this study because of your current exposure on Kenya’s policies and 
strategies on War on Terror. I am confident that your responses will go a long way in 
making this study a success. Your responses will be treated with strict confidentiality. 
You are not required to write your name anywhere in this research.  
Demographic information 
Please answer the questions appropriately by filling the blank spaces provided. 
1. Please indicate your age………………………… 
2. State your gender: ……………………….  
3. Kindly indicate your occupation and organization/department/Agency 
Organization .................................................................. 
Organization/Department/Agency ……………………………………….. 
4. How long have you worked in your organization, department or agency?......... 
5. Please indicate the highest level of your education you 
attained………………… 
  
PART I: Background to terrorism threat in Kenya  
Q.1. When did you first hear about terrorism in Kenya?................................................. 
Q.2. In your view, what do you consider to be the main causes of terrorism threat to 
Kenya? ………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q.3. How and when did this terrorism problem begin in Kenya? 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Q.4. Which terrorist group or groups pose main terror threat to Kenya? Explain 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Q.5. In what ways does these group or groups in Q.4 (above) threaten Kenya’s 
security? 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q.6. What is the outlook of terrorism threat in 
Kenya?.................................................... 
PART II: National security policy making processes in Kenya.  
Q.7. Through what mechanisms, structures and processes are national security 
policies and strategies formulated and implemented?.................................................... 
Q.8. Who is involved in formulation and implementation of policies and strategies on 
terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya? Explain 
........................................................ 
Q.9. Does Kenya have a national counter terrorism/violent extremism policy? 
Expound………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q.10 If yes in Q.9 above, what are the objectives of this 
policy?..................................... 
Q.11. What factors or issues are considered in formulation and implementation of 
polices on terrorism/violent extremism?........................................................................ 
Q.12. What legislations on counter terrorism/violent extremism does Kenya have? 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
PART III: Responses to terrorism in Kenya.  
Q.13. In your view, through what means, or strategies has Kenya responded to 
terrorism (domestic and regional)? Provide 
details……………………………………………….. 
Q.14. What prompted Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia? 
Expound………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q.15 Were there other options other than military incursion? 
Clarify…………………………………………………………………………………... 
Q.16. Through what processes was the decision on Kenya’s military intervention in 
Somalia sanctioned? …………………………………………………………………… 
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Q.17. Was there an exit strategy for KDF in Somalia? If yes, 
expound………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q.18. Comment counter violent extremism strategies in 
Kenya…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q.19. What are your views on the simultaneous use of military and CVE 
approaches?.................................................................................................................... 
Q.20 In your view, has Kenya’s responses to terrorism and violent extremism been 
effective? Clarify……………………………………………………………………… 
Q.21 What are shortcomings of Kenya’s responses to terrorism and violent 
extremism? 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
PART IV: Emerging issues on CVE strategies in Kenya.  
Q.22. In your view, how has terrorists responded to Kenya’s strategies on 
terrorism/violent 
extremism?............................................................................................ 
Q.23. What are the trends and new shifts on radicalization in Kenya? 
………………….. 
Q.24. Does CVE strategies in Kenya capture these new shifts and trends? …………… 
Q.25. Comment rationale of simultaneous use of force and CVE approaches in Kenya. 
Q.26. Comment on coordination in the use of force and 
CVE........................................... 
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